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Abstract: We study markets in which agents first make investments and are then matched
into potentially productive partnerships. Equilibrium investments and the equilibrium
matching will be efficient if agents can simultaneously negotiate investments and matches,
but we focus on markets in which agents must first sink their investments before matching.
Additional equilibria may arise in this sunk-investment setting, even though our matching
market is competitive. These equilibria exhibit inefficiencies that we can interpret as
coordination failures. All allocations satisfying a constrained efficiency property are equilibria,
and the converse holds if preferences satisfy a separability condition. We identify sufficient
conditions (most notably, quasiconcave utilities) for the investments of matched agents to
satisfy an exchange efficiency property as well as sufficient conditions (most notably, a single
crossing property) for agents to be matched positive assortatively, with these conditions then
forming the core of sufficient conditions for the efficiency of equilibrium allocations.
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1

Introduction

There are many markets whose participants make investments before entering. Employers
create firms before hiring employees, scientists develop inventions before taking them to
market, developers construct commercial buildings and homes before finding buyers, people
acquire human capital before embarking on careers, and so on. The agents in these markets
are typically heterogeneous, both in their underlying characteristics and their investments,
and hence the market must solve a matching problem rather than simply setting a marketclearing price. Perhaps the most obvious example is the market for skilled labor, requiring
years of investment on the part of workers and the marshalling of significant physical and
institutional capital on the part of firms, all before it is known who will match with whom.
The outcomes agents receive in the matching market will depend on their investments and
hence will affect their investment incentives. A large literature has considered the question
of how imperfections in the matching market will interact with the noncooperative nature
of investment choices to yield inefficient investments. For example, Acemoglu and Shimer
(1999), Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (2001a), de Meza and Lockwood (2010), and Felli and
Roberts (2012), study the hold-up problems (Grossman and Hart (1986) and Williamson
(1985)) that can arise as a consequence of bargaining power at the matching stage. Bidner
(2010), Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (1995), Hopkins (2012), Hoppe, Moldovanu, and Sela
(2009) and Rege (2008) study the consequences of imperfect information at the matching
stage. Burdett and Coles (2001) and Mailath, Samuelson, and Shaked (2000) study models
in which it is costly to search for a partner after one has invested.
While it is obviously important to understand how imperfections in the matching market
affect incentives for investment, we examine a more basic question—even in the absence
of such imperfections, can we expect investments to be efficient? We accordingly work
throughout this paper with an economy whose matching market is competitive, in the sense
that agents treat as fixed the utilities that must be provided to potential matching partners.
In particular, we study equilibria in economies in which agents first make investments and
then enter the matching market, where they form pairs whose productivity depends on
their underlying characteristics as well as the investments they bring to the market. The
structure of the underlying production process for a matched pair may give rise to imperfectly
transferable utilities (as argued by Legros and Newman (2007b) and as in Iyigun and Walsh
(2007)), and so we allow utility to be imperfectly transferable within a pair. Perfectly
transferable transferable utility is a special case. We identify when such economies will yield
efficient outcomes and characterize the nature and causes of inefficiencies.
We first formulate a benchmark “ex ante” equilibrium concept in which agents can
simultaneously choose investments and matching partners. Markets are complete in this
economy, and forces analogous to those lying behind the familiar welfare theorems lead to
the expected result that an allocation is an ex ante equilibrium if and only if it satisfies an
appropriate (pairwise) efficiency condition. We then formulate an “ex post” equilibrium
concept to capture the case in which investments must be sunk before matches are formed.
We show that ex ante equilibria are also ex post equilibria, implying that efficient ex post
equilibria exist whenever efficient allocations exist. The reasoning here is straightforward—
the ex post setting affords agents fewer opportunities to deviate from a putative equilibrium
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allocation. Agents have no profitable deviations from an ex ante equilibrium allocation, and
so must continue to have no profitable deviations from such an allocation in the ex post
setting. Hence, sunk investments per se do not preclude efficiency in competitive markets.
Alas, not all ex post equilibria are efficient. The difficulty is that markets are incomplete—
agents cannot simultaneously determine both investments and matches. There is no necessary
link between competition and efficiency in the absence of complete markets. Which markets
are available at the matching stage is determined endogenously by the agents’ investment
decisions. This gives rise to a coordination problem, with coordination failures leading to
inefficient ex post equilibria. We formulate a “constrained efficiency” notion reflecting the
more limited opportunities available to agents in the ex post setting, and show that all
constrained efficient allocations are ex post equilibria, and that if the agents’ preferences
satisfy a separability condition, then all ex post equilibria are constrained efficient.
Ex post equilibria can be inefficient for any of three reasons. Matched agents may fail to
coordinate on efficient investments, agents may have inadequate incentives to participate in
the market, and agents may match with the “wrong” partners. We identify (independent)
assumptions on the economy that suffice to eliminate each of these problems. First, we
show that a quasiconcavity assumption on agents’ utility functions suffices to ensure that
the investments of matched agents are efficient. Second, an assumption that the optimal
investments of unmatched agents allow them to be matched productively suffices to rule
out inefficiencies stemming from too little participation in the market. Third, we examine
mismatch in a model featuring unidimensional types and investments and satisfying our
separability assumption. The first step is to show that if the utility frontiers satisfy a single
crossing condition, then agents in an ex ante equilibrium must be positive assortatively
matched. We then use separability and the constrained efficiency of ex post equilibria to
show that the latter can be viewed as ex ante equilibria in an economy with restricted sets of
possible investments, and hence must also be positive assortatively matched. We thus have
conditions under which there can be no mismatch: every ex post equilibrium matches the
agents just as does a pairwise efficient allocation. Finally, combining the assumptions that
rule out each of the three sources of inefficiency gives us sufficient conditions for the Pareto
efficiency of ex post equilibria.
The existing literature has considered the issues analyzed in this paper in a number of
specific contexts. Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (2001b) were among the first to study the
investment incentives generated by a competitive matching market, using an equilibrium
concept akin to our ex post equilibrium. They consider a model with perfectly transferable utility, satisfying our single crossing crossing and separability conditions, obtaining a
counterpart of our constrained efficiency result. They identify cases in which constrained
efficiency in itself eliminates the possibility that agents coordinate on inefficient investments
(which is the only source of inefficiency that may arise in their setting). Dizdar (2012) notes
that the efficiency result of Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (2001b) can fail in the absence
of a counterpart to our quasiconcavity condition and also presents examples showing that
mismatch may arise in the absence of a single crossing property. Iyigun and Walsh (2007)
consider a model in which consumption sharing within a match may give rise to imperfectly
transferable utility, and argue that (their counterpart to) ex post equilibria are efficient. We
explain in Section 2.1.4 how these and other examples fit into our framework. Our analysis
unifies and extends these existing studies of investment in competitive matching markets,
characterizing the nature and causes of inefficiency and identifying conditions under which
equilibrium outcomes will be efficient.
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Peters and Siow (2002) assume that it is impossible to transfer utility ex post. We find it
convenient to initially exclude such nontransferable utility models. Section 5 explains how
our analysis can be extended to the nontransferable case. Most of our results carry over, with
one notable exception. In the absence of transfers, there is no counterpart to our result that
agent with quasiconcave utility functions will necessarily coordinate on efficient investments.
Perfect transferablility is thus not critical to the primary results in the literature, but it is
important that the agents have at least some ability to make ex post utility transfers,

2
2.1
2.1.1

The Model
The Economy
The Technology

There is a set of buyers (he), with names (indexed by i) distributed on a compact subset
N of a Euclidean space, and a set of sellers (she), with names (indexed by j) identically
distributed.1 In many of our examples we take N to be an interval in the real numbers.
When N is infinite, we assume names are distributed according to Lebesgue measure. When
N is finite, we have a model with finite, identical numbers of buyers and seller. We refer to
this as the finite case.
There are two functions β : N → B and σ : N → S which map each buyer i into his
type β(i) ∈ B and each seller j into her type σ(j) ∈ S, where B and S are compact subsets
of a (possibly multidimensional) Euclidean space. Each buyer chooses an investment b ∈ B
and each seller chooses an investment s ∈ S, with B and S again being compact subsets of a
(possibly multidimensional) Euclidean space. Then they match, with each match pairing a
single buyer with a single seller. A matched buyer and seller can make a transfer t ∈ R.
We view our model as applying to a wide variety of matches or partnerships. Depending
on the circumstances, the matches in the model may be interpreted as involving buyers and
sellers, firms and workers, men and women, and so on. We find it convenient to work with a
consistent set of terms throughout, and refer to the agents as buyers and sellers.
When a buyer of type β who chooses investment b matches with a seller of type σ who
chooses investment s and the two agents agree on a transfer t, the resulting utility for the
buyer is denoted by U (b, s, β, σ, t) and the resulting utility for the seller by V (s, b, σ, β, t).2 It
is natural to interpret the transfer t as a monetary payment from the buyer to the seller, but
we might also think of t as describing the allocation of effort in a joint production process, the
allocation of consumption in a marriage, or the division of joint output. While the transfer
can be used to shift utility between the buyer and seller, unless explicitly mentioned, we do
not assume that utility is perfectly transferable, i.e., we do not assume that U and V are
linear in t.
An agent may remain unmatched. A buyer of type β who chooses investment b ∈ B
and remains unmatched receives utility U (b, β). A seller of type σ who chooses investment
s ∈ S and remains unmatched receives utility V (s, σ). We thus model unmatched agents
1 The assumption that the sets of names for buyers and sellers are identical and have the same measure is
a convenient simplification, maintained in most of the related literature. Remark 7 in Section 2.2.3 comments
on the most important implication of allowing unequal measures of buyers and sellers.
2 These utility functions incorporate a practice that we follow whenever possible, of reversing the order of
arguments in pairs of functions that have comparable roles, one from the perspective of the buyer and one
from the perspective of the seller.
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as choosing investments from the same sets B and S as do matched agents. As a result, a
matched buyer (for example) can consider a potentially productive match with an unmatched
seller.
2.1.2

Assumptions

Throughout, we take “increasing” to mean “weakly increasing.”
Assumption 1.
[1.1] The functions U : B × S × B × S × R → R, V : S × B × S × B × R → R,
U : B × B → R, and V : S × S → R are continuous.
[1.2] The function U is strictly decreasing in t and for each (b, s, β, σ) has R as its image.
[1.3] The function V is strictly increasing in t and for each (s, b, σ, β) has R as its image.
In conjunction with our compactness assumptions, Assumption 1.1 ensures that solutions
exist to the maximization problems (appearing in Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2) defining the utility
possibilities available to pairs of matched agents.
The requirement that U and V have R as their range in Assumptions 1.2–1.3 eliminates
some special cases that we would otherwise have to explicitly address.
We say that the utility functions U and V have the strict Pareto property if for any (i) pair
of types (β, σ), (ii) investments and transfer (b, s, t), and (ii) utility levels (u, v) satisfying
U (b, s, β, σ, t) ≥ u,

V (s, b, σ, β, t) ≥ v,

(1)

with at least one strict inequality, there exists t0 such that
U (b, s, β, σ, t0 ) > u,

V (s, b, σ, β, t0 ) > v.

(2)

Assumption 1, in particular the requirement that U and V are continuous and strictly
monotonic in t, implies the strict Pareto property.
The key role of transfers in our arguments is to ensure the strict Pareto property. As long
as this property holds, we could just as well have allowed transfers to be multidimensional,
in the process perhaps better accommodating interpretations that involve the allocation of
effort or consumption.
2.1.3

Allocations

An allocation specifies for each buyer i a triple (J(i), b(i), u(i)) identifying the seller J(i)
(if any) with whom buyer i is matched and otherwise specifying that buyer i is unmatched
(J(i) = ∅), the investment b(i) chosen by buyer i, and the level of utility u(i) received by
buyer i. An allocation also specifies an analogous triple (I(j), s(j), v(j)) for each seller j.
Definition 1. An allocation is a sextuple (J, I, b, s, u, v) of functions
J :N →N ∪∅
I :N →N ∪∅
b:N →B
s:N →S
u:N →R
v:N →R.
4

An allocation (J, I, b, s, u, v) is feasible if
I(J(i)) = i

∀i ∈ N s.t. J(i) 6= ∅,

J(I(j)) = j

∀j ∈ N s.t. I(j) 6= ∅,

I and J are measure−preserving on {i ∈ N : J(i) 6= ∅} and {j ∈ N : I(j) 6= ∅},

(3)
(4)

and, for all (i, j) with J(i) = j ∈ N (or, equivalently given (3), I(j) = i ∈ N ), there exists
t ∈ R such that
u(i) = U (b(i), s(j), β(i), σ(j), t)

(5)

v(j) = V (s(j), b(i), σ(j), β(i), t),

(6)

and, for all i ∈ N with J(i) = ∅ and for all j ∈ N with I(j) = ∅,
u(i) = U (b(i), β(i))

(7)

v(j) = V (s(j), σ(j)),

(8)

and there exist measure-preserving bijections Jˆ : N → N and Iˆ : N → N that are inverses
ˆ = J(i) whenever J(i) 6= ∅ and I(j)
ˆ = I(j) whenever I(j) 6= ∅.
and for which J(i)
Conditions (3)–(4) are the market balance conditions that matches are reciprocal and
that any measurable set of buyers is matched with an equal-measure set of sellers. Conditions
(5)–(6) ensure that the utility levels of matched agents are feasible given the investments and
utility functions. Conditions (7)–(8) ensure that the utilities of unmatched agents are feasible.
The final requirement, that there exist measure-preserving bijections Jˆ and Iˆ coinciding with
J and I for matched agents, is a technical condition excluding counterintuitive constructions
that arise out of the quirks of the continuum.3 Intuitively, this final condition requires that
a buyer can be unmatched only if some seller is also unmatched. We could interpret this by
thinking of a first stage described by Jˆ and Iˆ in which the buyers and sellers are completely
sorted into potential pairs, with some such pairs then electing to remain unmatched while
the remaining matches are described by J and I. In the finite case, this requirement and
condition (4) are satisfied by any pair of functions J and I satisfying (3). We return to the
role played by Jˆ and Iˆ in Remark 3 of Section 2.1.5.
Given a feasible allocation (J, I, b, s, u, v) we let M ⊂ N × N identify the collection of
matched pairs, so that (i, j) ∈ M whenever j = J(i) or (equivalently) i = I(j) holds. For
every matched pair (i, j), we can identify from (5)–(6) the transfer t made by this pair. We
refer to the corresponding (b, s, t) as the exchange made by the pair (i, j). An alternative
formulation would be to express an allocation in terms of the matching and exchanges, which
would in turn imply utilities.
Let u(i) = maxb∈B U (b, β(i)) and v(j) = maxs∈S V (s, σ(j)) denote the outside options
of buyers i and sellers j. Assumption 1.1 ensures that outside options are well defined. We
refer to any b ∈ B satisfying u(i) = U (b, β(i)) as an autarchy investment of buyer i and to
any s ∈ S satisfying v(j) = V (s, σ(j)) as an autarchy investment of seller j.
3 For example, the requirement that Jˆ and Iˆ are bijections excludes the possibility that N = [0, 1] and the
matching is described by the identity function except for agents {1, 1/2, 1/3, 1/4, . . .}, with buyer 1 being
matched with seller 1/2, buyer 1/2 with seller 1/3, and so on. This arrangement leaves every agent matched
except seller 1.
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A feasible allocation (J, I, b, s, u, v) is individually rational if it satisfies the individual
rationality conditions
u(i) ≥ u(i) for all i ∈ N and v(j) ≥ v(j) for all j ∈ N.

(9)

Throughout the following we will focus on individually rational allocations, reflecting the
idea that all agents are free to remain unmatched and choose an autarchy investment. The
feasible allocation that results if all agents choose to exercise this option and then receive
their outside options is the autarchy allocation.
A feasible allocation is fully matched if J (and hence also I) maps onto N . In this case,
Jˆ and J coincide, as do Iˆ and I. Feasible allocations (J, I, b, s, u, v) and (J 0 , I 0 , b0 , s0 , u0 , v 0 )
are payoff equivalent if u0 (i) = u(i) and v 0 (j) = v(j) hold for all i, j ∈ N .
2.1.4

Special Cases

A special case of our model that has played a prominent role in the literature is that in which
utilities depend linearly on transfers, that is, there exist functions Ũ : B × S × B × S → R
and Ṽ : S × B × S × B → R such that for all (b, s, β, σ, t), we have
U (b, s, β, σ, t) = Ũ (b, s, β, σ) − t
V (s, b, σ, β, t) = Ṽ (s, b, σ, β) + t.
We say that utility is perfectly transferable in this case. The requirement in Assumptions
1.2-1.3 that U and V have all of R as their range is automatic when utility is perfectly
transferable.
When utility is perfectly transferable, we can represent the sum of the agents’ utilities by
a value function Z : B × S × B × S → R with
Ũ (b, s, β, σ) + Ṽ (s, b, σ, β) = Z(b, s, β, σ).
If buyer i and seller j match and choose investments (b, s), then there exists a transfer such
that (5)–(6) hold if and only if u(i) + v(j) = Z(b, s, β(i), σ(j)). The important information
about preferences is contained in the value function Z(b, s, β, σ), in the following sense. Fix
a quadruple of utility functions (Ũ , Ṽ , U , V ) and hence the attendant value function Z. Any
other quadruple (Ũ 0 , Ṽ 0 , U , V ) of utility functions giving rise to the same function Z also
gives rise to the same sets of (ex ante and ex post, defined below) equilibria.
At the other extreme from perfectly transferable utility is a model in which t does not enter
the utility functions U and V as an argument, so that there are effectively no transfers, as in
Peters and Siow (2002). The utilities in a match between types (β, σ) are then completely
determined by their investments (b, s). Assumptions 1.2–1.3 exclude such this case. It keeps
the exposition uncluttered to postpone the consideration of such nontransferable utility
models to Section 5. We refer to the case in which Assumption 1 holds, but utility is not
perfectly transferable, as the case of imperfectly transferable utility.
The literature has overwhelmingly focussed on models with separable preferences. Intuitively, preferences are separable if agents’ payoffs depend on the investments their partners
have chosen, but not on the types of the partners choosing those investments. A marriage
market may be separable because a man (for example) may care about the wealth with which
his spouse has been endowed by her parents, but not the cost at which her parents amassed
such wealth. A labor market may be nonseparable because firms are willing to hire software
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engineers who have invested relatively little in learning the relevant programming languages,
but who nonetheless have great natural talent for programming.
We offer the general definition of separability in Section 3.2.2, noting here that a sufficient
condition for separability is that preferences are additively separable, meaning that there are
functions fˆ, ĝ, f , g, f and g such that
U (b, s, β, σ, t)

=

fˆ(b, s, t) − f(b, β)

(10)

V (s, b, σ, β, t)

=

ĝ(s, b, t) − g(s, σ)

(11)

U (b, s)

=

f (b) − f(b, β)

(12)

V (s, σ)

=

g(s) − g(s, σ).

(13)

We can interpret fˆ, ĝ, f , and g as return functions and f and g as cost-of-investment functions,
so that the payoffs of agents are additively separable in returns and costs. In our examples
considering additively separable preferences we typically assume that the unmatched return
functions f (b) and g(s) appearing in (12)–(13) are identically equal to zero.4
If utility is perfectly transferable, then there exist functions f˜ and g̃ such that (10)–(11)
can be written as
U (b, s, β, σ, t)

=

f˜(b, s) − f(b, β) − t

(14)

V (s, b, σ, β, t)

=

g̃(s, b) − g(s, σ) + t.

(15)

Indeed, Section 3.2.2 confirms that in the case of transferable utility a representation
satisfying (14)–(15) and (12)–(13) is necessary and sufficient for separable (rather than
additively separable) preferences. When utility is perfectly transferable and preferences are
separable, we can define the surplus function z(b, s) = f˜(b, s) + g̃(b, s) and write the value
function as
Z(b, s, β, σ) = z(b, s) − f(b, β) − g(s, σ).
(16)
Referring to z as the surplus function is particularly apt when we invoke the normalization
f (b) = g(s) = 0 for all b and s. Then z(b, s) identifies the surplus created by entering a match
with investments (b, s), relative to choosing the same investments but remaining unmatched.
Three further ways that we might specialize the model have played prominent roles in
the literature and reappear in parts of our analysis.
First, it is common to restrict names, types and investments to be unidimensional, i.e.,
to restrict the sets N of names, B and S of types, and B and S of investments to be subsets
of R.
Second, much of the matching literature has followed the lead of Becker (1973) in
focusing on conditions under which equilibrium matchings will be positive assortative, i.e.,
higher buyers are matched with higher sellers. When names are unidimensional, we say
that an allocation is positive assortative (or satisfies positive assortative matching) if J (or,
equivalently I) is the identity map. Building on insights from Legros and Newman (2007b),
Section 4.3 identifies an appropriate single crossing property that ensures positive assortative
matching in ex post equilibria. When utility is perfectly transferable, the assumption that the
function Z(b, s, β, σ) is supermodular plays an important role in ensuring this single crossing
4 Doing so is without loss of generality as we may redefine the cost functions f(b, β) and g(s, σ) to coincide
with U (b, s) and V (s, σ) and then redefine the return functions for matched agents by deducting f (b) from
fˆ(b, s, t) and g(s) from ĝ(b, s, t) to obtain an equivalent model.
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property. If we also have separability, then (because the sum of supermodular functions is
supermodular) the value function Z will be supermodular if the functions z, −f, and −g
appearing in (16) are supermodular.
Third, we have taken the sets of buyers and sellers to be identical and to have equal
measure, ensuring the existence of fully matched allocations. Much of the attention in the
literature has focussed on fully matched allocations, and we will also do so when convenient.
We note that, by the definition given above, positive assortative allocations are fully matched.
Remark 7 in Section 2.2.3 comments on the most important implication of allowing unequal
measures of buyers and sellers. Section 4.2 gives conditions under which all equilibria are
(payoff equivalent to) fully matched allocations.
We can now indicate how several existing models fit into our framework:
1. Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (2001b) work with unidimensional types and investments,
perfectly transferable utility, additively separable preferences, a supermodular value
function Z(b, s, β, σ) whose form is given by (16), and fully matched equilibria. Very
similar assumptions on preferences are maintained in Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite
(2001a) and Felli and Roberts (2012), who study the finite case (without assuming
matching to be competitive).
Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (2001b) introduce the concepts of ex ante contracting
and ex post contracting equilibria, differing in technical details but analogous to our
ex ante and ex post equilibria (Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 below). They show that in
their setting, ex ante contracting equilibria exist, that ex ante contracting equilibria are
efficient and are also ex post contracting equilibria, and that inefficient “coordination
failure” ex post contracting equilibria also exist. They obtain a counterpart of to our
constrained efficiency result and identify cases in which constrained efficiency in itself
eliminates the possibility that agents coordinate on inefficient investments
2. Peters and Siow (2002) work with unidimensional types and investments, nontransferable utility, preferences that are separable and satisfy a single crossing condition,
and fully matched equilibria. They introduce the notion of a rational expectations
equilibrium and show that such equilibria are efficient. We discuss this result in Section
5.
3. Dizdar (2012) works with multidimensional types and investments, while otherwise
maintaining the framework from Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (2001b). Dizdar (2012)
notes that the efficiency result of Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (2001b) can fail in
the absence of a counterpart to our quasiconcavity condition and offers a sufficient
condition for matched agents to avoid coordination failures in investments, which we
discuss in Section 4.1. He shows that when investments and types are multidimensional,
there exist ex post equilibria featuring a different matching than the one obtained in
ex ante equilibrium, an impossibility in Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (2001b). We
discuss this result in Appendix G.3.
4. Acemoglu (1996) works with unidimensional types and investments, perfectly transferable utility, additively separable preferences and a supermodular value function.
Buyers, corresponding to firms in his model, are ex ante identical, which in our setting
corresponds to the assumption that the function β is constant. Acemoglu (1996) defines
the concept of a Walrasian equilibrium and shows that there is a unique Walrasian
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equilibrium in his model. His Walrasian equilibrium is the counterpart of a collection
of prices supporting a fully matched ex ante equilibrium (cf. Section 3.1.5 below), and
is efficient. Acemoglu (1996, footnote 7) mentions the issue which is at the center
of our paper, namely the incompleteness of markets when investments are chosen
before markets operate, but his analysis concentrates on the implications of search and
bargaining frictions that do not arise in our analysis (or the other papers cited here).
5. Iyigun and Walsh (2007) work with unidimensional types and investments, and fully
matched equilibria. Utility functions in their model can be written as
U (b, s, β, σ, t) = u1 (β − b) + u2 (f (b, s) + k − t)
V (s, b, σ, β, t) = v1 (σ − s) + v2 (g(s, b) + k + t)
U (b, β) = u1 (β − b) + u2 (f (b, 0))
V (s, σ) = v2 (σ − s) + v2 (g(s, 0)) ,
where k ≥ 0 is a constant. The interpretation is that agents’ types correspond to
their initial wealth, which they split between consumption in the first period and an
investment into a technology. This technology produces second period consumption
f (b, 0) for an unmatched buyer and g(s, 0) for an unmatched seller (with our buyers
and sellers corresponding to men and women in Iyigun and Walsh (2007)). If a buyer
and a seller match, the technology yields the amount f (b, s) + g(s, b) + 2k of the second
period consumption good, which the matched agents can share in any way they want.5
Preferences in this model are additively separable with f(b, β) = −u1 (β − b), fˆ(b, s, t) =
u2 (f (b, s) + k − t), and f (b) = u2 (f (b, 0)) for the buyers and an analogous specification
for the sellers. If the functions u2 and v2 were linear, this would be a model with
perfectly transferable utility, but instead the functions u1 , u2 , v1 , v2 are all assumed to
be strictly concave, resulting in a model with imperfectly transferable utility. Section 4
discusses conditions under which equilibria in such a model feature positive assortative
matching and are efficient, extending corresponding results in Iyigun and Walsh (2007).
6. Han (2002) works with unidimensional types and investments and perfectly transferable
utility, but with preferences that are not separable, developing conditions under which
matching must be positive assortative. We return to this model after giving a precise
definition of separability in Section 3.2.2.
2.1.5

Modeling Competitive Matching

Here we offer some remarks on the modeling choices we have made and relate them to
alternatives that have been pursued in the literature.
Remark 1. We have followed the practice, common since Aumann (1964) when studying
continuum economies, of starting with a measure space of agents whose names have no direct
economic implications, and then relying on functions such as β and σ to assign the relevant
economic characteristics to agents. Doing so simplifies many of our definitions and allows us
5 The model in Iyigun and Walsh (2007) does not satisfy our Assumption 1 because they assume that first
and second period consumption must be positive for all agents, implying that investments are restricted to
b ∈ [0, β] and s ∈ [0, σ] and, similarly, that transfers are restricted to the interval [−g(s, b), f (b, s)]. We could
write a more general (though more tedious) version of Assumption 1 that would accommodate this setting.
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to avoid making assumptions on the functions β and σ, assigning types to agents, throughout
much of our analysis.
Remark 2. Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (2001b), Mailath, Postlewaite, and Samuelson
(2013a,b), and Peters and Siow (2002) describe their market as matching buyer investments
with seller investments, rather than matching buyers with sellers. Our counterpart of this,
given that we do not assume preferences are separable, would be to describe the market as
matching pairs (b, β) with pairs (s, σ).
The difficulty in working with such a formulation is that with an infinite number of agents
we cannot be sure that the sets of investments chosen by buyers and sellers are well behaved,
raising questions as to how one should define an equilibrium. Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite
(2001b) solve this problem by focusing attention on strictly increasing equilibrium investment
functions b and s and defining the payoffs from agents’ matches in terms of the limits of
payoffs obtained from converging sequences of nearby matches. Mailath, Postlewaite, and
Samuelson (2013a,b) again place conditions on equilibrium functions b and s, and define the
matching function on the closure of the set of investments chosen by the agents. Peters and
Siow (2002) require their matching function to hold only almost everywhere.
Remark 3. We have formulated our feasibility condition as a collection of pointwise requirements—feasibility places restrictions on the match of every agent and on the utility of every
agent—rather than defining feasibility in terms of conditions that are required to hold only for
almost all agents. These two approaches to feasibility coincide when the number of agents is
finite, and we view it appropriate to use whichever most conveniently addresses the questions
of interest. Our formulation allows us to avoid a host of measure-theoretic technicalities. In
particular, having excluded some perverse cases (cf. footnote 3) by building Jˆ and Iˆ into the
definition of a feasible allocation, we find that our formulation significantly simplifies many
of the arguments. In particular, we use the existence of Jˆ and Iˆ in establishing sufficient for
the Pareto efficiency of ex post equilibria in Proposition 8.
Remark 4. An alternative approach to defining a feasible allocation is to dispense with
the functions I and J, specifying who is matched with whom, and instead to characterize
the matching in terms of a measure on the product space of buyers and sellers. Dizdar
(2012) follows this approach and Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (2001b, Appendix B) also
consider this possibility. When utility is perfectly transferable this approach makes powerful
techniques from the optimal transport literature available, but it is less obviously useful in
when utility is imperfectly transferable. Section 6.1 provides further discussion.

2.2

Equilibrium

In this section we define two equilibrium notions, ex ante equilibrium and ex post equilibrium.
The technology is the same in either case, requiring that investments be chosen before matches
become productive. The ex ante equilibrium concept is appropriate for situations in which
bilateral contracts, specifying matching partners and utilities, can be determined before
investment decisions are made, while the ex post equilibrium concept is appropriate when
investments must be made before matches are determined. We are primarily interested in
the latter, with the simpler concept of an ex ante equilibrium serving as a useful benchmark.
We view both equilibria as being the functional equivalent of a competitive equilibrium,
with complete markets in the case of ex ante equilibria and incomplete markets in the case of
ex post equilibria. The standard notion of a competitive equilibrium combines three features:
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(i) prices, identifying the terms under which agents can trade the goods in the economy,
with each agent viewing these prices as exogenously fixed, (ii) optimization, in the form
of a requirement that each agent maximize utility, given the constraints imposed by the
prices and (iii) market clearing, requiring that the excess demands emerging from the various
agents’ optimization problems balance, thus ensuring feasibility.
The counterpart of prices in the equilibrium definitions we give below is a pair of utility
schedules u and v, with u(i) identifying the “utility price” at which a seller can match
with buyer type i and v(j) identifying the utility price at which a buyer can match with
seller type j. The optimization requirement is that each buyer chooses a utility maximizing
exchange and partner, given the utility possibilities presented by the schedule v (with sellers
behaving similarly). Market-clearing is captured by the requirement that agents’ choices
yield a feasible allocation.
The key difference between ex ante equilibrium and ex post equilibrium is that in ex
post equilibrium agents not only take the utility, but also the investments, of their potential
partners as given when choosing a utility maximizing exchange and partner. The latter
constraint is not present in ex ante equilibrium.
As we explain in Section 3.1.5, we could also think of agents facing a price schedule (rather
than utility schedules), specifying what transfer t a particular buyer, who chooses investment
b, must make to obtain a match with a particular seller making investment s (and vice versa).
However, it clarifies the arguments, including the extension to the nontransferable-utility
case, to express the equilibrium conditions in terms of utilities.
2.2.1

Ex Ante Equilibrium

To define ex ante equilibrium, we find it convenient to formalize the maximization problem
faced by the agents in two stages. We describe agents as first determining their optimal
exchange conditional on matching with a particular partner and providing that partner with
a particular utility level, and then, given the schedule of induced utilities from matching
with various partners, deciding on the optimal partner (or choosing to stay unmatched).
To make this precise, let
φ(i, j, v)

=

max

U (b, s, β(i), σ(j), t) s.t. V (s, b, σ(j), β(i), t) ≥ v

(17)

V (s, b, σ(j), β(i), t) s.t. U (b, s, β(i), σ(j), t) ≥ u.

(18)

(b,s,t)∈B×S×R

ψ(j, i, u)

=

max
(s,b,t)∈S×B×R

Hence, φ : N × N × R → R identifies the maximum utility a buyer of type i can achieve
when matched with a seller of type j to whom he must provide utility v. The function
ψ : N × N × R → R has an analogous interpretation. Assumption 1 ensures that these
functions are well-defined and have the properties asserted in the following lemma. The
straightforward proof is in Appendix A.
Lemma 1. Let Assumption 1 hold. Then for every (i, j) ∈ N 2 ,
[1.1] φ is strictly decreasing in v and ψ is strictly decreasing in u,
[1.2] φ and ψ are inverse: u = φ(i, j, ψ(j, i, u)) for all u ∈ R and v = ψ(j, i, φ(i, j, v)) for
all v ∈ R, and
[1.3] φ is continuous in v and ψ is continuous in u.
The interpretation of Lemma 1.2 is that for a given pair of types (i, j) the functions φ and
ψ provide two equivalent ways of describing the Pareto frontier of the set of utilities available
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to this pair when forming a match. The Pareto frontier is strictly decreasing (Lemma 1.1)
and continuous (Lemma 1.3).
To conserve on notation, if the allocation (J, I, b, s, u, v) is such that supj∈N φ(i, j, v(j)) ≤
u(i), we say that ∅ maximizes φ(i, j, v(j)) over the set N ∪{∅} and that maxj∈N ∪{∅} φ(i, j, v(i))
= u(i). We adopt a similar convention for ψ. This gives us a convenient way of describing
the maximization problem in which buyer i maximizes his utility by either choosing a seller
with whom to match or choosing to remain unmatched.
Definition 2. An ex ante equilibrium is a feasible allocation (J, I, b, s, u, v) satisfying, for
all i ∈ N and j ∈ N ,
J(i) ∈ argmax φ(i, j, v(j)) and u(i) =

max φ(i, j, v(j))

(19)

I(j) ∈ argmax ψ(j, i, u(i)) and v(j) = max ψ(j, i, u(i)).

(20)

j∈N ∪{∅}

j∈N ∪{∅}
i∈N ∪{∅}

i∈N ∪{∅}

Notice that one of the requirements for equilibrium is that the maxima in (19)–(20) exist.
The (utility)-price-taking feature of competitive equilibrium appears in the incentive
constraints (19)–(20), where each buyer i (for example) views the function v as a constraint
requiring that the match (i, j) can form only if seller j receives at least utility v(j) from
the match. Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (2001b), Mailath, Postlewaite, and Samuelson
(2013a,b), and Peters and Siow (2002) build analogous competition assumptions into their
models.
The incentive conditions (19)–(20) incorporate the individual rationality conditions (9).
A fully matched allocation is an ex ante equilibrium if and only if the individual rationality
conditions hold and, for all i ∈ N and j ∈ N ,
J(i) ∈ argmax φ(i, j, v(j)) and u(i) = max φ(i, j, v(j))
j∈N

j∈N

I(j) ∈ argmax ψ(j, i, u(i)) and v(j) = max ψ(j, i, u(i)).
i∈N

i∈N

(21)
(22)

The investment functions b and s (and the associated transfers) enter the equilibrium
conditions through (19)–(20) and the requirement that the allocation be feasible. In particular,
(19)–(20) imply that an ex ante equilibrium (J, I, b, s, u, v) satisfies
u(i) = φ(i, j, v(j))

and

v(j) = ψ(j, i, u(i)) ∀(i, j) ∈ M,

(23)

so that for every matched pair (i, j), there exists a transfer t such that the equilibrium
utilities u(i) = U (b(i), s(j), β(i), σ(j), t) and v(j) = V (s(j), b(i), σ(j), β(i), t) lie on the
utility frontier defined in (17)–(18). We say that an allocation satisfying (23) is exchange
efficient and note that exchange efficiency is a necessary condition for a feasible allocation to
be an ex ante equilibrium.
More generally, we find it useful to say that (b, s, t) is exchange efficient for the pair (i, j)
if the exchange (b, s, t) solves both of the maximization problems appearing in (17)–(18)
given the utility levels induced by (b, s, t), that is,
U (b, s, β(i), σ(j), t) = φ(i, j, V (s, b, σ(j), β(i), t))

(24)

V (s, b, σ(j), β(i), t) = ψ(j, i, U (b, s, β(i), σ(j), t)).

(25)
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By Lemma 1.2 the functions φ and ψ are inverses, so that an exchange (b, s, t) is efficient
for the pair (i, j) if and only if one of the two conditions appearing in (24)–(25) holds.
Consequently, one of these two conditions is redundant. A corresponding observation applies
to the two conditions for the exchange efficiency of an allocation given in (23), and also
applies to the incentive constraints (21)–(22) for a fully matched equilibrium. We will exploit
these equivalences in our proofs. Such equivalence relations do not hold in the nontransferable
utility case (Section 5) and for the corresponding conditions for ex post equilibria (Section
2.2.2), making it helpful later on to have stated the above pairs of conditions (rather than
only one of each pair) here.
When utility is perfectly transferable, the two conditions (24)–(25) for an exchange (b, s, t)
to be exchange efficient for a pair (i, j) reduces to the requirement that the pair of investments
(b, s) maximize the value available to these two agents, or
(b, s) ∈ argmax Z(b0 , s0 , β(i), σ(j)).

(26)

b0 ∈B,s0 ∈S

2.2.2

Ex Post Equilibrium

When markets open after investments have been chosen—so that the ex post equilibrium
notion is applicable—buyer i (for example) faces sellers who are characterized not only by a
schedule v of utility levels, but also by a schedule s of investments. The equilibrium incentive
constraint for buyer i is that i’s equilibrium payoff be at least the payoff i could obtain by
matching with any seller j, given any exchange (b, s(j), t) that gives seller j at least her
equilibrium utility. Unlike the case with an ex ante equilibrium, it is irrelevant whether
player i could better his equilibrium payoff by matching with seller j with an exchange (b, s, t)
that preserves player j’s equilibrium payoff but for which s 6= s(j). As a first step to defining
ex post equilibrium, we thus let
φ̆(i, j, s, v)

=

max

U (b, s, β(i), σ(j), t) s.t. V (s, b, σ(j), β(i), t) ≥ v

(b,t)∈B×R

ψ̆(j, i, b, u)

=

max

V (s, b, σ(j), β(i), t) s.t. U (b, s, β(i), σ(j), t) ≥ u.

(s,t)∈S×R

Let (J, I, b, s, u, v) be a feasible allocation. Analogously to our convention for ex ante
equilibrium, if supj∈N φ̆(i, j, s(j), v(j)) ≤ u(i), we say that ∅ maximizes φ̆(i, j, s(j), v(j))
and that the maximum in that case is u(i), with a similar convention for sellers.
Definition 3. An ex post equilibrium is a feasible allocation (J, I, b, s, u, v) satisfying, for
all i ∈ N and j ∈ N ,
J(i) ∈ argmax φ̆(i, j, s(j), v(j)) and u(i) =

max φ̆(i, j, s(j), v(j))

(27)

I(j) ∈ argmax ψ̆(j, i, b(i), u(i)) and v(j) = max ψ̆(j, i, b(i), u(i)).

(28)

j∈N ∪{∅}

j∈N ∪{∅}

i∈N ∪{∅}

i∈N ∪{∅}

Again, one of the requirements for equilibrium is that the maxima in (27)–(28) exist.
The incentive conditions (27)–(28) imply the individual rationality conditions, which
are again given by (9). As we have noted, every ex ante equilibrium satisfies the exchange
efficiency condition (23). Conditions (27)–(28) imply less, namely that every matched pair
(i, j) ∈ M satisfies
u(i) = φ̆(i, j, s(j), v(j))

and
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v(j) = ψ̆(j, i, b(i), u(i)).

(29)

We refer to a feasible allocation (J, I, b, s, u, v) satisfying (29) for all matched pairs as being
conditionally exchange efficient. An exchange (b, s, t) is conditionally exchange efficient for a
pair of agents (i, j) ∈ M if it satisfies
U (b, s, β(i), σ(j), t) = φ̆(i, j, s, V (s, b, σ(j), β(i), t))

(30)

V (s, b, σ(j), β(i), t) = ψ̆(j, i, b, U (b, s, β(i), σ(j), t)).

(31)

Condition (30) indicates that conditional on a match between i and j, there is no possibility
of increasing the buyer’s utility without changing either the seller’s investment or reducing
her utility level. The interpretation of (31) is analogous.
In contrast to the equalities defining (unconditional) exchange efficiency, it is not the case
that one of the conditions appearing in (29) is redundant. The utility possibilities created
by buyer i contemplating a match with seller j are different from those created by seller j
contemplating a match with buyer i, as it is j’s investment s(j) that is held constant in the
former instance and i’s investment b(i) that is held constant in the latter. Hence, given a
pair of agents (i, j) with exchange (b, s, t), it may be impossible for the buyer to choose an
alternative investment b0 (with the seller’s investment remaining s) that (together with a
suitably chosen transfer) increases the buyer’s utility while meeting the seller’s utility target,
but at the same time it may be possible to increase the seller’s utility if seller j chooses
investment s0 (and the buyer’s investment remains b) while meeting the buyer’s utility target.
For similar reasons, it is not the case that one of the conditions (30)–(31) is redundant. This
is most evident when utility is perfectly transferable, in which case the conditional exchange
efficiency conditions (30)–(31) reduce to the requirement that both agents choose their own
investment to maximize the value function Z while taking the investment of the other agent
as given, that is, (b, s) satisfies
b ∈ argmax Z(b, s, β(i), σ(j))
s ∈ argmax Z(b, s, β(i), σ(j)),

(32)
(33)

while t is arbitrary. Dizdar (2012) has noted that these conditions can be interpreted as the
requirement that (b, s) is a Nash equilibrium in the full appropriation game in which both i
and j have the value function as the payoff function. When utility is imperfectly transferable,
there is no analogous simplification. In particular, we can no longer evaluate conditional
exchange efficiency of investments (b, s) independently of the transfer t.
Remark 5. Except for the requirement that unmatched agents choose an autarchy investment
and receive their outside options, the specification of the utility functions U and V does not
affect the ex post equilibrium conditions. Similarly, the ex ante equilibrium conditions only
depend on the outside options. It thus suffices to specify the set of autarchy investments and
the outside options for all agents when considering either ex ante or ex post equilibria. In
our examples we typically find it convenient to proceed in this way rather than specifying
the functions U and V , and we typically also assume that autarchy investments are uniquely
determined.
Remark 6. Problems in which agents must invest before trading are notorious for giving
rise to hold-up problems (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Williamson, 1985). Felli and Roberts
(2012) have studied the hold-up problem in a matching model in which agents first invest
and thereafter engage in a bargaining process that prevents agents from capturing the full
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incremental return from a change in their investment. In contrast, the maximization problems
appearing in (30) and (31) indicate that both agents in a partnership capture the incremental
return from a change in their own investment. This precludes the existence of a hold-up
problem in ex post equilibrium. As we see in Section 5.2 this observation does not apply in
the nontransferable utility case, demonstrating that not only the competitive nature of the
ex post equilibrium concept, but also (imperfect) transferability plays an important role in
eliminating hold-up considerations.
2.2.3

Example

This section introduces an example that will serve as a building block in a number of our
subsequent examples. Here we use it to illustrate the ex ante and ex post equilibrium concepts
and to give a preview of Corollary 1, stating that ex ante equilibra are also ex post equilibria,
while illustrating that inefficient ex post equilibria can also exist.
Example 1. Names, types, and investments are unidimensional, with N = [0, 1]; with
B = S = [γ, γ + α], where γ > 0 and α > 0; and with B × S = [0, b] × [0, s], where b and s
are assumed sufficiently large as not to pose constraints for the solutions of the maximization
problems we consider below. Types are specified by β(i) = γ + αi and σ(j) = γ + αj.
Utility is perfectly transferrable and preferences are additively separable with the cost
functions appearing in (10)–(13) given by
f(b, β) =

b5
5β

and g(s, σ) =

s5
.
5σ

(34)

The return functions for unmatched agents satisfy f (b) = g(s) = 0 for all b and s, indicating
that investments have no value outside a match. Autarchy investments are then zero for all
agents, with resulting outside options u(i) = v(j) = 0, for all i, j ∈ N . The return functions
for matched agents are given by fˆ(b, s, t) = bs − t and ĝ(s, b, t) = t − k, where k > 0. The
corresponding surplus and value functions are
z(b, s) = bs − k

and Z(b, s, β, σ) = bs −

b5
s5
−
− k.
5β
5σ

(35)

As the surplus function z is supermodular and the cost functions f and g are submodular,
the value function Z is supermodular.
We might interpret bs as the value of a product that is purchased by the buyer, with the
buyer and seller each bearing the costs of their value-enhancing investment, given by f(b, β)
and g(s, σ). The buyer purchases the product by making a transfer t to the seller, who bears
the additional cost k whenever trade occurs. With k = 0, this model is a special case of the
model examined by Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (2001b, p. 338), featuring functional
forms that serve as a key example in their paper.
The assumption k > 0 implies that the autarchy allocation is an ex post equilibrium:
From (35), the highest payoff an agent can obtain from matching with an agent on the other
side of the market who refrains from investing and must be provided with his or her outside
option is −k, so that choosing autarchy is optimal. On the other hand, even though the
investments (b, s) = (0, 0) satisfy the conditional exchange efficiency conditions (32)–(33)
for every pair (i, j), there can be no ex post equilibrium in which the agents in a matched
pair choose these investments, because any such allocation violates the individual rationality
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constraints. The only other solution of (32)–(33) for the pair (i, j) coincides with the solution
to the exchange efficiency condition (26) and is given by
4

1

1

4

b = (β(i)) 15 (σ(j)) 15 and s = (β(i)) 15 (σ(j)) 15 .

(36)

If the pair of agents (i, j) is matched in an (ax ante or ex post) equilibrium it must choose
these investments. In particular, every ex post equilibrium is exchange efficient.6
Let us consider fully matched allocations. The submodularity of the cost functions f and
g implies that higher types of agents will choose larger equilibrium investments, while the
supermodularity of the surplus function z ensures that higher investments will be matched
with higher investments. This allows us to conclude that any fully matched (ex ante or ex
post) equilibrium will be positive assortative, that is, each buyer i is matched with seller j = i.
(See Remark 9 and Corollary 5 in Section 4.3 for a formal development of this point.) From
(36) we thus obtain that investments in any fully matched (ex ante or ex post) equilibrium
are given by
1
1
b(i) = (β(i)) 3 and s(j) = (σ(j)) 3 .
(37)
Let (J, I, b, s, u, v) be a positive assortative and exchange efficient allocation. Such an
allocation will be an ex ante equilibrium if and only if it satisfies the individual rationality
conditions (9), which here reduce to u(i) ≥ 0 and v(j) ≥ 0, and the incentive conditions
(21) - (22). As the two incentive conditions are equivalent, we can focus on (21). Because
J(i) = i, this can be rewritten as
u(i) = φ(i, i, v(i)) = max φ(i, j, v(j)).

(38)

0≤j≤1

Using (36) we can determine
φ(i, j, v) =

1
1
3
(β(i)) 3 (σ(j)) 3 − k − v
5

and then use familiar incentive compatibility arguments to solve (38) for
2
3
(β(i)) 3 − k/2 − θ
10
2
3
v(j) =
(σ(j)) 3 − k/2 + θ,
10

u(i) =

(39)
(40)

where θ is a constant. Because these utility schedules are strictly increasing in names, the
individual rationality condition is satisfied if and only if u(0) ≥ 0 and v(0) ≥ 0 holds.
Recalling that we have defined β(0) = σ(0) = γ individual rationality thus requires:
3 2
γ 3 + 2θ ≥ k
5

and

3 2
γ 3 − 2θ ≥ k.
5

(41)
2

In particular, a fully matched ex ante equilibrium exists if and only 35 γ 3 ≥ k holds. If this
inequality holds strictly, all ex ante equilibria are fully matched.7
6 In the case k = 0 studied by Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (2001b, p. 338), there exists a collection of
exchange inefficient ex post equilibria that are payoff equivalent to the autarchic allocation, in which some
agents match but choose zero investments.
7 In the case 3 γ 2
3 = k the fully matched ex ante equilibrium is unique, but there exists one additional
5
ex ante equilibrium. This differs from the fully matched one only in that agents i = j = 0 choose to stay
unmatched.
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When is the allocation (J, I, b, s, u, v) with J(i) = i and investments given by (37) an ex
post equilibrium? Given that the allocation is positive assortative (and thus fully matched),
we can rewrite the incentive conditions for ex post equilibrium in a manner analogous to
(21) - (22) to obtain
u(i) = φ̆(i, i, s(i), v(i)) = max φ̆(i, j, s(j), v(j))

(42)

v(j) = ψ̆(j, j, b(j), u(j)) = max ψ̆(j, i, b(i), u(i)).

(43)

0≤j≤1

0≤i≤1

Solving the maximization problem embedded in the definition of the functions φ̆ and ψ̆ for
the investments given by (37), delivers
5
1
2
4
1
(β(i)) 4 (σ(j)) 12 − (σ(j)) 3 − k − v(j)
5
5
5
2
1
4
1
ψ̆(j, i, b(i), u(i)) = (β(i)) 12 (σ(j)) 4 − (β(i)) 3 − k − u(j).
5
5

φ̆(i, j, s(j), v(j)) =

Using these expressions to solve (42)–(43) shows that these conditions are satisfied if and
only if (39)–(40) hold. We can thus conclude that the set of fully matched ex post equilibria
coincides with the set of fully matched ex ante equilibria. As we have noted above, there
exists an additional, Pareto inefficient, ex post equilibrium, namely the autarchy allocation.
Remark 7. When condition (41) holds as a strict inequality a continuum of fully matched
2
equilibria arises out of the ability to split the value 35 γ 3 − k > 0 between the two bottom
types in any way that respects their individual rationality conditions. This multiplicity arises
from our assumption that there are equal masses of buyers and sellers. If we generalized
the model to allow there to be more sellers than buyers (for example), then the shortage of
buyers would push surplus toward buyers, and there would be a unique ex ante equilibrium
in which θ is determined by the condition v(0) = 0. We are thus dealing with a nongeneric
case, but nothing in our analysis exploits this nongenericity.

3
3.1

Efficiency
Equilibrium and Efficiency

Are equilibria efficient? Section 3.1.2 shows that a feasible allocation is an ex ante equilibrium
if and only if it is satisfies pairwise efficiency, a refinement of Pareto efficiency that we define
in Section 3.1.1. This gives us the counterparts of the standard welfare theorems for ex
ante equilibrium, as one would expect of a competitive economy with complete markets.
Section 3.1.3 shows that a feasible allocation is an ex post equilibrium if and only if it
satisfies pairwise conditional efficiency. As the name suggests, pairwise conditional efficiency
is weaker than pairwise efficiency, with the difference between the two concepts reflecting the
possibility of coordination failures in the choice of investments. Section 3.1.5 shows that the
failure of pairwise efficiency in ex post equilibria can alternatively be interpreted as reflecting
the existence of too few prices.
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3.1.1

Pareto and Pairwise Efficiency

Our point of departure is a notion of Pareto efficiency, requiring that it is not possible to
construct a Pareto improvement by changing the allocation for a finite set of agents.
Definition 4. A feasible allocation (J 0 , I 0 , b0 , s0 , u0 , v 0 ) is a finite Pareto improvement on
the feasible allocation (J, I, b, s, u, v) if both allocations agree except for a finite set of agents
and
u0 (i) ≥
0

v (i) ≥

u(i)

∀i ∈ N

v(j)

∀j ∈ N,

with a strict inequality for at least one i or j. A feasible allocation (J, I, b, s, u, v) is Pareto
efficient if it allows no finite Pareto improvements.
It is immediate from this definition that Pareto efficient allocations are exchange efficient.
If the sets of buyers and sellers are finite, the restriction to allocations that differ only
for finitely many agents has no effect and Pareto efficiency as defined here is the standard
definition. One might consider simply applying the standard definition of Pareto efficiency—
without the finiteness restriction—to cases with infinitely many buyers and sellers, but doing
so can lead to counterintuitive results. Appendix B provides an example. An alternative
approach to Pareto efficiency with infinite sets of agents is to follow Aumann (1964) in
requiring a Pareto superior allocation to make a positive measure of agents better off. Our
restriction to finite improvements plays an analogous role.8
There may exist Pareto efficient, individually rational allocations in which the matching
differs from the matching of any ex ante equilibrium. For example, suppose that half of the
buyers have high types and half have low types, with a similar division for sellers. There
are no investments, utility is perfectly transferable, and outside options are zero. A match
between two low agents produces a zero value, a match between a low and a high agent
produces value 1, and a match between two high agents produces value 4. Then the allocation
in which low buyers are matched with high sellers and high buyers with low sellers, with
the value shared equally within each partnership, is Pareto efficient.9 However, ex ante
equilibrium requires that high buyers match with high sellers.
We examine the following:
Definition 5. A feasible allocation (J, I, b, s, u, v) is pairwise efficient if it is individually
rational and
u(i) ≥ φ(i, j, v(j))

∀(i, j) ∈ N 2

(44)

v(j) ≥ ψ(j, i, u(i))

2

(45)

∀(i, j) ∈ N .

Pairwise efficiency again obviously implies exchange efficiency, and we can view pairwise
efficiency as augmenting the conditions for exchange efficiency (placing restrictions on the
payoffs of matched pairs of agents) with a stability requirement (imposing restrictions on the
8 Our formulation is similar in spirit to notions examined by Kaneko and Wooders, who explore core
concepts for economics with an infinite number of agents based on finite blocking coalitions (e.g., Kaneko
and Wooders (1996)).
9 The Pareto efficiency of this allocation hinges on our assumptions that only transfers within a match
are feasible. If unrestricted transfers were possible, then every Pareto efficient allocation features the same
matching as the ex ante equilibrium.
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payoffs attainable from matching with some other agent) that is familiar from the literature
on matching problems without investments (Gale and Shapley, 1962; Roth and Sotomayor,
1990).
Remark 8. Pairwise efficiency is a refinement of Pareto efficiency (with the discussion
preceding Definition 5 indicating that this refinement is strict).10 To show this, suppose that
the individually rational feasible allocation (J, I, b, s, u, v) is not Pareto efficient. Then there
exists an alternative feasible allocation (J 0 , I 0 , b0 , s0 , u0 , v 0 ) with u0 (i) ≥ u(i) and v 0 (j) ≥ v(j)
for all i and j and (we can assume, with the case of a seller being analogous) a buyer i0 such
that u0 (i0 ) > u(i0 ). Because (J, I, b, s, u, v) is individually rational, buyer i0 is matched in
allocation (J 0 , I 0 , b0 , s0 , u0 , v 0 ). Let j 0 = J 0 (i0 ). Then we have
φ(i0 , j 0 , v(j 0 )) ≥ φ(i0 , j 0 , v 0 (j 0 )) ≥ u0 (i0 ) > u(i0 ),
where the first inequality follows from Lemma 1 and v 0 (j 0 ) ≥ v(y 0 ), and the second inequality
holds because (J 0 , I 0 , b0 , s0 , u0 , v 0 ) is feasible. We thus have φ(i0 , j 0 , v(j 0 )) > u(i0 ), ensuring
that (J, I, b, s, u, v) fails (44) and hence is not pairwise efficient.
3.1.2

Ex Ante Equilibrium and Pairwise Efficiency

The following is straightforward:
Proposition 1. Let Assumption 1 hold. Then a feasible allocation is pairwise efficient if
and only if it is an ex ante equilibrium.
Proof. First, let (J, I, b, s, u, v) be an ex ante equilibrium. Then the second component of
(19) implies (44) and the second component of (20) implies (45). As ex ante equilibrium are
feasible and individually rational, it follows that (J, I, b, s, u, v) is pairwise efficient.
Conversely, let the feasible allocation (J, I, b, s, u, v) be pairwise efficient. Then individual
rationality holds by definition, while conditions (44)–(45) give
u(i) ≥

sup φ(i, j, v(j))
j∈N

v(j) ≥

sup ψ(j, i, u(j)).
i∈N

Conditions (5)–(8) in the definition of feasibility ensure for that each of these inequalities
either (i) the supremum is attained and the condition holds with equality, or (ii) the supremum
is not attained and the agent in question is unmatched. This implies the incentive constraints
(19)–(20), ensuring that (J, I, b, s, u, v) is an ex ante equilibrium.
3.1.3

Ex Post Equilibrium and Pairwise Conditional Efficiency

We will link ex post equilibria to the following efficiency notion.
10 Goldman and Starr (1982) define an allocation in an exchange economy to be pairwise efficient if there
are no two agents who can make themselves (weakly, with at least one strictly) better off by trading goods
with one another, and show that this notion of pairwise efficiency in this context is strictly weaker than
Pareto efficiency. The contrasting results reflect the fact that in an exchange economy, two agents can engage
in bilateral trade without affecting the utility of other agents in the economy, whereas in our case agent i can
match with agent j only if withdrawing from his current match with agent J(i).
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Definition 6. A feasible allocation (J, I, b, s, u, v) is pairwise conditionally efficient if it is
individually rational and
u(i) ≥ φ̆(i, j, s(j), v(j))
v(j) ≥ ψ̆(j, i, b(i), u(i))

∀(i, j) ∈ N 2 ,

(46)

2

∀(i, j) ∈ N .

(47)

The modifier “conditional” captures the idea that each agent’s payoff satisfies an efficiency
criterion given the investments of the agents on the other side of the market. We can view
pairwise conditional efficiency as the coupling of conditional exchange efficiency with a
stability requirement. The (omitted) proof of the following is analogous to the proof of
Proposition 1.
Proposition 2. Let Assumption 1 hold. Then a feasible allocation is pairwise conditionally
efficient if and only if it is an ex post equilibrium.
Upon observing that conditions (44)–(45) in the definition of pairwise efficiency can be
rewritten as
u(i) ≥
v(j) ≥

φ̆(i, j, s, v(j))

∀s ∈ S, (i, j) ∈ N 2 ,

(48)

2

(49)

ψ̆(j, i, b, u(j)) ∀b ∈ B, (i, j) ∈ N ,

it is immediate that pairwise efficiency implies pairwise conditional efficiency. Combining
this observation with Propositions 1 and 2 we obtain:
Corollary 1. Let Assumption 1 hold. Then:
[1.1] Every pairwise efficient allocation is also pairwise conditionally efficient.
[1.2] Every ex ante equilibrium (J, I, b, s, u, v) is also an ex post equilibrium.
Corollary 1 gives us the counterpart of one of the welfare theorems for the relationship
between pairwise efficient allocations and ex post equilibria, namely that pairwise efficient
allocations are ex post equilibria. This ensures that whenever a pairwise efficient allocation
exists, then a pairwise efficient ex post equilibrium also exists. Combining Corollary 1 with
Remark 8, we see that incomplete markets, arising here out of the fact that investments must
be chosen before matches are formed, preclude neither pairwise nor Pareto efficiency.
3.1.4

Ex Post Equilibrium Coordination Failures

Corollary 1 does not preclude the existence of pairwise inefficient equilibria. We may
view such equilibia as arising from coordination failures in the choice of investments: If
pairwise efficiency fails, there is a pair (i, j), perhaps matched to each other or perhaps not,
and an exchange (b, s, t) that would make both i and j better off. However, realizing the
increased payoffs promised by the exchange (b, s, t) requires that both agents choose different
investments.
The interpretation of pairwise inefficiencies as coordination failures can be vividly illustrated by considering the case of one-sided investment. Suppose that S is a singleton and
hence only buyers make investments (the argument similarly applies to the case in which
B is a singleton). Then φ and φ̆ are identical, in the sense that for all (i, j, v), we have
φ(i, j, v) = φ̆(i, j, s, v), where s is the sole element of S. Consequently, (44) and (46) are
equivalent. As (44) is in turn equivalent to (45) it follows that every ex post equilibrium
is an ex ante equilibrium. There is no coordination to be done in this case, and hence no
coordination failures. We thus have the following:
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Corollary 2. Let Assumption 1 hold. If either B or S is a singleton, then every ex post
equilibrium is pairwise efficient.
More generally, because ex post equilibria are individually rational, an ex post equilibrium
can only fail pairwise efficiency if (44)–(45) are violated, which means that there exist agents
i and j and investments b =
6 b(i) and s 6= s(j) that (when accompanied by an appropriate
transfer t) would make both agents strictly better off when matching with each other. With
ex ante contracting, there is no difficulty for the agents to coordinate on such investments,
as either buyer i or seller j can contemplate the exchange (b, s, t). In the case of an ex
post equilibrium, however, neither i nor j can count on the other agent to abandon their
equilibrium investment choice, precluding coordination on the joint deviation.
Example 1, in which the inefficient autarchy allocation is an ex post equilibrium, has
already provided an illustration of the kind of coordination failure in investment choices that
can arise in ex post equilibrium. The following less degenerate example, a slight adaptation
of an example from Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (2001b, p. 339), shows that coordination
failures may lead to both underinvestment and overinvestment, in each case resulting in a
fully matched ex post equilibrium that is Pareto inefficient.
Example 2. We use the specification from Example 1, but let the surplus function be given
by
n
o
√
z(b, s) = max bs − k, 2 bs − k ,
where k > 0. Taking the cost functions in (34) into account, the value function is
n
o b5
√
s5
Z(b, s, β, σ) = max bs − k, 2 bs − k −
−
.
5β
5σ
One interpretation of the above specification is that the agents have two technologies available,
with the surplus given by whichever of these is the most productive. We refer to these as the
high technology, with√surplus function z1 (b, s) = bs − k and the low technology, with surplus
function z2 (b, s) = 2 bs − k.
2
Suppose, first that the agents have only the high technology available and let k < 35 γ 3
As we have seen in Example 1, pairwise efficiency then implies positive assortment and
investments given by
1
1
b1 (i) = (β(i)) 3 ,
s1 (j) = (σ(j)) 3 .
(50)
Payoffs satisfy, for a matched pair i = j,
5

1

u1 (i) + v1 (j) = [β(i)σ(j)] 3 −

5

2
(β(i)) 3
(σ(j)) 3
3
−
− k = (β(i)) 3 − k > 0.
5β(i)
5σ(j)
5

(51)

1

Suppose, second, that only the low technology is available and let k < 85 γ 4 . As the
corresponding value function is again supermodular, we can follow the same steps as in
the analysis of Example 1 to obtain analogous results: pairwise efficiency calls for positive
assortment with investment functions
1

1

b2 (i) = (β(i)) 4 ,

s2 (j) = (σ(j)) 4

(52)

and payoffs satisfying, for a matched pair i = j,
5

1

1

1

u2 (i) + v2 (j) = 2[(β(i)) 4 (σ(j)) 4 ] 2 −

5

1
(β(i)) 4
(σ(j)) 4
8
−
− k = (β(i)) 4 − k > 0. (53)
5β(i)
5σ(j)
5
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Now suppose that both technologies are available, so that the surplus function is given by
2
1
z(b, s) as specified above, and assume k < min{ 35 γ 3 , 58 γ 4 }, implying that pairwise efficient
allocations are fully matched. Appendix C.1 confirms that the surplus function z is again
supermodular, ensuring the supermodularity of the value function Z and, thus, that pairwise
efficient allocations are positive assortative (cf. Remark 9 in Section 4.3.2). Let γ = 9 and
α = 3, so that
β(i)

=

9 + 3i,

β(0) = 9,

β(1) = 12

σ(j)

=

9 + 3i,

σ(0) = 9,

σ(1) = 12 .

We begin by constructing a pairwise efficient ex post equilibrium. Let β ∗ ≈ 10.53 be the
value of β solving
8 1
3 2
β3 = β4.
5
5
Any matched pair with types β = σ < β ∗ can earn higher payoffs with the low technology than
with the high technology. Any matched pair with types β = σ > β ∗ can earn higher payoffs
with the high technology than with the low technology. In a pairwise efficient allocation any
pair of matched agents (i, j) for whom β(i) = σ(j) < β ∗ thus uses the low technology (with
investments given by (52)) and any pair of matched agents (i, j) for whom β(i) = σ(j) > β ∗
uses the high technology (with investments given by (50)). Assuming that the resulting value
(as given by (51) for low pairs and (53) for high types) is split equally between the two agents
in each match then gives a pairwise efficient allocation. At β ∗ , investments take a jump
1
1
from (β ∗ ) 4 ≈ 1.80 to (β ∗ ) 3 ≈ 2.19. Figure 1 illustrates the investments. The equilibrium
investments take a jump at β ∗ , but equilibrium utilities do not. Indeed, β ∗ is determined in
order that the jump from one technology to the other causes no jump in utilities. This is a
necessary condition for equilibrium, since otherwise some agents on one side of the a jump in
utilities would prefer altering their actions to move to the other side (cf. Lemma 2 in Section
4.3).
Now we construct two Pareto inefficient ex post equilibria, with the first featuring
underinvestment and the second featuring overinvestment. As in the pairwise efficient
equilibrium constructed above, both of these equilibria are positive assortative and feature
strictly increasing investment functions. Further, we continue to assume that matched pairs
split the value resulting from their investments equally.
In the first of these equilibria, investments duplicate the pairwise efficient investments
in an economy in which only the low technology is available. That is, b(i) = b2 (i) and
s(j) = s2 (j) for all i and j, where the investment schedules b2 and s2 are defined in (52)
and are illustrated by the lower investment schedule in Figure 1. Agents with types above
β ∗ are investing too little in this equilibrium, in the sense that any pair of matched agents
with types above β ∗ could both be made better off by both increasing their investments in
order to exploit the high technology. Appendix C.2 confirms that despite this inefficiency
the incentive constraints for an ex post equilibrium are satisfied.
In the second of these equilibria, investments duplicate the pairwise efficient investments
in an economy in which only the high technology is available. That is, b(i) = b1 (i) and
s(j) = s1 (j) for all i and j, where the investment schedules b1 and s1 are defined in (50)
and illustrated by the higher investment schedule in Figure 1. Agents with types below β ∗
are investing too much in this equilibrium, in the sense that any pair of matched agents
with types below β ∗ could both be made better off by both decreasing their investments in
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b

2.29

b1/3

1.86

b1/4

2.19

2.08

1.80

1.73

b
9

b* ≈ 10.53

12

Figure 1: Illustration of the equilibrium investment functions from Example 2. The upper
curve shows the buyer’s investment function (with the seller’s investment function being
analogous) in an ex post equilibrium when only the high technology is used. The lower curve
shows the buyer’s investment function (with the seller’s investment function again being
analogous) in an ex post equilibrium when only the low technology is used. Pairwise efficient
allocations use both technologies, with investments following the lower curve up to β ∗ and
then jumping to the upper curve, as shown by the heavy (or, if in color, red) line.
order to exploit the low technology. Appendix C.3 confirms that despite this inefficiency the
incentive constraints for an ex post equilibrium are satisfied.
We note that as long as k > 0 is not too large, any ex post equilibrium is either the
autarchy allocation (which is an ex post equilibrium here, just as in Example 1) or fully
matched. In particular, individual rationality implies that every pair of matched agents
chooses strictly positive, conditionally efficient investments, since the strictly negative surplus
that accompanies matching with zero investments otherwise would imply that at least one
of the agents in the pair would rather stay unmatched. Pairwise conditional efficiency then
implies that if any agents are matched, all must be, since otherwise we could find buyers
(for example) arbitrarily close to one another, one unmatched with a payoff of zero and one
matched with a payoff bounded away from zero, yielding a discontinuity that is precluded by
pairwise conditional efficiency.
3.1.5

Prices

The equilibrium utility schedule u(i) can be viewed as identifying the price, in utility terms,
that a seller must provide in order to match with buyer i, with a similar interpretation for
v(j). This section reformulates our equilibrium notions along the lines suggested by the
literature on hedonic pricing.11 Agents face prices, specifying transfers, and an equilibrium
11 The literature on hedonic pricing, with early contributions by Becker (1965), Houthakker (1952), Lancaster
(1966) and Muth (1966) and a classic exposition by Rosen (1974), is centered around the idea that goods can
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price function causes the quantity demanded for each possible match to equal the quantity
supplied.This allows us to provide an alternative interpretation of the coordination failures
that lie behind ex post equilibria that are not pairwise efficient, this time as a reflection of
incomplete markets. For convenience, we focus on fully matched allocations.
Prices are given by a function t(b, β, s, σ), with the interpretation that buyer i with
investment b and type β(i) can buy any match (b, β(i), s, σ) by paying t(b, β(i), s, σ), with a
similar provision for sellers. We make no assumptions about the sign of t(b, β, s, σ).
We say that a feasible allocation (J, I, b, s, u, v) can be supported by prices t(b, β, s, σ) if
an auctioneer or market maker could post such prices, offering to buy or sell a match to any
agent at the posted price, and have the resulting optimizations on the part of the agents
yield the allocation (J, I, b, s, u, v). A hedonic equilibrium is a feasible allocation that can
be supported by prices, together with its supporting prices.
We must pay some attention to the domain of the price function t(b, s, β, σ). Following
Mailath, Postlewaite, and Samuelson (2013b, p. 547), we say that prices are complete if t is
defined on the domain B × B × S × S. For a given allocation (J, I, b, s, u, v) we say that
a function t(b, β, s, σ) is a specification of ex post prices if the domain of this function is
(B × B × S) ∪ (B × S × S), where
S = {(s, σ) ∈ S × S : s = s(j), σ = σ(j) for some j ∈ N }
B = {(b, β) ∈ B × B : b = b(i), β = β(i) for some i ∈ N }.
Then S identifies the (s, σ) pairs that appear in the ex post market, and B does the same for
sellers.
Definition 7. A fully matched feasible allocation (J, I, b, s, u, v) is supported by complete
prices t : B × B × S × S → R if for all buyers i ∈ N
(b(i), s(J(i)), σ(J(i)))

∈

argmax

U (b, s, β(i), σ, t(b, β(i), s, σ))

(54)

U (b, s, β(i), σ, t(b, β(i), s, σ)) ≥ u(i),

(55)

(b,s,σ)∈B×S×S

u(i)

=

max
(b,s,σ)∈B×S×S

with an analogous condition holding for all sellers j ∈ N .
A fully matched feasible allocation (J, I, b, s, u, v) is supported by ex post prices t :
(B × B × S) ∪ (B × S × S) → R if, for all buyers i ∈ N ,
(b(i), s(J(i)), σ(J(i))) ∈ argmax U (b, s, β(i), σ, t(b, β(i), s, σ))
(b,s,σ)∈B×S

u(i) =

U (b, s, β(i), σ, t(b, β(i), s, σ)) ≥ u(i),

max
(b,s,σ)∈B×S

with an analogous condition holding for all sellers j ∈ N .
We can in general expect an allocation supported by prices to be supported by a variety
of price functions. The individual rationality constraints identify the bounds placed on such
functions by the option of not participating in the market.
Complete prices attach a price to every possible combination (b, β, s, σ) of investments
and types. A price function defined on the restricted domain (B × B × S) ∪ (B × S × S) gives
be defined as bundles of attributes. Hedonic equilibria in competitive matching models with multidimensional
types and perfectly transferable utility have been studied by Ekeland (2010a).
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us just enough prices to evaluate the maximization problems that appear in the definition
of ex post equilibrium. For example, given a candidate equilibrium (J, I, b, s, u, v), a buyer
of type β can consider any investment b ∈ B, but can consider matches only with seller
investments s and types σ satisfying (s, σ) ∈ S. In order to attach prices to such choices, we
need prices defined on (B × B × S) ∪ (B × S × S).
Proposition 3. Let Assumption 1 hold.
[3.1] A fully matched feasible allocation can be supported by complete prices if and only if
it is a fully matched ex ante equilibrium.
[3.2] A fully matched feasible allocation can be supported by ex post prices if and only if
it is a fully matched ex post equilibrium.
Proof. [3.1]. Let (J, I, b, s, u, v) be a fully matched ex ante equilibrium. Then for every
(b, β, s, σ) with the property that there exists a buyer i0 with β(i0 ) = β, we let the price
t(b, β, s, σ) = t(b, β(i0 ), s, σ) satisfy (the existence of a solution to the following equation is
implied by Assumption 1):
U (b, s, β(i0 ), σ, t(b, β(i0 ), s, σ)) = u(i0 ).
This price is well defined: if there are buyers i and i0 with β = β(i) = β(i0 ), then the incentive
constraints imply that in equilibrium we must have u(i) = u(i0 ). For those (b, β, s, σ) for
which there exists no i with β(i) = β, let t(b, β, s, σ) satisfy
V (s, b, σ, β, t(b, β, s, σ)) < V (s, σ).
The existence of such a price is again ensured by Assumption 1.
This formulation of prices ensures that every buyer i receives payoff u(i) no matter what
(b, s, σ) he chooses, which in turn ensures that (54)–(55) hold. Next, every seller can choose
any (s, b, β) with the property that β = β(i0 ) for some i0 at a price that gives buyer i0 a
utility of u(i0 ), whereas choosing any other (s, b, β) results in less than the seller’s outside
option. Hence, the optimization problem faced by seller j is equivalent to
max ψ(j, i, u(i)),
i∈N

which duplicates the incentive constraint (22), ensuring that the optimal choice of seller j is
(s(j), b(I(j)), β(I(j))).
Conversely, let the fully matched feasible allocation (J, I, b, s, u, v) be supported by
complete prices. Then (54)–(55) and the corresponding seller conditions immediately give the
individual rationality constraint (9). Suppose that one of the incentive constraints (19)–(20)
fails, say (19), so that there exist i0 and j 0 with
u(i0 ) < φ(i0 , j 0 , v(j 0 )).
This implies that there exist (b0 , s0 , t0 ) for which
u(i0 ) < U (b0 , s0 , β(i0 ), σ(j 0 ), t0 )
v(j 0 ) ≤ V (s0 , b0 , σ(j 0 ), β(i0 ), t0 ).
This in turn ensures that there is no t(b0 , β(i0 ), s0 , σ(j 0 )) at which both (55) and the corresponding seller condition can be satisfied, contradicting the assumption that (J, I, b, s, u, v)
is supported by complete prices.
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[3.2] The proof for ex post equilibria is identical, except that φ(i, j, v(j)) is replaced by
φ̆(i, j, s(j), v(j)) and ψ(j, i, u(i)) is replaced by ψ̆(j, i, b(i), u(i)).
The inability to support an ex post equilibrium which is not pairwise efficient with
complete prices arises out of the fact that if a pair of agents with types (β 0 , σ 0 ) strictly prefers
an exchange (b0 , s0 , t0 ) to what they obtain an equilibrium, then there is no price one could
post that would discourage both sides of the market from trying to demand (resp. supply)
(b0 , s0 , β 0 , σ 0 ). A seller of type σ 0 will be willing to choose investment s0 and sell to buyer
type β 0 with investment b0 at a high price, while a buyer of type β 0 would like to choose b0
and buy from seller σ 0 with investment s0 at a low price. We can thus interpret a failure of
pairwise efficiency in an ex post equilibrium as a problem of missing markets. Markets are
“complete enough” only to ensure pairwise conditional efficiency.
We offer two interpretations of ex post prices. First, we might think of a market maker
who posts prices, standing ready to trade any good at the posted price. The market maker
must post prices for the goods that actually trade in equilibrium, meaning those (b, β, s, σ)
for which there exists a pair (i, j) ∈ M with (b, β, s, σ) = (b(i), β(i), s(j), σ(j)). We can
think of a price for a good in B × B × S as the result of the market maker’s standing
ready to answer questions from buyers of the form, “what if I bring b to the market, am
of type β and attempt to buy (b, β, s, σ)?” We can think of prices for goods in B × S × S
as responses to similar enquiries from sellers. Notice, however, that a good outside the set
(B × B × S) ∪ (B × S × S) requires a doubly counterfactual inquiry, and hence might be
viewed as less likely to occur. Hence, one case of interest will be that in which prices are
defined only on the set (B × B × S) ∪ (B × S × S), giving ex post prices.
Alternatively, we can interpret prices as a description of the terms at which trade on
a decentralized market occurs. Prices attached to untraded goods would be interpreted as
expectations as to what those prices would be if the corresponding goods appeared in the
market. Our interpretation of ex post prices would then be that trades involving a departure
from equilibrium behavior on the part of only a single player are salient enough or happen
often enough in the process leading to equilibrium as to generate common price expectations,
but that the same is not true for doubly counterfactual goods.
The coordination-failure and missing-prices interpretations of inefficient ex post equilibria
are related. For an allocation (J, I, b, s, u, v) to fail pairwise efficiency, there must be a
pair (i, j) and an exchange (b, s, t) that makes both better off than under the allocation
(J, I, b, s, u, v). The coordination difficulty is that buyer i can entertain exchange (b, s(j), t)
and seller j can entertain (b(i), s, t), but there is no way (under the ex post equilibrium
concept) for them to coordinate on the exchange (b, s, t). The allocation (J, I, b, s, u, v)
can then be an ex post equilibrium but fail pairwise efficiency if neither of the exchanges
(b, s(j), t) or (b(i), s, t) can make buyer i and seller j both better off, even though (b, s, t)
does so.
If both agents in the pair (i, j) would be better off making the exchange (b, s, t) then
they are under the allocation (J, I, b, s, u, v), then the allocation (J, I, b, s, u, v) cannot be
supported by any collection of prices that includes the price t(b, β(i), s, σ(j)), and hence
cannot be supported by complete prices. In effect, the existence of the price t(b, β(i), s, σ(j))
solves the coordination problem for agents i and j be allowing either one of them to demand
the coordinated deviation to the exchange (b, s, t(b, β(i), s, σ(j))). However, (J, I, b, s, u, v)
might be supported by ex post prices, because such prices specify a price t(b, β(i), s(j), σ(j))
and specify a price t(b(i), β(i), s, σ(j)), but do not specify a price t(b, β(i), s, σ(j)). Because
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the latter price is missing from the market, the “coordinated” exchange (b, s, t) is out of the
agents’ reach.

3.2

Pairwise Constrained Efficiency and Separability

This section introduces a pairwise constrained efficiency notion, stronger than pairwise
conditional efficiency but weaker than pairwise efficiency, and a property of the agents’
preferences that we refer to as separability. Section 3.2.3 presents one of our main results: if
preferences are separable, then every ex post equilibrium is pairwise constrained efficient.
This generalizes a corresponding result of (Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite, 2001b, Lemma 2),
showing that pairwise constrained efficiency requires virtually nothing beyond separability.
As we discuss in Section 3.2.4, constrained efficiency links the inefficiencies that can arise
in ex post equilibrium to the (lack of) heterogeneity of equilibrium investment choices. We
return to this point in Section 4.1. Pairwise constrained efficiency also plays an important
role in Section 4.3, where it provides the foundation for establishing conditions under which
ex post equilibria exhibit positive assortative matching.
3.2.1

Pairwise Constrained Efficiency

Pairwise efficiency and pairwise conditional efficiency both require that there be no pair of
agents who could match and improve their payoffs. The notions differ in terms of the sets of
investments for the agents on the other side of the market that an agent can contemplate
when calculating the payoffs from a match. As indicated by condition (48), pairwise efficiency
allows buyer i to consider any seller investment s ∈ S when assessing the payoff from a match
with seller j, whereas condition (46) indicates that under pairwise conditional efficiency
buyer i can only consider investment s(j). Our next efficiency concept lies between those
two notions. Condition (56) in the following definition requires that buyer i cannot gain
by matching with seller j, given that the seller’s investment must be drawn from the set of
investments S that are chosen by some seller and hence are “in the market.” Cole, Mailath,
and Postlewaite (2001b, p. 356) refer to equilibria with this property as “efficient in a
constrained sense,” and so we refer to this notion as pairwise constrained efficiency.12
Definition 8. A feasible allocation (J, I, b, s, u, v) is pairwise constrained efficient if it is
individually rational and
u(i) ≥ φ̆(i, j, s, v(j))
v(j) ≥

ψ̆(j, i, b, u(j))

∀s ∈ S, (i, j) ∈ N 2
2

∀b ∈ B, (i, j) ∈ N ,

(56)
(57)

where B is the image of N under b and S is the image of N under s.
The following is immediate from the definitions:
Corollary 3.
[3.1] Pairwise efficient allocations are pairwise constrained efficient.
[3.2] Pairwise constrained efficient allocations are pairwise conditionally efficient.
12 Felli and Roberts (2012) say that an investment is “constrained efficient” if it maximizes the value
available in a match, conditional on holding fixed the identities of the agents in the match and the investment
of the other agent. The counterpart of this notion in our terminology is conditional exchange efficiency.
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Ex ante equilibrium

⇐⇒ Pairwise eff iciency
=⇒ Pairwise constrained eff iciency
=⇒ Pairwise conditional eff iciency
⇐⇒ Ex post equilibrium.

Figure 2: Summary of Propositions 1–2 and Corollaries 1 and 3.
We can summarize Propositions 1–2 and Corollaries 1 and 3 in Figure 2.
Ex post equilibria can be pairwise constrained efficient without being pairwise efficient.
The pairwise inefficient autarchy equilibrium in Example 1 provides an illustration. It is
constrained pairwise efficient because all buyers and all sellers make identical investments, in
which case pairwise conditional efficiency implies pairwise constrained efficiency. Less obvious,
but implied by Proposition 4 below, is that the Pareto inefficient ex post equilibria appearing
in Example 2 are also pairwise constrained efficient. These examples thus demonstrate that
pairwise constrained efficiency is strictly weaker than pairwise efficiency. The following
example shows that without any restriction on preferences ex post equilibria need not be
pairwise constrained efficient, so that pairwise constrained efficiency lies strictly between
pairwise conditional efficiency and pairwise efficiency—both converses that are not asserted
by Figure 2 fail.
Example 3. Let N = B = S = [0, 1], let β and σ be identity functions, and let B = [0, b]
and S = [0, s] for sufficiently large b and s. Utility is perfectly transferable. Outside options
and autarchy investments are zero.
We work with the value function
Z(b, s, β, σ) = min{β, σ} min{b, s, 1}.
It is straightforward to confirm that this value function is supermodular in every pair of
variables. Consequently, as has been the case for the value functions in our previous examples,
Z is supermodular. In any pairwise efficient allocation, buyer i matches with seller j = i and
investments satisfy b(i) = s(j) = 1 for all i > 0 and j > 0. (The agents i = j = 0 receive
their outside options, either by staying unmatched or by matching with each other.)
Now consider the feasible allocation in which matching is positive assortative, the value
in each match is split equally between the two agents in the match, and the investments are
given by
 i
e −c
i < 21
b(i) =
1
i ≥ 12
 j
e −c
j < 12
s(j) =
,
1
j ≥ 12
1

where c = e 2 − 1 ≈ .65. Figure 3 illustrates these investment functions. Investments are
strictly increasing in index for agents below 1/2. At 1/2, the investments hit their exchange
efficient value of 1, and thereafter remain constant. The constant c is chosen so as to paste
together the investment schedules and hence also the utility schedules for agents above and
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b

Figure 3: Illustration of the ex post equilibrium investment functions in Example 3. The
solid line gives the ex post equilibrium investments, while the dotted line shows the exchange
efficient investments for agents below 1/2.

below 1/2, ensuring that the latter are continuous (as they must be in ex post equilibrium,
cf. Lemma 2.2 in Section 4.2.2).
Agents above 1/2 are investing as they would in a pairwise efficient allocation and receive
the corresponding utilities, while those below 1/2 are investing too little and thus fail to
realize the maximal possible value from their match. Moreover, the outcome is not pairwise
constrained efficient, as those agents with indices less than 1/2 would do better to each
choose an investment of 1, and such an investment is present on both sides of the market.
To show that the above allocation is an ex post equilibrium, we must show that no
buyer i ∈ [0, 1/2) would prefer to match with some seller j ∈ (i, 1/2].13 Deviating from the
proposed allocation to a such a higher seller poses a trade-off. The fact that seller j has a
higher investment allows buyer i to participate in the production of a higher value with j
than does buyer i in i’s current match. However, this value is not as large as that generated
in j’s current match, and so seller j must receive more than half of the value when matching
with i, in order to be willing to participate. Appendix D confirms that these deviations are
unprofitable.
3.2.2

Separability

Example 3 differs from Examples 1–2 in that it features preferences that are not separable in
the sense of the following definition.
Definition 9. Preferences are separable if there exist continuous functions fˆ : B ×S ×R → R,
13 It is immediate that there are no gains from deviating to a match with a seller lower than i, and matching
with seller 1/2 is equivalent to matching with any higher seller. Moreover, symmetry ensures that if no buyer
has an incentive to deviate, then the same holds for sellers.
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ĝ : S × B × R → R, f : B → R, g : S → R, Û : R × B × B → R and V̂ : R × S × S such that:
U (b, s, β, σ, t) = Û (fˆ(b, s, t), b, β)

(58)

V (s, b, σ, β, t) = V̂ (ĝ(s, b, t), s, σ)

(59)

U (b, β) = Û (f (b), b, β)

(60)

V (s, σ) = V̂ (g(s), s, σ),

(61)

where Û and V̂ are strictly increasing in their first arguments.
The buyer condition (58) (for example) indicates that (i) the buyer’s utility does not
depend on the seller’s type σ, and (ii) if we can find one buyer who prefers matching with a
seller on terms (b, s0 , t0 ) to matching on terms (b, s, t), then every buyer has this preference,
i.e., writing buyer β’s preferences as %β , we have that for all β, β 0 ∈ B,14
(b, s, t) %β (b, s0 , t0 ) ⇐⇒ (b, s, t) %β 0 (b, s0 , t0 ).

(62)

Notice that the buyer’s investment is the same across these two pairs, so the important
content of this property is that the buyer’s trade-off between s and t does not depend on the
buyer’s type.
It is trivial to verify that additively separable preferences are indeed separable. Further, when utility is perfectly transferable, separability implies additive separability: the
representation given by (12)–(15) is not only sufficient but also necessary for separability.15
We indicated in Section 2.1.4 that the existing literature on investment-and-matching
problems has focussed on models with separable preferences. In particular, Iyigun and Walsh
(2007) work with the special case of the additively separable preferences given by (10)–(13).16
Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (2001a,b), Dizdar (2012), and Acemoglu (1996) specialize
further to the case of perfectly transferable utility, working with utility functions for matched
agents of the form given by (14)–(15), typically captured by a value function of the form given
in (16). Preferences are also additively separable in the models with perfectly transferable
utility considered in Mailath, Postlewaite, and Samuelson (2013a,b). Separability is less
evident in Felli and Roberts (2012), but holds in an (equivalent) version of their model in
which what they call the “quality” of an agent is interpreted as the agent’s investment choice.
14 Condition (58) obviously implies (62). To see the converse, suppose (62) holds. Then we can omit σ as an
argument of U , and can choose an arbitrary β ∗ ∈ B and define fˆ(b, s, t) = U (b, s, β ∗ , t). Now for any triple
(b, s0 , t0 ), let y 0 = fˆ(b, s0 , t0 ) and then define Û (y 0 , b, β) := U (b, s0 , β, t0 ). To confirm that this construction is
well defined, we note that if fˆ(b, s0 , t0 ) = fˆ(b, s00 , t00 ), then by definition (b, s0 , t0 ) ∼β ∗ (b, s00 , t00 ), with (62)
then ensuring that (b, s0 , t0 ) ∼β (b, s00 , t00 ) for any β ∈ B, and hence U (b, s0 , β, t0 ) = U (b, s00 , β, t00 ).
15 To see this, consider the buyers. Suppose that (58) holds and that utility is perfectly transferable. We
can then omit σ as an argument of Ũ . Choose some s∗ ∈ S and let Ũ (b, s∗ , β) =: −f(b, β). Then choose some
β ∗ ∈ B and define f˜(b, s) := Ũ (b, s, β ∗ ) − Ũ (b, s∗ , β ∗ ). Using separability for the second of the following
equalities we then have

Ũ (b0 , s0 , β 0 )

=

Ũ (b0 , s0 , β 0 ) − Ũ (b0 , s∗ , β 0 ) + Ũ (b0 , s∗ , β 0 )

=

Ũ (b0 , s0 , β) − Ũ (b0 , s∗ , β) − f(b0 , β 0 )
f˜(b0 , s0 ) − f(b0 , β 0 ),

=
U (b, β ∗ )

yielding (14). Defining f (b) :=
− Ũ (b, s∗ , β ∗ ) and using an analogous argument gives (12).
16 Preferences in Peters and Siow (2002) also satisfy (10)–(13) (with neither fˆ nor ĝ depending on t) and
are thus separable. See Section 5 for further discussion.
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Our definition of separability does not impose the additive structure appearing in (10)–(13).
In contrast, Han (2002) works with perfectly transferable utility and preferences that can be
written as
U (b, s, β, σ, t) = f † (b, s, β) − f(b) − t

(63)

V (s, b, σ, β, t) = g̃(s, b) − g(s, σ) + t.

(64)

Here separability fails because the buyer’s tradeoff between b and s depends on the buyer’s
type.
3.2.3

Separability and Pairwise Constrained Efficiency

Separability of preferences implies the pairwise constrained efficiency of ex post equilibria.
The proof of the following result also shows that for fully matched ex post equilibria, we
need only the first part of the definition of separability, namely (58)–(59), to obtain this
conclusion.
Proposition 4. Let Assumption 1 hold and let preferences be separable. Then ex post
equilibria are pairwise constrained efficient.
Proof. Let (J, I, b, s, u, v) be an ex post equilibrium, and suppose that it is not pairwise
constrained efficient. Then there exists a pair of agents (i, j) for whom (56)–(57) fail. Suppose
it is (56) that fails (with the case in which (57) fails being analogous). Then there exists a
pair of investments (b, s) with s = s(j 0 ) for some j 0 and a transfer t such that
Û (fˆ(b, s, t), b, β(i)) > u(i)

(65)

V̂ (ĝ(s, b, t), s, σ(j)) ≥ v(j).

(66)

Suppose first that seller j 0 is matched, and let i0 be the buyer matched with seller j 0 and
let their exchange be (b0 , s, t0 ). One of the possibilities buyer i can contemplate is to match
with seller j 0 , with exchange (b, s, t). Condition (65) ensures that the exchange (b, s, t) with
seller j provides buyer i with more than his equilibrium utility, and so separability ensures
that such a match with seller j 0 does likewise. The incentive constraints (27)-(28) for ex post
equilibrium ensure that the exchange (b, s, t) decreases j 0 ’s utility, or
V̂ (ĝ(s, b, t), s, σ(j 0 )) < v(j 0 ) = V̂ (ĝ(s, b0 , t0 ), s, σ(j 0 )).

(67)

Next, by separability, the fact that buyer i0 is willing to consummate an equilibrium match
featuring exchange (b0 , s, t0 ) with seller j 0 ensures that buyer i0 would also be willing to make
this exchange with seller j. The incentive constraints (27)-(28) for ex post equilibrium ensure
that this does not increase j’s utility, or
V̂ (ĝ(s, b0 , t0 ), s, σ(j)) ≤ v(j).

(68)

From (66) and (68), we have
V̂ (ĝ(s, b, t), s, σ(j)) ≥ V̂ (ĝ(s, b0 , t0 ), s, σ(j)),
whereas (67) together with separability implies the reverse strict inequality. Hence, we have
obtained a contradiction to the assumption that (65)–(66) hold.
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Now suppose that seller j 0 is not matched. Then
V (s, σ(j 0 )) = v(j 0 ) > V̂ (ĝ(s, b, t), s, σ(j 0 ))

(69)

holds, where the equality is from feasibility and the strict inequality follows from separability:
if it failed, buyer i and seller j 0 could match with exchange (b, s, t) with seller j 0 receiving
at least her equilibrium utility v(j 0 ) and buyer i receiving more than his equilibrium utility
(from (65)), contradicting the incentive constraints for ex post equilibrium. By (61), the
outer inequality in (69) implies
V (s, σ(j)) > V̂ (ĝ(s, b, t), s, σ(j)),
whereas (66) in conjunction with the incentive constraint v(j) ≥ V (s, σ(j)) implies the
reverse weak inequality. This contradiction finishes the proof.
Figure 4 illustrates the argument proving Proposition 4. The proposed deviation involves
agents (i, j) and investments (b, s) at some transfer t. Investment s is already in the market,
chosen by seller j 0 . Focussing on the case in which seller j 0 is matched, we note that (because
of separability) agent i could also make himself better off if he could make the exchange
(b, s, t) with agent j 0 . The equilibrium hypothesis is that agent i has no such opportunity
to improve his payoff, meaning that engaging in the exchange (b, s, t) with buyer i must be
less attractive for seller j 0 than j 0 ’s equilibrium exchange (b0 , s0 , t0 ) with buyer i0 . Because of
separability, the identity of j 0 ’s partners in these exchange does not affect his utility, so that
we can write this condition as
(s, b0 , t0 ) j 0 (s, b, t).
Similarly, we can exploit separability to argue that seller j could have used investment s to
buy investment b0 from buyer i0 at transfer t0 and to infer from the fact that she chooses not
to, that
(s, b, t) j (s, b0 , t0 ).
Sellers j and j 0 thus rank the options (b, s, t) and (b0 , s, t0 ) differently, implying that (as in
our Example 3) preferences are not separable.
3.2.4

Separability, Coordination Failures and Heterogeneity

The link between separability and pairwise constrained efficiency is important for two reasons.
We postpone one of these to Section 4.3, where separability and pairwise constrained efficiency
play a central role in establishing conditions for positive assortative matching. This section
highlights the second reason, the role of separability in limiting the scope of coordination
failures.
Section 3.1.4 observed that failures of pairwise efficiency of ex post equilibria can be
interpreted as coordination failures in investment choices—an ex post equilibrium can only
fail pairwise efficiency if (44)–(45) are violated, which means that there exist agents i and j
and investments b =
6 b(i) and s =
6 s(j) that (when accompanied by an appropriate transfer t)
would make both agents strictly better off when matching with each other. When preferences
are separable, the pairwise constrained efficiency conditions (56)–(57) imply that the only
coordination failures that can arise are those in which both agents in a pair (i, j) could be
made better off by choosing a pair of investments (b0 , s0 ) (and an appropriate transfer t0 ) with
the property that neither b0 nor s0 is in the market. Formally, Proposition 4 leads immediately
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Figure 4: Illustration of the argument that ex post equilibria are pairwise constrained
efficient. The horizontal axis shows the set B of possible buyer investments and the set B of
investments that are in the market. The vertical axis similarly shows the set S of possible
seller investments and the set S of investments that are in the market. The hypothesis is
that a pair of agents (i, j) could gain by matching with one another and exchanging (b, s, t).
Investment b is not contained in B, but investment s is contained in S, and hence is chosen
by some seller j 0 . If j 0 is matched, then there is a pair (i0 , j 0 ) who are matched in equilibrium
and execute exchange (b0 , s, t0 ).

to the following result, generalizing a corresponding result for perfectly transferable utility in
Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (2001b, Proposition 4).
Corollary 4. Let Assumption 1 hold and let preferences be separable. Suppose (J, I, b, s, u, v)
is an ex post equilibrium and there exist agents i and j and an exchange (b0 , s0 , t0 ) such that
U (b0 , s0 , β(i), σ(j), t0 ) ≥ u(i)
V (s0 , b0 , σ(j), β(i), t0 ) ≥ v(j),
with at least one equality strict. Then there exists no i0 for which b(i0 ) = b0 and no j 0 with
s(j 0 ) = s0 .
The scope for coordination failures in ex post equilibrium is thus limited by the heterogeneity of investments that are actually chosen in equilibrium. The richer the sets B and S
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of equilibrium investments, the fewer exchanges (b0 , s0 , t0 ) there are with b0 6∈ B and s0 6∈ S,
and hence the fewer opportunities for a failure of pairwise efficiency. In particular, if the
sets B and S include every investment that is chosen by some agent in a pairwise efficient
allocation, the ex post equilibrium in question must be pairwise efficient. In essence, it is
enough to ensure the right investments are in the market, at which point the market will
ensure that they are chosen by the right agents.
For example, it is immediate from Corollary 4 that with separable preferences, any ex
post equilibrium satisfying B = B (or S = S, with the following discussion focusing on the
first of these cases) is pairwise efficient. When might this condition be satisfied? Suppose
that utility is perfectly transferable. Then fully matched ex post equilibria will satisfy B = B
if for every b0 ∈ B there exists a buyer i for whom choosing that investment is a dominant
strategy in the full appropriation game, that is, for all s ∈ S the investment b0 is the unique
investment satisfying (32). If b0 is also the unique autarchy investment of buyer i or all ex
post equilibria are fully matched (conditions ensuring this are discussed in Section 4.2), the
pairwise efficiency of ex post equilibria follows. This dominant strategy condition is stringent,
but is satisfied, for example, in Chiappori, Iyigun, and Weiss (2009).
Whether the dominant strategy condition of the previous paragraph holds can depend
upon whether the agents in the economy are sufficiently heterogeneous. The following
example illustrates.
Example 4. Let N = [a, 1] with 0 < a < 1/6 and B = S = [a, 3]. Utility is perfectly
transferable and preferences are separable. Let there be two possible investments on each
side of the market, so that B = {L, H} and S = {L, H}. The return functions f˜(b, s) and
g̃(s, b) in (14)–(15) are given by
L H
L 1 2 ,
H 2 5
while investment costs are 0 for an L investment and β1 or σ1 in the case of an H investment.
The return functions for unmatched agents satisfy f (b) = g(s) = 0, so that for all types
outside options are zero and L is the autarchy investment.
Suppose first that β and σ are the identity functions, so that the sets of buyer and seller
types in the economy are both [a, 1]. Pairwise efficiency for this economy calls for all agents
with types less than 1/2 to choose L investments, and all agents with types greater than 1/2
to choose H investments. Agents who choose L match with one another, as do agents who
choose H, with the matching being arbitrary within these constraints. However, there is
also an ex post equilibrium in which every agent chooses L. Agents with names (and hence
types) greater than 1/2 are not choosing exchange efficient investments, but the equilibrium
is pairwise constrained efficient. Pairwise constrained efficiency does not imply exchange
efficiency in this case because the sets of investments in the market, B = S = {L}, are too
sparse.
Suppose now that β(i) = 2i and σ(j) = 2j, and so the set of buyer and seller types in
the economy are both [2a, 2]. As before, pairwise efficiency for this economy calls for all
agents with types less than 1/2 to choose L investments, and all agents with types greater
than 1/2 to choose H investments. Every ex post equilibrium must be fully matched (as the
existence of an unmatched pair of agents leads to an immediate contradiction of the pairwise
conditional efficiency of ex post equilibria). For buyers and sellers with names above 1/2
(and thus types above 1), the ex post exchange efficiency conditions (32)–(33) now imply
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b(i) = s(j) = H, irrespectively of the partner they are matched with and the investment
chosen by that partner. Similarly, for matched buyers and sellers with names below 1/6 (and
thus types below 1/3), every ex post equilibrium satisfies b(i) = s(j) = L. Consequently, in
every ex post equilibrium all investments are in the market, i.e., B = B and S = S, ensuring
that every pairwise constrained efficient allocation is pairwise efficient. Hence, Proposition 4
implies that every ex post equilibrium is pairwise efficient.
3.2.5

Prices

Section 3.1.5 showed that we can alternatively formulate the notions of ex ante and ex post
equilibria in terms of prices attached to quadruples (b, β, s, σ) of investments and types.
If preferences are separable, then we can write prices simply as a function t(b, s), as do
Mailath, Postlewaite, and Samuelson (2013b). To see this, suppose we have a set of (possibly
complete) ex post prices t(b, β, s, σ) that support an ex post equilibrium, and let preferences
be separable. Suppose there exist values (b, β, s) and distinct values σ and σ 0 such that
t(b, β, s, σ) > t(b, β, s, σ 0 ). Then the good (b, β, s, σ) does not trade in equilibrium, because
buyer preferences are independent of σ and hence no buyer will buy the more expensive good
(b, β, s, σ) when the equivalent but cheaper good (b, β, s, σ 0 ) is available. We can thus reduce
the price of (b, β, s, σ) to t(b, β, s, σ 0 ) without disrupting the equilibrium. In particular, the
fact that buyers still have the good (b, β, s, σ 0 ) available at the original price ensures that it
is still optimal for no buyer to demand (b, β, s, σ), even at its new, lower price. In addition,
no sellers were offering this good for sale at the previous price (since otherwise the market
would not clear), and lowering the price of a good cannot make it more attractive for sellers
to offer for sale. We can thus assume that prices take the form t(b, β, s). An analogous
argument now ensures that prices also need not depend on β.
Mailath, Postlewaite, and Samuelson (2013a,b), continuing with separable preferences,
explore the circumstances under which prices in the ex post market can be written as a
function of the seller’s investment s only. This is not an implication of separability, and
requires additional conditions.
Can prices be written as functions of just (b, s) even when preferences are not separable?
The following example makes it clear that we cannot expect to do so in general.
Example 5. Let N = B = S = B = S = [0, 1] and let β and σ be identity functions. Let
utility be perfectly transferable. Outside options are zero with autarchy investments of zero
for all types. The value function is given by
Z(b, s, β, σ) = βσ(b − b2 )(s − s2 ).
Then the pairwise efficient outcome calls for every buyer to choose b = 1/2 and every seller
to choose s = 1/2, and for agents to match positive assortatively. However, there is no way
to support such an outcome with prices of the form t(b, s).

4

Characterization of Ex Post Equilibria

This section develops conditions under which we can refine the characterization of ex post
equilibria we have obtained in Propositions 2 and 4. Our goal is to establish conditions under
which ex post equilibria will be Pareto efficient, a task we complete in Section 4.4, and so we
organize our discussion around three obvious sources of inefficiency.
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First, exchange efficiency is a necessary condition for both pairwise efficiency and Pareto
efficiency. Every ex ante equilibrium is thus exchange efficient. In contrast, Examples 2 and
4 each exhibit ex post equilibria in which some (and in some examples all) pairs of agents
choose investments that are exchange inefficient, i.e., that place them strictly inside their
utility frontiers. Section 4.1 establishes conditions under which an ex post equilibrium will
be exchange efficient.
Second, as in the ex post equilibrium of Example 1 in which all agents choose their
autarchy investments and remain unmatched, there may be too few agents participating
in the market. Section 4.2 identifies conditions ensuring that every ex post equilibrium is
fully matched. As demonstrated by Example 8 these conditions are stronger than the ones
required to ensure that ex ante equilibria are fully matched, but they are quite straightforward.
For fully matched equilibria, assuming continuity of the maps from names into types has
important implications that we also record here.
Third, as we illustrate in in Examples 8 and 9 of Section 4.1.3, agents may be matched
with the “wrong” partners. Section 4.3 identifies conditions under which such mismatch
cannot arise. In doing so we focus on the case which has been most prominent in the literature,
in which all ex ante equilibria are positive assortative (e.g., Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite
(2001b), Iyigun and Walsh (2007), and Peters and Siow (2002)), and establish conditions
under which the same holds for all ex post equilibria.17 These conditions ensure that one of
the key questions addressed in the matching literature since Becker (1973), namely whether
competitive matching leads to positive assortment, will continue to have a positive answer
despite the potential coordination failures that may arise when investments are chosen before
agents enter the matching market.

4.1

Exchange Efficiency of Ex Post Equilibria

In models with perfect transferability and separable preferences, two approaches to establishing exchange efficiency have been considered. The first, suggested by Dizdar (2012), is to
seek conditions under which, for any pair of types (i, j), conditional efficiency of an exchange
for that pair implies (unconditional) exchange efficiency for that pair. We develop this
approach, assuming neither perfect transferability nor separability, in Section 4.1.1. Doing
so requires utility functions to be quasiconcave in exchanges, but has the advantage that no
assumptions about the distribution of types in the economy and no assumptions about how
the preferences of various types are related to one another are needed. The second approach
was first pursued by Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (2001b). The idea is to “leverage” the
full set of pairwise conditional efficiency conditions (46)–(47) to infer exchange efficiency of
ex post equilibria, even when conditional exchange efficiency for a given pair of types does
not imply exchange efficiency for that pair. We comment on this approach in Section 4.1.2.
Exchange efficiency is of course only one step toward (pairwise or Pareto) efficiency. It
will be little solace to learn that each pair of matched agents lies on their utility frontier if
some agents, who could strictly gain from doing so, are not matched at all or if we have the
“wrong” agents matched to each other. Examples 8 and 9 in Section 4.1.3 illustrate these
possibilities.
17 Positive assortment rather than negative assortment is not critical to our argument. Replacing Definition
10 appearing in Section 4.3 by the corresponding generalized condition for negative assortative matching
from Legros and Newman (2007b) will give results for negative assortative matching equivalent to the ones
we obtain here.
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4.1.1

From Conditional Exchange Efficiency to Exchange Efficiency

Suppose we are given a pair of types (β, σ) and an exchange (b, s, t) solving
(b, t) ∈ argmax U (b0 , s, β, σ, t0 ) s.t. V (s, b0 , σ, β, t0 ) ≥ V (s, b, σ, β, t),

(70)

(b0 ,t0 )∈B×R

(s, t) ∈ argmax V (s0 , b, σ, β, t0 ) s.t. U (b, s0 , β, σ, t0 ) ≥ U (b, s, β, σ, t).

(71)

(s0 ,t0 )∈S×R

Does it follow that (b, s, t) also solves
(b, s, t) ∈

argmax

U (b0 , s0 , β, σ, t0 ) s.t. V (s0 , b0 , σ, β, t0 ) ≥ V (s, b, σ, β, t)?

(72)

(b0 ,s0 ,t0 )∈B×S×R

If the answer is positive for all (β, σ) ∈ B × S, it follows from the definitions of the utility
frontier functions φ̆, ψ̆, and φ that (30)–(31) imply (24) for all (i, j) ∈ N 2 . Because (24)
and (25) are equivalent, it follows that the conditional exchange efficiency of an allocation
implies its (unconditional) exchange efficiency, ensuring the exchange efficiency of every ex
post equilibrium.
The natural approach to establishing a connection between (70)–(71) and (72) is to
consider the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the solutions to these problems. This requires
differentiability assumptions which strengthen the continuity and monotonicity requirements
from Assumption 1. Convexity of the set of feasible investments in conjunction with
quasiconcavity of the utility functions then implies that the Kuhn-Tucker conditions developed
in Arrow and Enthoven (1961) are applicable and hence that conditional exchange efficiency
implies exchange efficiency.18
Proposition 5. Let Assumption 1 hold. Let B and S be convex and let U and V be
quasiconcave and differentiable in (b, s, t) for all (β, σ) ∈ B × S, with the partial derivatives
with respect to t satisfying Ut < 0 and Vt > 0. Then every ex post equilibrium is exchange
efficient.
Proof. As explained above, it suffices to show that (70)–(71) imply (72).
Using the strict Pareto property, we can exchange the role of the objective function and
the constraint in (71) to obtain that an exchange (b, s, t) satisfies (71) if and only if and (s, t)
solves
max U (b, s0 , β, σ, t0 ) s.t. V (s0 , b, σ, β, t0 ) ≥ V (s, b, σ, β, t).
(73)
0 0
(s ,t )∈S×R

Using Ub , Us , Vb , and Vs to denote the vectors of partial derivatives of the utility functions
with respect to the corresponding variables, the Kuhn-Tucker-Lagrange conditions for (70) are
(Arrow and Enthoven, 1961, p. 790) that there exists λ ≥ 0 satisfying, for all (b0 , t0 ) ∈ B × R,
(Ub (b, s, β, σ, t) + λVb (s, b, σ, β, t)) · (b0 − b) + (Ut (b, s, β, σ, t) + λVt (s, b, σ, β, t)) (t0 − t) ≤ 0.
(74)
Similarly, the Kuhn-Tucker-Lagrange conditions for (73) are that there exists µ ≥ 0 satisfying,
for all (s0 , t0 ) ∈ S × R,
(Us (b, s, β, σ, t) + µVs (s, b, σ, β, t)) · (s0 − s) + (Ut (b, s, β, σ, t) + µVt (s, b, σ, β, t)) (t0 − t) ≤ 0.
(75)
18 Quasiconcavity does not depend upon the sign convention we adopt for transfers, so the assumptions
that U and V are quasiconcave are symmetric, despite the fact that transfers enter these functions with
different signs.
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Because (i) both U and V are quasiconcave in (b, s, t), (ii) t is unconstrained, and (iii) Vt > 0
holds, these Kuhn-Tucker-Lagrange conditions are necessary for (70) and (73) (Arrow and
Enthoven, 1961, p. 791). Further, setting b0 = b in (74) and s0 = s in (75) we obtain
Ut (b, s, β, σ, t) + λVt (s, b, σ, β, t) = 0,
Ut (b, s, β, σ, t) + µVt (s, b, σ, β, t) = 0.
Because Ut < 0 and Vt > 0 holds, these equalities imply µ = λ > 0, so that (74) and (75)
imply the existence of λ ≥ 0 such that
(Ub (b, s, β, σ, t) + λVb (s, b, σ, β, t)) · (b0 − b) +
(Us (b, s, β, σ, t) + λVs (s, b, σ, β, t)) · (s0 − s) +
(Ut (b, s, β, σ, t) + λVt (s, b, σ, β, t)) (t0 − t) ≤ 0
holds for all (b0 , s0 , t0 ) ∈ B × S × R. These are the Kuhn-Tucker-Lagrange conditions for (72).
Because t is unconstrained and Ut < 0 holds, condition (a) in Theorem 3 from Arrow and
Enthoven (1961) is satisfied and these conditions are then sufficient for (72). Hence, (b, s, t)
solves (72).
As indicated by (30)–(31), conditional exchange efficiency for a pair may be understood
as the requirement that the “conditional utility frontiers” φ̆ and ψ̆ both pass through the
point (u, v) in utility space induced by the exchange (b, s, t). The first part of the proof of
Proposition 5 establishes that the two conditional utility frontiers must have the same slope
in such a point of intersection. The second part then shows that this equal slope condition is
sufficient to imply that (u, v) lies on the unconditional utility frontier. The convexity and
differentiability assumptions imposed in Proposition 5 play an essential role in this argument,
by ensuring that local considerations suffice to evaluate whether there is any scope to increase
both agent’s utilities by adjusting their exchange. Further, the fact that either agent in a
match can contemplate an adjustment of the transfer when considering a change in her or
his investment plays a crucial role in the proof of Proposition 5. In particular, as we will see
in Section 5, there is no counterpart to Proposition 5 in the nontransferable utility case.
When utility is perfectly transferable, the question we address in this section reduces to
the question of whether conditions (32)–(33) imply condition (26). Recall that (32)–(33) are
the conditions for a pair of investments (b, s) to be a Nash equilibrium in the full appropriation
game in which buyer i chooses b ∈ B, seller j chooses s ∈ S, and both agents have the
value Z(b, s, β(i)), σ(j)) as a payoff function, whereas (26) states that (b, s) maximizes this
value. Hence, in the perfectly transferable case we are asking for conditions under which
all Nash equilibria of the full appropriation game solve the value maximization problem.
As Dizdar (2012) has noted, any solution to the value maximization problem is a Nash
equilibrium in the full appropriation game, so assuming the existence of a unique equilibrium
in the full appropriation game is clearly sufficient for such a result. Proposition 5 provides
a complementary result, showing that all Nash equilibria in the full appropriation game
solve the value maximization problem whenever the value function is differentiable and
concave in (b, s) on the convex domain B × S.19 While our approach generalizes to the
19 Concavity and differentiability of Z implies that both U (b, s, β, σ) = Z(b, s, β, σ) − t and V (s, b, σ, β) = t
are quasiconcave and differentiable. Applying Proposition 5 to this specification of utility functions, yields
the result. The same result could be obtained by noting that the full appropriation game is a potential
game with the potential Z(b, s, β, σ) and applying the observation from Footnote 4 in Monderer and Shapley
(1996).
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case of imperfectly transferable utility, Dizdar’s observation has no natural counterpart with
imperfectly transferable utility as, in general, different solutions to the exchange efficiency
problems (24)–(25) feature distinct investments.
A value function Z can be both supermodular in (b, s) and concave in (b, s), so that the
conditions appearing in Proposition 5 are applicable in the case of a supermodular value
function. When investments are unidimensional and Z twice differentiable, we simply need
the supermodularity requirement Zbs (b, s, β, σ) > 0, along with standard concavity conditions
Zbb (b, s, β, σ) ≤ 0 and Zbs (b, s, β, σ)2 ≤ Zbb (b, s, β, σ)Zss (b, s, β, σ), with the last condition
ensuring that the complementarities giving rise to Zbs > 0 are not so strong as to overwhelm
the “partial concavity” of the value function in each of b and s (as they do in Examples 1
and 2).
Example 6. Let k = 0 in Example 1. The resulting value function Z(b, s, β, σ) = bs −
b5 /5β − s5 /5σ is supermodular but is not concave (it is convex in a neighborhood of the
origin). Proposition 5 thus does not apply. Indeed, as we have noted in Footnote 6, for
k = 0 Example 1 admits a fully-matched zero-investment ex post equilibrium that is not
exchange efficient. We could replace f and g with functions that are increasing in b and s
(with positive derivatives at zero) for which the value function Z would be concave. However,
the zero-investment equilibrium would remain, and so Proposition 5 would then imply that
zero investments are exchange efficient.
4.1.2

Leveraging Pairwise Conditional Efficiency

This section examines an approach to exchange efficiency, pioneered by Cole, Mailath, and
Postlewaite (2001b, Section 6), that we refer to as the “leveraging approach.”
Every allocation satisfying the pairwise conditional efficiency conditions (46)–(47) is
conditionally exchange efficient. This imposes restrictions on the investments of any matched
pair (i, j) ∈ M , and Section 4.1.1 exploited (only) these implications of pairwise conditional
efficiency. However, pairwise conditional efficiency imposes incentive constraints on all pairs
(i, j) ∈ N 2 , including those that are not matched to each other. The leveraging approach
exploits these latter restrictions by using the information that all matched pairs engage in
conditionally efficient exchanges, to conclude that these exchanges must be (unconditionally)
efficient.
The following example illustrates the basic idea of the leveraging approach.
Example 7. Consider the economy given in Example 2. There we assumed γ = β(0) =
σ(0) = 9 and α + γ = β(1) = σ(1) = 12. We constructed two kinds of exchange inefficient ex
post equilibria. In the first kind all agents choose the low technology, even though exchange
efficiency dictates that sufficiently high pairs of matched agents choose the high technology.
In the second kind, all agents choose the high technology, even though exchange efficiency
dictates that sufficiently low pairs of matched agents choose the low technology. All other ex
post equilibria in this example were exchange efficient.
Suppose now that γ = 8 and α = 6 holds, so that buyer and seller types are uniformly
distributed on [8, 14]. In this case, the two kinds of exchange inefficient ex post equilibria do
not exist, ensuring the exchange efficiency of all ex post equilibria. There are two steps to
the argument.
First, we argue that in every ex post equilibrium other than the autarchy allocation (which
is exchange efficient) there is both a matched pair of agents choosing the high technology
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and a matched pair of agents choosing the low technology. Appendix C calculated that
for matched pairs with types β = σ that exceed β ≈ 13.4, the only conditionally efficient
investments compatible with the individual rationality constraints are the high-technology
1
1
investments (β 3 , σ 3 ). For these agents, the high technology is sufficiently lucrative that if
one agent chooses the investment optimal for the low technology, the other agent will not
find it a best response to do so. Matched agents with relatively high types must then choose
their efficient investments, appropriate for the high technology. A similar argument shows
that matched pairs with types β = σ that fall short of β ≈ 8.93 must choose their efficient
investments, appropriate for the low technology. As every ex post equilibrium other than the
autarchy allocation is fully matched with positive assortative matching, our claim follows.
Second, pairwise conditional efficiency implies that the equilibrium utility schedules u
and v must be continuous. Should u (for example) take a jump at some i∗ , then buyers
very close to but on the low-utility side of i∗ would prefer to match with nearby sellers
on the high side, precluding pairwise conditional efficiency. (Lemma 2 in Section 4.2.2
gives the formal argument.) Agents can then jump between the low-technology investments
to the high-technology investments only at type β ∗ ≈ 10.53, the type at which a pair of
matched agents of identical type produce precisely the same maximal value under the low
technology and under the high technology. This ensures that all agents with types above β ∗
must choose the optimal high-technology investments and agents below β ∗ must choose the
optimal low-technology investments. Hence, no matched pair of agents can choose inefficient
investments.
A similar argument shows that if β(i) = 9 + 5i and σ(j) = 9 + 5j, so that the sets of
types of buyers and sellers appearing in the economy are both [9, 14], then there is no ex
post equilibrium in which a pair of matched agents inefficiently invests in the low technology.
However, in the absence of sufficiently low types from the economy, the equilibrium in which
matched agents inefficiently overinvest cannot be eliminated. The reverse statement holds if
the set of types is [8, 12]. In general, if the sets of buyers and sellers are identical intervals
that include β ∗ , there will be equilibria in which some agents inefficiently underinvest if
the interval of types does not include β, and equilibria in which some agents inefficiently
overinvest if the interval does not include β. For the leveraging approach to work, we must
have a rich enough set of types in the economy to ensure that both low-technology and
high-technology investments are chosen by some pairs of matched agents.
The first step of the argument in Example 7 resembles the arguments from Section 4.1.1
in that matched pairs of agents are considered in isolation. It is only in the second step
of the argument that the additional constraints implied by pairwise conditional efficiency,
namely the continuity of the equilibrium utility schedules, are “leveraged” to obtain exchange
efficiency.
Appendix E continues the discussion of the leveraging approach. Example 11 shows that
when preferences are separable, pairwise constrained efficiency opens additional possibilities
for leveraging pairwise conditional efficiency. In particular, the argument exploits pairwise
constrained efficiency to establish the counterpart to the result from the first step in Example
7. To do so it draws inferences about the choices of agents who need not be close.20 Similar
forces appear in Section 3.2.4.
20 The preferences in Example 7 are separable, but the arguments of Example 7 did not exploit the resulting
pairwise constrained efficiency. Appendix E explains why the separability-based argument illustrated in
Example 11 has no force in Example 7.

40

In general, the implications of pairwise constrained efficiency and hence the leveraging
approach become more powerful when separability and hence pairwise constrained efficiency
holds. Nevertheless, there is little hope of obtaining reasonably general conditions under
which the leveraging approach can be used to infer exchange efficiency. Appendix E illustrates
this with Example 12, adapted from Dizdar (2012).
4.1.3

Is Exchange Efficiency Enough?

This section presents two examples of exchange efficient ex post equilibria that are Pareto
inefficient (and hence not pairwise efficient). If every pair of matched agents is on their
payoff frontier and yet the allocation (J, I, b, s, u, v) is not Pareto efficient, then the Pareto
dominating allocation must feature some different matching than that specified by I and J.
We explore these matching issues in two steps.
First, it may be that not enough agents are matched. In particular, every ex post
equilibrium in which all agents are unmatched and choose their autarchy investments is
trivially exchange efficient, but may fail to be Pareto efficient. Example 1 has already
provided an example of such an ex post equilibrium. However, for each pair (i, j), the
autarchy investments in Example 1 are also a pair of conditionally efficient (but exchange
inefficient) investments for a match between i and j. As a result, this example has the
appearance of simply having relabeled a failure of exchange efficiency to be nonparticipation.
In Example 8 below, conditional efficiency implies exchange efficiency for any pair of matched
agents and Pareto efficiency requires that all agents match. Nonetheless, we exhibit a Pareto
(and hence pairwise) inefficient ex post equilibrium in which no agents match. Section 4.2
introduces an assumption sufficient to ensure that all ex post equilibria are fully matched.
Second, it may be that all agents are matched, but are matched with the “wrong” partners.
Example 9 below satisfies Section 4.2’s condition to ensure all ex post equilibria are fully
matched. Nevertheless, there exists an exchange efficient ex post equilibrium which is Pareto
inefficient because agents choose their investments in anticipation of matching with the wrong
partner. In this example, utility is perfectly transferable, preferences are separable, and any
matched pair of agents has a unique conditionally efficient pair of investments. The culprit
in the failure of efficiency is the lack of structure on the value function Z, which we address
in Section 4.3 by introducing the single crossing conditions in Definition 10.
Example 8. Let N = [0, 1], B = S = [3, 4], let β(i) = i + 3 and σ(j) = j + 3, and let
B = [0, b] and S = [0, s] for sufficiently large b and s, Utility is perfectly transferable and
additively separable, with the cost functions appearing in (10)–(13) given by
f(b, β) =

(b + 1)3
3β

and g(s, σ) =

(s + 1)3
.
3σ

The return functions for matched agents are given by fˆ(b, s, t) = (b + 1)(s + 1) − t and
ĝ(s, b, t) = t, with the corresponding surplus and value functions
z(b, s) = (b + 1)(s + 1)

and

Z(b, s, β, σ) = (b + 1)(s + 1) −
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(b + 1)3
(s + 1)3
−
.
3β
3σ

The return functions for unmatched agents are given by f (b) ≡ 1 ≡ g(s), giving
U (b, β)

=

V (s, σ)

=

(b + 1)3
3β
(s + 1)3
.
1−
3σ

1−

We first note that every ex ante equilibrium is fully matched. In particular, for any pair of
types (β, σ) ∈ B × S, it is a simple calculation that investments b = s = 1 provide a strictly
higher total payoff than remaining unmatched. The supermodularity of the functions z, −f
and −g ensures that matching in ex ante equilibrium must be positive assortative. Solving
the value maximization problem for agents i = j allows us to calculate that the investment
functions in any ex ante equilibrium are given by
b(i) = β(i) − 1 = i + 2
s(j) = σ(j) − 1 = j + 2.
Now consider ex post equilibria. The full appropriation game has a unique Nash equilibrium, ensuring that any fully matched ex post equilibrium satisfies exchange efficiency.
We next argue that it is an ex post equilibrium for each agent to remain unmatched, while
choosing investment zero. The investment choices in this allocation are clearly optimal given
that agents are unmatched, and confirming that the allocation is an ex post equilibrium
requires showing that there is no pair of agents who could profitably match when one of the
agents’ investments is fixed at zero. A seller of type σ can initiate a match with a buyer of
type β whose investment is fixed at zero, with the seller choosing investment s and generating
value
(s + 1)3
.
s+1−
3σ
The first-order condition for maximizing this quantity is 1 − (s + 1)2 /σ = 0, which we can
1
1
solve for (s + 1) = σ 2 , allowing a total value of 23 σ 2 . We then have an ex post equilibrium if
for all (β, σ) ∈ [3, 4] × [3, 4], we have
2 1
1
1
σ2 ≤ 2 −
−
,
3
3β
3σ
where the left side is the value created in the candidate match and the right side is the sum
of payoffs the agents earn while unmatched. This will clearly be least likely to hold when
β = 3, and it is then straightforward that the resulting inequality holds for σ ∈ [3, 4].
It is immediate that this ex post equilibrium is Pareto inefficient. We have noted that
any allocation matching all agents with b = s = 1 gives every agent a strictly higher payoff,
which suffices for the conclusion. Obviously, an ex ante equilibrium in which the buyer and
seller in each match receive an equal payoff also makes every agent strictly better off.

Example 9. Suppose that utility is perfectly transferable and preferences are additively separable. There are two types of buyer, β and β, with equal masses of each type. There are two
types of seller, σ and σ, with equal masses of each types. There are eight buyer investments,
{b1 , b2 , b3 , b4 , b1 , b2 , b3 , b4 }, and eight seller investments, {s1 , s2 , s3 , s4 , s1 , s2 , s3 , s4 }.
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b1
b2
b3
b4

s1
20
10
8
8

s2
8
9
8
8

s3
3
4
7
6

s4
2
3
6
0

b1
b2
b3
b4

s1 s2
9 8
10 15
8 8
8 8

s3
3
4
0
6

s4
2
3
5
6

b1
b2
b3
b4

s1
5
6
6
6

s2
5
0
7
7

s3 s4
6
6
7
7
15 10
9
8

b1
b2
b3
b4

s1
0
6
6
6

s2
5
6
7
9

s3
6
7
8
9

.

b1
b2
b3
b4

s1
40, 40
20, 20
16, 16
16, 16

˜(b, s) = b̃(s, b) sfor
s2 Figure
s3 5: Functions
s4
s2
1 Example
16, 16
6, 6
4, 4
b1 10, 10 10, 10
18, 18
8, 8
6, 6
b2 12, 12
0, 0
16, 16 14, 14 12, 12
b3 12, 12 14, 14
16, 16 12, 12 0, 0
b4 12, 12 14, 14
Buyer β, Seller σ

s4
6
7
9
20

9. s3
12, 12
14, 14
30, 30
18, 18

s4
12, 12
14, 14
20, 20
16, 16

Buyer β, Seller σ
.

b1
b2
b3
b4

s1
18, 18
20, 20
16, 16
16, 16

s2
s3
s4
16, 16
6, 6
4, 4
30, 30
8, 8
6, 6
16, 16
0, 0 10, 10
16, 16 12, 12 12, 12

b1
b2
b3
b4

Buyer β, Seller σ

s1
0, 0
12, 12
12, 12
12, 12

s2
10, 10
12, 12
14, 14
18, 18

s3
12, 12
14, 14
16, 16
18, 18

s4
12, 12
14, 14
18, 18
40, 40

Buyer β, Seller σ

Figure 6: Full appropriation games for Example 9.
Preferences are given by (14)–(15), where f˜(b, s) = g̃(s, b) and where these functions are
given in Figure 5. The cost functions are given by, for i = 1, 2, 3, 4:
f(bi , β) = f(bi , β) = g(si , σ) = f(si , σ) = 0
f(bi , β) = f(bi , β) = g(si , σ) = g(si , σ) = 45.
We have f ≡ 0 ≡ g. Hence, outside options are zero. Autarchy investments are any of
{b1 , b2 , b3 , b4 } for a buyer of type β and any of {b1 , b2 , b3 , b4 } for a buyer of type β, with
sellers being analogous.
The cost functions ensure that it is a strictly dominated strategy for agent β to choose an
investment bk (for any k), or for β to choose bk , for σ to choose sk , or for σ to choose sk . The
associated full appropriation games, omitting these obviously strictly dominated strategies,
are then given in Figure 6. Each full appropriation game has a unique Nash equilibrium
that is also the unique outcome of the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies.
The unique pairwise efficient allocation forms matches (β, σ) (with investments (b1 , s1 ), for a
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total payoff of 40) and matches (β, σ) (with investments (b4 , s4 ), for a total payoff of 40).
However, there is an ex post equilibrium matching (β, σ) (with investments (b2 , s2 ), for a
total payoff of 30) and matching (β, σ) (with investments (b3 , s3 ), for a total payoff of 30).
The latter equilibrium is Pareto inefficient.

4.2
4.2.1

Full Matching
Sufficient Conditions for Full Matching

A simple sufficient condition to ensure that all pairwise efficient allocations and, hence all ex
ante equilibria, are fully matched is to assume that for every (i, j) ∈ N 2 , there exists some
exchange (b, s, t) with
U (b, s, β(i), σ(j), t) > u(i) and

V (s, b, σ(j), β(i), t) > v(j).

(76)

Any feasible allocation in which there exists a pair of unmatched agents (i, j) is then Pareto
dominated by an otherwise unchanged allocation in which these two agents match with an
exchange (b, s, t) satisfying (76).21 This condition can be interpreted as the requirement
that all possible matches are productive, allowing the matching partners to achieve utilities
strictly higher than their outside options. The vast majority of our examples satisfy this
condition.22
Assuming all matches to be productive, however, does not suffice to ensure that all ex
post equilibria are fully matched. This is evident from Examples 1 and 8 in which unmatched
agents choose their autarchy investments of zero and no match involving an agent who has
chosen an investment of zero can generate any strictly positive surplus. A condition sufficient
to ensure that all ex post equilibria are fully matched is that matches are productive even
when one of the agents in the match has chosen an autarchy investment. The following is
immediate from the pairwise conditional efficiency of ex post equilibria:
Proposition 6. Let Assumption 1 hold. Suppose that for all (i, j) ∈ N 2 , either (i) for
all autarchy investments b of buyer i there exists (s, t) with U (b, s, β(i), σ(j), t) > u(i) and
V (s, b, σ(j), β(i), t) > v(j), or (ii) an analogous condition holds for the autarchy investments
of seller j. Then every ex post equilibrium (J, I, b, s, u, v) is fully matched.
The sufficient conditions of Proposition 6 will hold only if autarkic investments are also
of value within a match. We have built this malleability of investments into our model.
An alternative would be to assume that matched and unmatched agents have access to
fundamentally different technologies, with incompatible types of investments. We discuss
this issue further in Appendix E.
Suppose that preferences are separable. Then the conditions appearing in Proposition 6
will hold if we have
fˆ(b, s, 0) ≥ f (b) and ĝ(s, b, 0) ≥ g(s),
(77)
21 In the extension of our model to the case in which the masses of buyers and sellers may differ, (76)
suffices to ensure that the short side of the market is fully matched.
22 In some of our examples (e.g., Examples 1, 3, and 5) the strict inequalities from (76) hold for all matches
but possibly those involving either the lowest possible type of buyer or lowest possibly type of seller, with
equality holding for such matches. In these cases the bottom types only may remain unmatched (cf. the
discussion in footnote 7) with the resulting ex ante equilibria being payoff equivalent to fully matched ex ante
equilibria. For our purposes it is without loss of generality to treat these equilibria as being fully matched.
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with at least one inequality strict, whenever b is an autarchy investment for some type of
buyer and s an autarchy investment for some type of seller. These conditions will in turn be
satisfied if all autarchy investments are strictly positive, the functions fˆ and ĝ are strictly
increasing in the partner’s investment, and being unmatched is equivalent to being matched
to a partner with a zero investment. The conditions appearing in (77) are also satisfied in
Iyigun and Walsh (2007). In contrast, the conditions appearing in Proposition 6 fail in many
of our examples, which are designed to highlight the difference between ex ante and ex post
equilibria and use convenient but special functional forms.
4.2.2

Full Matching, Continuity, and Separability

So far we have made no assumptions on the functions β and σ. To make further progress,
we require some regularity of the map from names into types to ensure that we can link
assumptions on the agents’ utility functions (which are expressed in terms of types) to
properties of the utility frontiers (which are expressed in terns of names).
Assumption 2. The functions β and σ are continuous.
Assumptions 1 and 2 imply continuity of the utility frontiers and, as a consequence, the
continuity of equilibrium utility schedules for fully matched equilibria. Appendix F proves:
Lemma 2. Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then
[2.1] The functions φ, ψ, φ̆, and ψ̆ are continuous.
[2.2] In any fully matched ex ante or ex post equilibrium (J, I, b, s, u, v) the functions u
and v are continuous.
The intuition for the second part of this result is standard: if the utility schedule u (for
example) took a jump at i∗ , then some buyer with a name very close to i∗ and with a utility
on the lower side of the jump could increase his utility by matching with seller J(i) currently
matched with another buyer i who is also close to i∗ but on the upper side of the jump. Of
course, Lemma 2 trivially holds in the finite case.
Our next result exploits separability to show that fully matched ex post equilibria are
ex ante equilibria in an economy in which the investment opportunities are restricted in a
particular way. In light of the constrained efficiency result from Proposition 4 this is not
surprising. To state the result, we introduce some notation and terminology that we also
require in Section 4.3.
For any pair of nonempty closed sets B̃ ⊆ B and S̃ ⊆ S, define φB̃,S̃ : N × N × R → R
as follows:
φB̃,S̃ (i, j, v) =

max

U (b, s, β, σ, t) s.t.

V (s, b, σ, β, u) ≥ v.

b∈B̃,s∈S̃,t∈R

Define ψS̃,B̃ analogously. We assume that B̃ and S̃ are nonempty and closed to ensure that
the utility frontiers φB̃,S̃ and ψS̃,B̃ are well defined and Lemmas 1 and 2 are applicable. Given
such sets B̃ and S̃, consider an allocation (J, I, b, s, u, v) satisfying b(i) ∈ B̃ and s(j) ∈ S̃.
We say that this allocation is individually rational on (B̃, S̃) if u(i) ≥ maxb∈B̃ U (b, β(i)) and
v(j) ≥ maxs∈S̃ V (s, σ(j)) hold for all i and j. If, in addition, the pairwise efficiency conditions
(44)–(45) from Definition 5 hold for φB̃,S̃ and ψS̃,B̃ , then (J, I, b, s, u, v) is pairwise efficient
on (B̃, S̃) . If we let B̃ = B and S̃ = S, we have φB,S = φ and ψS,B = ψ and recover the
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standard definition of pairwise efficiency. Note that we may apply Proposition 1 to conclude
that an allocation which is pairwise efficient on some sets B̃ and S̃ is an ex ante equilibrium
in an economy in which B̃ and S̃ are the sets of available investments.
Lemma 3. Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, let preferences be separable, let (J, I, b, s, u, v)
be a fully matched ex post equilibrium, and let B and S be the closures of the sets B and S
of investments chosen by buyers and sellers. Then (J, I, b, s, u, v) is pairwise efficient on
(B, S).
Proof. Individual rationality of (J, I, b, s, u, v) on (B, S) is immediate. Applying the
definition of pairwise efficiency on (B, S), it thus suffices to show that, for all i and j,
u(i) ≥ sup φ̆(i, j, s, v(j)) = max φ̆(i, j, s, v(j)) = φB,S (i, j, v(j)) ≥ φB,S (i, j, v(j))
s∈S

s∈S

v(j) ≥ sup ψ̆(j, i, b, u(i)) = max ψ̆(j, i, b, u(i)) = ψB,S (j, i, u(i)) ≥ ψS,B (j, i, u(i)).
b∈B

b∈B

The first inequality in each case follows from Proposition 4 and the definition of pairwise
constrained efficiency (cf. (56)–(57)), the subsequent equality is implied by continuity of φ̆
and ψ̆ (and the continuity of u and v) established in Lemma 2, the second equality follows
from the relationship between φ̆ and φ and between ψ̆ and ψ (cf. (48)–(49)), and the final
inequality follows from the observation that restricting agents to a smaller set of investments
cannot increase the utility possibilities open to them.

4.3

Positive Assortative Matching

Throughout this section we consider fully matched allocations. We seek conditions under
which all fully matched ex post equilibria are payoff equivalent to positive assortative
allocations. Assuming unidimensional names is a prerequisite for such an investigation. The
following assumption directs our attention to the two most commonly studied cases.
Assumption 3. The sets N ⊂ R is either a finite or an interval.
Section 4.3.1 shows that familiar single crossing conditions on the restricted utility frontiers
φB̃,S̃ and ψS̃,B̃ introduced in Section 4.2.2 ensures payoff equivalence to positive assortative
equilibria. Section 4.3.2 considers assumptions on the underlying utility functions U and
V (and set of types and investments) that, when coupled with the natural monotonicity
requirements on the maps from names to types, imply the requisite single crossing properties
of the utility frontiers.
4.3.1

A Single Crossing Condition for Positive Assortative Matching

In their study of matching models with imperfectly transferable utility Legros and Newman
(2007b) have introduced the concept of generalized increasing differences. For an economy
with a finite number of agents they show that generalized increasing differences ensures
payoff equivalence of equilibrium matchings to positive assortative matching, and that a
strict version of this property yields positive assortative equilibrium matchings. Generalized
increasing differences is a property on the functions describing the utility frontiers. As noted
by Legros and Newman (2007b) the property of (strict) generalized increasing differences is

46

equivalent to the (strict) single crossing condition that appears in the following definition.
The interpretation is that higher buyers have a comparative advantage in matching with
higher sellers, and vice versa.
Definition 10. Let B̃ ⊆ B and S̃ ⊆ S be closed sets. Then φB̃,S̃ and ψS̃,B̃ satisfy single
crossing if for all i > i and j > j,
φB̃,S̃ (i, j, v1 ) ≥ φB̃,S̃ (i, j, v2 )

=⇒ φB̃,S̃ (i, j, v1 ) ≥ φB̃,S̃ (i, j, v2 )

(78)

ψS̃,B̃ (j, i, u1 ) ≥ ψS̃,B̃ (j, i, u2 )

=⇒ ψS̃,B̃ (j, i, u1 ) ≥ ψS̃,B̃ (j, i, u2 ).

(79)

If the inequalities in the consequents of (78)–(79) are strict, then single crossing is said to be
strict.
By Lemma 1.2, the functions φB̃,S̃ and ψS̃,B̃ appearing in Definition 10 are inverse. This
implies that conditions (78)–(79) are not independent, but equivalent to each other.
The following key lemma asserts the payoff equivalence of fully matched ex ante equilibria
to positive assortative ex ante equilibria when the utility frontiers φ and ψ satisfy single
crossing. Further, with strict single crossing the equivalence is exact. For the finite case, this
result is the counterpart to Proposition 1 in Legros and Newman (2007b). Extending the
result to infinite sets of agents is straightforward when the single crossing is strict, but raises
a number of technical issues otherwise. We resolve these with the help of the continuity
result in Lemma 2. The proof is in Appendix G.2.
Lemma 4. Let Assumptions 1–3 hold and assume that φ and ψ satisfy single crossing.
Then every fully matched ex ante equilibrium is payoff equivalent to a positive assortative ex
ante equilibrium. If φ and ψ satisfy strict single crossing, then every fully matched ex ante
equilibrium is positive assortative.
In general, the result in Lemma 4 has no obvious counterpart for ex post equilibria, as
there is no natural generalization of the single crossing conditions to the conditional utility
frontiers φ̆ and ψ̆. However, when preferences are separable we can use Lemma 3 to infer that
a fully matched ex post equilibrium is an ex ante equilibrium in an economy in which buyers
are restricted to choose investments in B and sellers are restricted to choose investments in
S. Provided that the functions φB,S and ψS,B satisfy single crossing, we can then apply
Lemma 4 to obtain a positive assortment result. However, as we explain in Remark 10 below,
strict single crossing must fail when B or S is a singleton and preferences are separable.
Consequently, the following result does not contain a counterpart of the strict single crossing
result from Lemma 4.
Proposition 7. Let Assumptions 1–3 hold, let preferences be separable, and assume that
φB̃,S̃ and ψS̃,B̃ satisfy single crossing for all nonempty closed B̃ ⊆ B and S̃ ⊆ S. Then
every fully matched ex-post equilibrium is payoff equivalent to a positive assortative ex post
equilibrium.
Proof. Let (J, I, b, s, u, v) be a fully matched ex post equilibrium. By Lemma 3 the
allocation (J, I, b, s, u, v) is pairwise efficient on B and S and thus a fully matched ex ante
equilibrium in the corresponding economy in which the sets of feasible investments are given
by B and S. Because these sets are compact, Assumptions 1–3 hold in the restricted economy.
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We can then apply Lemma 4 to infer the existence of a payoff equivalent, positive assortative
ex ante equilibrium (J 0 , I 0 , b0 , s0 , u, v) in the restricted economy.
It remains to show that (J 0 , I 0 , b0 , s0 , u, v) is an ex post equilibrium in the original economy.
First, (J 0 , I 0 , b0 , s0 , u, v) is clearly feasible in the original economy. Second, the allocations
(J, I, b, s, u, v) and (J 0 , I 0 , b0 , s0 , u, v) have identical payoffs and the only new investments
we have possibly added when moving from b and s to b0 and s0 are contained in the closures
of the sets B and S. Noting that (J, I, b, s, u, v) is individually rational and satisfies the
pairwise constrained efficiency conditions (56)–(57) in the original economy, we can then
conclude that (J 0 , I 0 , b0 , s0 , u, v) also has these properties. From Corollary 3 and Proposition
2 this implies that (J 0 , I 0 , b0 , s0 , u, v) is an ex post equilibrium in the original economy, giving
the result.
The sufficient conditions in Proposition 7 require that single crossing not only holds for B
and S, but for arbitrary closed subsets of B and S. Example 13 in Appendix G.3 illustrates
the importance of this stronger condition by providing an example adapted from Dizdar
(2012). In this example, preferences are separable and (78)–(79) hold for φ and ψ, but there
exist ex post equilibria which are not payoff equivalent to allocations in which matching is
positive assortative.
4.3.2

Sufficient Conditions for Single Crossing

The single crossing properties in Definition 10 are not written in terms of the primitives of
the problem. We have formulated Proposition 7 in terms of this single crossing property for
two reasons. First, Definition 10 succinctly and intuitively identifies what is needed to ensure
positive assortative matching, namely a single crossing condition on utility frontiers. Second,
as Legros and Newman (2007b) discuss, it is difficult to find general sufficient conditions,
ensuring that single crossing is satisfied. In this section we exploit separability to identify
conditions on utility functions guaranteing single crossing of φB̃ S̃ and ψB̃ S̃ for all closed
subsets of B and S, ensuring the applicability of Proposition 7.23 As it is common in the
literature (cf. Section 2.1.4) we restrict attention to the case of unidimensional types and
investments. In addition, we assume that agents with higher names have higher types.
Assumption 4.
[4.1] The sets B, S, B, and S are subsets of R.
[4.2] The functions β and σ are strictly increasing.
The results in this section continue to hold of β and σ are only weakly increasing, but we
will need the full strength of Assumption 4.2 in Section 5.
Recall that with separable preferences we have (cf. (58)–(59))
U (b, s, β, σ, t) = Û (fˆ(b, s, t), b, β)
V (s, b, σ, β, t) = V̂ (ĝ(s, b, t), s, σ).
We say that separable preferences satisfy outer single crossing if
Û (x1 , b, β) ≥ Û (x2 , b, β)

=⇒

Û (x1 , b, β) ≥ Û (x2 , b, β)

(80)

V̂ (y1 , s, σ) ≥ V̂ (y2 , s, σ)

=⇒

V̂ (y1 , s, σ) ≥ V̂ (y2 , s, σ)

(81)

23 Han

(2002) provides conditions for ex ante equilibria to exhibit positive assortative matching when
preferences are given by (63)–(64), so that utility is perfectly transferable but not separable.
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hold whenever b > b, β > β, s > s and σ > σ. The interpretation of the outer single crossing
properties is obvious: given the returns associated with the different investments, higher
types are (weakly) more inclined to chose higher investments.
Now define
ρ(b, s, y)

=

max fˆ(b, s, t) s.t. ĝ(s, b, t) ≥ y

σ(s, b, x)

=

max ĝ(s, b, t) s.t. fˆ(b, s, t) ≥ x

t∈R

t∈R

for all b, s, y, and x. The functions ρ and σ are the utility frontiers for an economy in which
pairs of agents are described by their investments (b, s) and the utility functions for a match
between such agents with a transfer t are given by the return functions fˆ and ĝ.
We say that separable preferences satisfy inner single crossing if
ρ(b, s, y1 ) ≥ ρ(b, s, y2 )

=⇒

ρ(b, s, y1 ) ≥ ρ(b, s, y2 )

(82)

σ(s, b, x1 ) ≥ σ(s, b, x2 )

=⇒

σ(s, b, x1 ) ≥ σ(s, b, x2 )

(83)

hold whenever b > b and s > s. The interpretation of inner single crossing is again obvious:
agents which have chosen higher investments are more eager to match with agents who have
chosen high investments.
Remark 9. In the additively separable case outer single crossing holds if and only if the
cost functions f and g are submodular. To see this, consider the case of (80). With additively
separable preferences for the buyer we can rewrite this as
x1 − f(b, β) ≥ x2 − f(b, β) =⇒ x1 − f(b, β) ≥ x2 − f(b, β).
This holds for all x1 , x2 ∈ R if and only if
f(b, β) − f(b, β) ≥ f(b, β) − f(b, β).
As we require (80) for all b > b and β > β this is submodularity of f.
An analogous argument shows that with perfectly transferable utility and separable
preferences the inner single crossing conditions (82)–(83) hold if and only if the surplus
function z is supermodular. In the case of separable preferences with perfectly transferable
utility the slightly more general result that supermodularity of Z suffices for the single
crossing conditions in Proposition 7 is immediate from Theorem 2.7.6 in Topkis (1998).
Outer single crossing ensures that in equilibrium agents with higher types choose higher
investments, whereas inner single crossing implies positive assortment of investments. Because
we have assumed that types are increasing in names this suffices to imply positive assortment
in ex post equilibrium. Appendix H proves:
Corollary 5. Let Assumptions 1–4 hold. Suppose preferences are separable and satisfy outer
and inner single crossing. Then every fully matched ex post equilibrium is payoff equivalent
to a fully matched allocation satisfying positive assortative matching.
The proof proceeds by showing that outer and inner single crossing of preferences imply
the single crossing conditions appearing in Proposition 7, and then applying this proposition.

49

Corollary 5 still leaves us with the task of determining when the outer and inner single
crossing conditions (80)–(83) hold. We focus on additively separable preferences. In this
case outer single crossing is equivalent to the submodularity of the cost functions f and g
(cf. Remark 9). It remains to identify conditions on the return functions fˆ and ĝ ensuring
the inner single crossing conditions (82)–(83) for the case of imperfectly transferable utility.
(With transferable utility, supermodularity of the surplus function z is necessary and sufficient.
Again, see Remark 9.) The following result, proven in Appendix H.3, does so.
Corollary 6. Let Assumptions 1–4 hold, and let preferences be additively separable with
submodular cost functions f and g. Suppose further that there exists continuous functions
F : R → R, G : R → R, f : B × S → R, g : S × B → R and h : R → R such that
fˆ(b, s, t) = F (f (b, s) − t)

(84)

ĝ(s, b, t) = G(g(s, b) + h(t)),

(85)

where F and G are strictly increasing, f and g are supermodular and increasing in their second
argument, and h is increasing and concave. Then every fully matched ex post equilibrium is
payoff equivalent to a positive assortative ex post equilibrium.
The proof shows that under the stated assumptions, (84)–(85) imply inner single crossing
at which point the result follows from Corollary 5.
The assumptions on the return functions in the statement of Corollary 6 are patterned
after the ones in the example studied by Iyigun and Walsh (2007) that we have discussed in
Section 2.1.4. We can think of investments as determining an amount of a second period
consumption good, given by f (b, s) + g(s, b), and a baseline division of this consumption good
across the two agents, given by (f (b, s), g(s, b)). When h(t) = t is the identity function (as in
Iyigun and Walsh, 2007) the division of the consumption good can be changed without cost;
the case of concave h allows for the possibility that there are increasing costs in transferring
the consumption good from one agent to the other.
Remark 10. Throughout this section we have focussed on establishing conditions under
which φB̃,S̃ and ψS̃,B̃ satisfy the single crossing condition, rather than the strict single
crossing condition from Definition 10. It is an immediate consequence of the separability
of preferences that φB̃,S̃ and ψS̃,B̃ must fail the strict single crossing condition when B̃ or
S̃ is a singleton. To see this suppose, for instance, that S̃ is a singleton, so that all sellers
choose the same investment. Separability then implies that if one buyer is indifferent between
matching with seller j or seller j 0 , then all buyers will be indifferent. More generally, as long
as we cannot exclude the possibility that in an ex post equilibrium different agents choose
the same investment, even assuming strict versions of inner and outer single crossing does
not imply strict single crossing of the corresponding frontiers φB,S and ψS,B . However, if
conditional exchange efficiency implies that all matched agents choose different investments
(see Examples 1, 2, 7, 8, 11, and 12) then strict inner single crossing and strict outer single
crossing imply strict single crossing of the relevant utility frontier, and then Lemma 4 can be
applied to infer that fully matched ex post equilibria are positive assortative.

4.4

Efficient Ex Post Equilibria

Sections 4.2.1 and 4.3.1 have identified conditions, namely condition (76) and the conditions
appearing in Lemma 4, under which all ex ante equilibria are positive assortative. It is clear
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that under these conditions, being positive assortative and exchange efficient is necessary for
the Pareto (and pairwise) efficiency of ex post equilibria. The following result shows that
having the correct, positive assortative matching and being exchange efficient are then also
sufficient for Pareto efficiency of ex post equilibria.
Proposition 8. Let Assumptions 1 and 3 hold, let condition (76) hold and assume φ and ψ
satisfy single crossing. Then every positive assortative ex post equilibrium that is exchange
efficient is also Pareto efficient.
Proof. Let (J, I, b, s, u, v) be positive assortative and exchange efficient. We show that
there exists no (J 0 , I 0 , b0 , s0 , u0 , v 0 ) which is a finite Pareto improvement on (J, I, b, s, u, v).
Suppose, contrariwise, that (J 0 , I 0 , b0 , s0 , u0 , v 0 ) is a finite Pareto improvement on the allocation (J, I, b, s, u, v). As (J, I, b, s, u, v) is fully matched, the allocation (J 0 , I 0 , b0 , s0 , u0 , v 0 )
has at most a finite number of unmatched agents, with identical numbers of unmatched
buyers and sellers. From condition (76), these agents can be matched with each other in a
way that is still a finite improvement on (J, I, b, s, u, v). Hence, we may assume without loss
of generality that (J 0 , I 0 , b0 , s0 , u0 , v 0 ) is fully matched. Let n be the cardinality of the set
{i | J 0 (i) 6= J(i)} = {j | I 0 (j) = I(j)} (where the equality of these sets is from the fact that
J(i) 6= i is equivalent to I(i) 6= i). Because (J, I, b, s, u, v) is exchange efficient, we must
have n > 0, ensuring that there is a lowest type (cf. Assumption 3), i, such that J 0 (i) 6= i
holds. Let j = J 0 (i) > i and i = I 0 (i) > i (where the strict inequalities hold because i is also
the lowest type for whom I 0 (j) 6= j holds).
Because both allocations are fully matched, if one buyer has a different partner then
there must be at least one other buyer with a different partner, and hence we cannot have
n = 1. Next, consider the case n = 2. Then we have j = i. From exchange efficiency of
(J, I, b, s, u, v), we have:
u(i) = φ(i, i, v(i)),
u(i) = φ(i, i, v(i)).
From feasibility of (J 0 , I 0 , b0 , s0 , u0 , v 0 ) we have:
u0 (i) ≤ φ(i, i, v 0 (i)),
u0 (i) ≤ φ(i, i, v 0 (i)).
Because v 0 (i) ≥ v(i) and v 0 (i) ≥ v(i) holds, the latter two inequalities imply
u0 (i) ≤ φ(i, i, v(i)),
u0 (i) ≤ φ(i, i, v(i)).
Because u0 (i) ≥ u(i) and u0 (i) ≥ u(i) holds, the exchange efficiency equalities then yield:
φ(i, i, v(i)) ≤ φ(i, i, v(i)),
φ(i, i, v(i)) ≤ φ(i, i, v(i)).
These inequalities contradict the single crossing property unless they both hold with equality.
But equality in both of these inequalities can only hold if u0 (i) = u(i) and v 0 (i) = v(i)
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holds for i = i, i, contradicting the assumption that (J 0 , I 0 , b0 , s0 , u0 , v 0 ) is a finite Pareto
improvement on (J, I, b, s, u, v).
Now consider the case n > 2. We argue that if there exists such a finite Pareto improvement, then there also exists a finite Pareto improvement with n0 < n. Repeating this
argument a finite number of times then yields the existence of a finite Pareto improvement
with n = 2, which we have already shown to be impossible. We consider two cases, namely
j = i and j 6= i.
In the first of these case, we can apply the argument from the case n = 2 to conclude
that u0 (i) = u(i) and v 0 (i) = v(i) holds for i = i, i. Consequently, if (J 0 , I 0 , b0 , s0 , u0 , v 0 ) is a
finite Pareto improvement on (J, I, b, s, u, v), so will be the allocation which coincides with
(J 0 , I 0 , b0 , s0 , u0 , v 0 ) except that the buyers and sellers with types i and i are assigned their
original partners and exchanges from the allocation (J, I, b, s, u, v). This new finite Pareto
improvement has cardinality n0 = n − 2.
Suppose now that we have j 6= i. As in the case n = 2 exchange efficiency gives us:
u(i) = φ(i, i, v(i)),
u(i) = φ(i, i, v(i)).
Feasibility gives us:
u0 (i) ≤ φ(i, j, v 0 (j)),
u0 (i) ≤ φ(i, i, v 0 (i)).
Using v 0 (j) ≥ v(j) and v 0 (i) ≥ v(i) this yields
u0 (i) ≤ φ(i, j, v(j)),
u0 (i) ≤ φ(i, i, v(i)).
Combining the first of these with the exchange efficiency condition and u0 (i) ≥ u(i), yields
φ(i, i, v(i)) ≤ φ(i, j, v(j)).
Because i > i and j > i, the single crossing property implies
φ(i, i, v(i)) ≤ φ(i, j, v(j)).
From previous inequalities, we have
φ(i, i, v(i)) ≤ φ(i, i, v(i)),
so that we can infer
u(i) ≤ φ(i, j, v(j)).
If this last inequality is strict, we can change (J 0 , I 0 , b0 , s0 , u0 , v 0 ) by (i) “rematching” buyer
and seller i with each other and having them make the exchange from the original allocation
and (ii) matching buyer i and seller j with each other and fixing an exchange for them such
that both of them strictly improve on their utility in the original allocation. Hence, we have
found a finite Pareto improvement with cardinality n0 = n − 1. If, on the other hand, we
have
u(i) = φ(i, j, v(j)),
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then it must have been the case that u0 (i) = u(i) and v 0 (j) = v(j) must have held for i = i, i
and j = i, j, so that performing the same rematching as described above again generates a
finite Pareto improvement with cardinality n0 = n − 1.
We can combine Proposition 8 with previous results to obtain conditions under which all ex
post equilibria are Pareto efficient. In particular, Proposition 5 provides sufficient conditions
for ex post equilibria to be exchange efficient, Proposition 6 offers sufficient conditions for
ex post equilibria to be fully matched, and Proposition 7 gives sufficient conditions for
positive assortment of fully matched ex post equilibria. Together, the conditions appearing in
Propositions 5–7, which imply the conditions from Proposition 8, thus preclude coordination
failures in ex post equilibrium:
Corollary 7. Let the conditions from Propositions 5–7 hold. Then every ex post equilibrium
is Pareto efficient.
One may wonder whether the conclusion in Propositions 8 and Corollary 7, can be
strengthened to obtain the pairwise rather than just Pareto efficiency of all ex post equilibria.
From Proposition 1 such a result would imply that all ex post equilibria are ex ante equilibria.
The following example provides a counterexample to the conjecture that the conditions in
Proposition 8 imply pairwise efficiency of positive assortative ex post equilibria.
Example 10. Let N = {0, 1}, B = {β, β} and S = {σ, σ}. Buyer 0 has type β and buyer 1
has type β > β. Sellers are similarly either σ or σ > σ. For simplicity, we will refer to agents
by their types rather than names throughout the following.
There are three possible buyer investments, {b1 , b2 , b3 } and three possible seller investments, {s1 , s2 , s3 }. Preferences are separable and utility is perfectly transferable with surplus
function z(b, s) given by
s1 s2 s3
b1 10 0 0
.
b2 0 8 0
b3 0 0 12
The cost-of-investment functions f and g are given by
f(b1 , β) = f(b2 , β) = 0,
f(b1 , β) = 20,

f(b3 , β) = 20
f(b2 , β) = f(b3 , β) = 0

g(s3 , σ) = 20
g(s1 , σ) = g(s2 , σ) = 0,
g(s1 , σ) = 20,
g(s2 , σ) = g(s3 , σ) = 0.
Outside options are zero. As we only consider fully matched equilibria, autarchy investments
are irrelevant. This example satisfies the conditions of Proposition 8.
There is a continuum of ex ante equilibria in this economy, featuring identical matching
and investments but differing in payoffs. In every ex ante efficient equilibrium, buyer β and
seller σ match and choose investments (b1 , s1 ), while buyer β and seller σ match and choose
investments (b3 , s3 ). Let u denote the equilibrium payoff earned buyer β, with u, v, and v
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similarly defined. The set of equilibrium payoffs is the set of quadruples (u, u, v, v) satisfying:
u

∈

[0, 10]

v

∈

10 − v

u ≥

max{u − 2, 0}

v

≥

max{v − 2, 0}

u+v

=

12.

The second condition indicates that the pair (β, σ) is on its utility frontier, while the last
condition indicates the same for the pair (β, σ). The first condition indicates that the pair
(β, σ) can achieve payoffs anywhere on its utility frontier. The remaining two conditions
indicate that the pair (β, σ) must secure a payoff on its frontier that allows both agents in
this match a payoff at least as high as they can achieve by matching with partner σ or β.
We now consider an allocation with the identical matching and investments, but in which
u=v

=

5

u =

10

v

2.

=

This is an ex post equilibrium. The only ex post equilibrium conditions that are not immediate
are the requirements that buyer β and seller σ are earning higher payoffs than they could
earn by matching with each other. But given that seller σ is choosing investment s3 , there is
no investment that buyer β can choose that yields him a positive payoff with such a seller.
For similar reasons, there is no profitable deviation for seller σ. We thus have an ex post
equilibrium that fails pairwise efficiency.
The point illustrated by Example 10 is that ex ante and ex post equilibria give rise to
fundamentally different incentive constraints. Buyer and seller investments are both up for
grabs when agents consider the alternative matchings that give rise to the pairwise efficiency
conditions, and this imposes tighter incentive constraints on equilibrium payoffs than do
the corresponding pairwise conditional efficiency considerations. We thus cannot in general
expect ex post equilibria to be pairwise efficient, even if they are exchange efficient and the
matching is unambiguously “correct.”
Remark 11. Fully matched ex ante and ex post equilibria are equivalent in Example 1,
but are not equivalent in Example 10. The continuity built into Example 1 ensures that
the local incentive constraints determining whether a positive assortative and exchange
efficient allocation is pairwise efficient are identical to the local incentive constraints for
pairwise conditional efficiency. The finiteness of Example 10 precludes such a continuity-based
argument.

5

Nontransferable Utility

The most obvious case excluded by our model is that in which utility is nontransferable, as
exemplified by Peters and Siow (2002). Following the “marriage market” literature arising
out of Gale and Shapley (1962), Peters and Siow (2002) assume that there is no possibility
for altering the utilities of a matched pair of agents once their investments are sunk. This
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section extends our analysis to accommodate nontransferable utility. Many of our results
carry over with no or relatively small changes, while others require significant modifications.
Most importantly, nontransferable utility leads to a rather dramatic failure of exchange
efficiency, thus undermining the possibility to obtain general conditions guaranteeing the
Pareto efficiency of ex post equilibria.

5.1

The Model

We continue to work with the model introduced in Section 2, but now replace Assumptions
1.2–1.3. with the assumptions that neither U nor V depend on t:
Assumption 5.
[5.1] The functions U , U , V , V are continuous.
[5.2] U (b, s, β, σ, t) = U (b, s, β, σ, t0 ) holds for all (b, s, β, σ), t and t0 .
[5.3] V (s, b, σ, β, t) = V (s, b, σ, β, t0 ) holds for all (s, b, σ, β), t and t0 .
Assumption 5 is maintained throughout the following. We simplify the notation by writing
U (b, s, β, σ) and V (s, b, σ, β) for the utilities agents obtain from engaging in an exchange
(b, s, t) (which, by Assumptions 5.2–5.3, are independent of t). We similarly simply refer to
(b, s) as an exchange. As a hint of difficulties to come, we observe that non-transferability of
utility implies a failure of the strict Pareto property (cf. equations (1)–(2)).
The definition of a feasible allocation, Definition 1, remains unchanged.

5.2

Equilibrium and Efficiency with Nontransferable Utility

As in the transferable utility case, our first step in defining ex ante and ex post equilibria is to
define functions φ, ψ, φ̆, and ψ̆, describing the utility possibilities available to a matched pair
of agents. In the absence of effective transfers, we must accommodate the possibility that
the set of exchanges satisfying the constraint appearing in the definition of these functions
is empty. We do so by assigning −∞ as the value of the relevant function in such a case.
Formally, we let
ŭ(i, j, b) = max U (b, s, β(i), σ(j)),
s∈S

v̆(j, i, s) = max V (s, b, σ(j), β(i)),
b∈B

ū(i, j) = max ŭ(i, j, b),
b∈B

v̄(j, i) = max v̆(j, i, s)
s∈S
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and define
(

maxb,s U (b, s, β(i), σ(j)) s. t. V (s, b, σ(j), β(i)) ≥ v
−∞

if v ≤ v̄(j, i)
otherwise,

maxb,s V (s, b, σ(j), β(i)) s. t. U (b, s, β(i), σ(j)) ≥ u
−∞
(
maxb U (b, s, β(i), σ(j)) s. t. V (s, b, σ(j), β(i)) ≥ v
φ̆(i, j, s, v) =
−∞
(
maxs V (s, b, σ(j), β(i)) s. t. U (b, s, β(i), σ(j)) ≥ u
ψ̆(j, i, b, u) =
−∞

if u ≤ ū(i, j)
otherwise,

φ(i, j, v) =
(

ψ(j, i, u) =

if v ≤ v̆(j, i, s)
otherwise,
if u ≤ ŭ(i, j, b)
otherwise.

The existence of all the maxima appearing in these definitions is assured by Assumption 5.1.
With these modifications, the definitions of ex ante and ex post equilibria (Definitions
2–3 in Section 2.2) as well as the definitions of Pareto efficiency, pairwise efficiency, pairwise
conditional efficiency, and pairwise constrained efficiency (Definitions 4–8 in Section 3.1) carry
over without any further changes to the case of nontransferable utility. Ex ante equilibria
continue to satisfy the exchange efficiency condition (23) and ex post equilibria continue
to satisfy the conditionally exchange efficiency condition (29). It is also easily verified that
Propositions 1 and 2 as well as the associated Corollaries 1, 2 and 3 continue to hold when
Assumption 1 is replaced by Assumption 5 in the statement of these results.24 In particular,
the result that every ex ante equilibrium is an ex post equilibrium holds with nontransferable
utility, ensuring that pairwise efficient allocations are ex post equilibria, and we again have
the relationships summarized in Figure 2.
It is less obvious that Proposition 4 continues to hold with non-transferable utility.
However, neither the definition of separability, Definition 9, nor our proof of Proposition 4
makes use of the existence of effective transfers. Hence, even with non-transferable utility
separability of preferences implies the pairwise constrained efficiency of ex post equilibria.
Further, Corollary 4 can be inferred from Proposition 4 without having to resort to the strict
Pareto property and thus continues to hold, too. As a consequence under separability, the
“leveraging approach” to bounding the inefficiencies that may arise in an ex-post equilibrium
discussed in Section 4.1.2 remains applicable with non-transferable utility and imposes
significant constraints in the construction of ex-post equilibria. The example considered in
Section 5.4 illustrates this.
In contrast to the results discussed in the preceding paragraph, the exchange efficiency
result in Proposition 5 makes essential use the (imperfect) transferability of utility. To
investigate the effects of assuming non-transferable utility on this result, we begin by
observing that under nontransferability an exchange (b, s) is conditionally efficient for the
pair (i, j) if and only if
b ∈ arg max
U (b0 , s, β(i), σ(j)) s.t. V (s, b0 , σ(j), β(i)) ≥ V (s, b, σ(j), β(i)),
0

(86)

s ∈ arg max
V (s0 , b, σ(j), β(i)) s.t. U (b, s0 , β(i), σ(j)) ≥ U (b, s, β(i), σ(j)).
0

(87)

b ∈B
s ∈S

24 Because there are no effective transfers, we obviously cannot establish a counterpart to Proposition 3
concerning prices.
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The implications of (86)–(87) are most easily understood when investments are unidimensional and utility functions satisfy an additional monotonicity property. We thus strengthen
Assumption 4 to:
Assumption 6.
[6.1] The sets B, S, B, and S are subsets of R.
[6.2] The functions β and σ are strictly increasing.
[6.3] The function U (b, s, β, σ) is strictly increasing in s and V (s, b, σ, β) is strictly
increasing in b.
Assumption 6 states that, as in the model considered in Peters and Siow (2002), each
agent in a matched pair strictly prefers that his or her partner chooses a higher investment
level. As a consequence, the constraint appearing in (86) reduces to b0 ≥ b and the constraint
in (87) reduces to s0 ≥ s. It follows that every exchange (b, s) with the property that neither
the buyer nor the seller strictly prefers a unilateral increase in his or her own investment is
conditionally efficient for the pair under consideration. The following result, which imposes
the counterparts to the differentiability and convexity requirements from Proposition 5, is
then immediate. As before, we use subscripts to denote partial derivatives.
Proposition 9. Let Assumptions 5–6 hold, let B = [b, b] and S = [s, s], and U and V
quasiconcave and differentiable in (b, s). Then an exchange (b, s) is conditionally efficient for
the pair (i, j) if and only if
Ub (b, s, β(i), σ(j)) · (b − b) ≤ 0,
Vs (s, b, σ(j), β(i)) · (s − s) ≤ 0.
Proposition 9 indicates that the only exchanges excluded by conditional efficiency are
ones in which the buyer (for example, with a similar statement for the seller) underinvests to
such an extent that the buyer could increase his own utility by increasing his investment for
the given investment of the seller. Even with the quasiconcavity conditions of Proposition
5, pairwise conditional efficiency thus does not preclude exchanges in which both agents
underinvest (in the sense that both agents’ utilities could be increased by an increase in both
investments). Similarly, pairwise conditional efficiency does not preclude cases in which both
agents overinvest (in the sense that both agents’ utilities could be increased by a decrease in
both investments).
Ex post equilibria with underinvestment can be interpreted as reflecting a hold-up
problem, arising from the fact that in the absence of effective transfers the gain from
increasing an investment is completely captured by the agent on the other side in the market.
Overinvestment can be interpreted in terms of an investment arms race, in which agents
chose wastefully high investments because they cannot use transfers to provide the agent on
the other side of the market with an appropriate utility level.

5.3

Matching in Ex Post Equilibrium

It is immediate that Proposition 6 continues to hold with nontransferable utility, providing
conditions under which all ex post equilibria are fully matched. Here we establish conditions
ensuring that fully matched ex post equilibria are payoff equivalent to positive assortative
allocations.

57

Section 5.1 noted that the strict Pareto property fails under nontransferable utility. In
the absence of the strict Pareto property, Lemma 1 does not hold. Rather than seeking a
counterpart to Proposition 7, the proof of which relied on Lemma 1, we provide sufficient
conditions for positive assortment by giving a direct proof for a counterpart to Corollary 5.
In the following result we consider the case of separable preferences (cf. Definition 9), so
that utility functions are given by
U (b, s, β, σ) = Û (fˆ(b, s), b, β)
V (s, b, σ, β) = V̂ (ĝ(s, b), s, σ)
for functions Û and V̂ that are strictly increasing in their first arguments. We say that
preferences satisfy strict outer single crossing if the inequalities in the consequents of
conditions (80)–(81) from Section 4.3.2 hold strictly. The proof of the following is in
Appendix I.
Proposition 10. Let Assumptions 3 and 5–6 hold, let preferences be separable and satisfy
strict outer single crossing. Then every fully matched ex post equilibrium is payoff equivalent
to a positive assortative ex post equilibrium.
There are two key differences between the conditions appearing in the statement of
Corollary 5 and Proposition 10. First, there is no counterpart to the requirement that the
functions fˆ and ĝ satisfy a single crossing condition in the statement of Proposition 10.
The role of this single crossing requirement in the proof of Corollary 5 is to ensure that
the matching of investments induced by a matching of agents can be taken to be positive
assortative. In the absence of transfers, the requirement in Assumption 6 that U and V
are strictly increasing in the partner’s investment suffices for this step of the argument.
Second, in Proposition 10 strict outer single crossing rather than (weak) outer single crossing
is imposed. In the absence of effective transfers, this strengthening of the single crossing
condition is required to ensure that investments are increasing in names.
Proposition 10 isolates exchange inefficiency as the key stumbling block in extending our
efficiency result in Proposition 8 for the case of (imperfectly) transferable utility to the case
of nontransferable utility.

5.4

Example

To illustrate our results, we consider an example patterned after the model in Peters and
Siow (2002).25 The set of names, types, and investments are compact intervals in R with
N = B = S = [0, 1] and B = S = [0, x] with x > 4. The functions β and σ are the identity
functions. Utility functions are given by
b2
,
2(β + 1)
s2
V (s, b, σ, β) = b + s −
,
2(σ + 1)

U (b, s, β, σ) = b + s −

b2
2(β + 1)
s2
V (s, σ) = s −
.
2(σ + 1)
U (b, β) = b −

25 The main difference between this example and the scenario considered in Peters and Siow (2002) is that
the set of feasible investments in Peters and Siow (2002) is type dependent. Our model and results can be
extended to cover this possibility, but for the sake of clarity we prefer not to do so here.
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These utility functions represent additively separable preferences with fˆ(b, s) = ĝ(s, b) = b+s,
f (b) = fˆ(b, 0), g(s) = ĝ(s, 0), and
Û (y, b, β) = y −

b2
s2
and V̂ (y, s, σ) = y −
.
2(β + 1)
2(σ + 1)

The autarchy investments b(i) and s(j) chosen by unmatched agents are given by the
solution to the first order conditions U b (b, i) = 0 and V s (s, j) = 0, implying
b(i) = 1 + i > 0

and s(j) = 1 + j > 0,

resulting in the outside options
u(i) =

i+1
2

and v(j) =

j+1
.
2

Because autarchy investments are strictly positive, condition (77) holds with strict
inequalities, ensuring that all ex post equilibria are fully matched. Because Assumptions 3–6
hold and Û and V̂ satisfy strict single crossing, Proposition 10 implies that every ex post
equilibrium is payoff equivalent to an allocation with positive assortative matching. We thus
restrict attention to positive assortative allocations in the following. Further, we simplify the
exposition by considering symmetric allocations in which matched agents choose identical
investments, that is, i = j implies b(i) = s(j). Notice, however, that asymmetric ex ante
and ex post equilibria also exist, despite the symmetry of the model.
The investment functions in the symmetric ex ante equilibrium are given by
b∗ (i) = 2(i + 1)

and

s∗ (j) = 2(j + 1),

and

v ∗ (j) = 2(j + 1).

resulting in equilibrium utility levels
u∗ (i) = 2(i + 1)

The corresponding allocation with positive assortative matching is also an ex post equilibrium.
In the following we exhibit additional ex post equilibria failing exchange (and hence pairwise
and Pareto) efficiency, thus illustrating the scope of possible inefficiencies indicated by
Proposition 9.
First we construct an underinvestment equilibrium. Consider the investment functions b
and s given by b(i) = s(j) = 2 for all i and j. In this allocation almost all agents underinvest
relative to the symmetric ex ante equilibrium. The resulting utility levels in the corresponding
allocation with positive assortative matching are
u(i) = 4 −

2
≥ u(i)
(i + 1)

and v(j) = 4 −

2
≥ v(j),
(j + 1)

ensuring that the individual rationality constraints are satisfied. As the conditions from
Proposition 9 are satisfied, this allocation is an ex post equilibrium. Every agent fares strictly
better in this equilibrium than under autarchy except for agents i = j = 1, who are choosing
investments (and earning utilities) just equal to their autarchy levels. The latter equality
implies that we could not construct a similar equilibrium with an investment level lower than
2.
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Next we consider an overinvestment equilibrium. Consider the investment functions b
and s given by
(
3
if i < 1/2
b(i) =
∗
b (i) otherwise
(
3
if j < 1/2
s(j) =
s∗ (j) otherwise.
Relative to the symmetric ex ante equilibrium this allocation features overinvestment for all
agents i < 1/2 and j < 1/2. Given positive assortative matching, the resulting utility levels
are
(
9
if i < 1/2
6 − 2(i+1)
u(i) =
∗
u (i)
otherwise
(
9
6 − 2(j+1)
if j < 1/2
v(j) =
∗
u (j)
otherwise.
The allocation is individually rational and is conditionally exchange efficiency. To show that
it is an ex post equilibrium, we show that it is pairwise constrained efficient. We show that
(46) holds for buyers (with (47) for sellers being analogous). For any pair (i, j), we have
φ̆(i, j, s(j), v(j)) = 2s(j) −

(s(j))2
,
2(β + 1)

which follows from noting that (i) agent i can match with j and provide j with utility b(j)
only if b ≥ b(I(j)) = s(j), and (ii) agent i will then choose b = s(j), since s(j) exceeds agent
i’s autarchy investment. We then need only note that 2s − (s2 )/(2(β + 1)) is concave and
maximized by s = 2(β + 1), ensuring that no agent i can do better than to match with agent
j = 1.
Remark 12. The existence of ex post equilibria failing Pareto efficiency in this example
appears to be in conflict with the results of Peters and Siow (2002), who also examine a
nontransferable utility model in which matches are arranged after investments are sunk, but
conclude that all of the equilibria in this model are efficient.
This conflict is only apparent, as the equilibrium notion employed by Peters and Siow
(2002) is more demanding than our notion of ex post equilibrium.26 Peters and Siow (2002)
define a “return function,” identifying for each buyer investment b the seller investment s
with which a buyer who chooses b would be matched (note that preferences are separable),
with the inverse of this function similarly identifying a buyer investment b to be matched
with each value of s chosen by a seller. Their equilibrium concept requires that every agent
chooses a utility-maximizing investment, subject to the matching possibilities specified by
the return function, and the resulting demand-for-investment functions clear the market.
The return function in Peters and Siow (2002) is the functional equivalent of a complete set
of prices in our model. Their argument that the resulting equilibria are efficient is analogous
26 Bhaskar and Hopkins (2011) apply a counterpart of the ex post equilibrium concept to the model in
Peters and Siow (2002), finding inefficient equilibria resembling the ones we describe above.
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to the argument used to establish our Proposition 3, showing that ex post equilibria supported
by complete prices are pairwise efficient. The complete prices in our model and the return
function in Peters and Siow (2002) each solve the coordination problems that can give rise to
inefficient ex post equilibria. We are not sanguine that such coordination problems are easily
solved in markets where matches are formed only after investments are sunk, and so we have
not built such a solution to the coordination problem into our ex post equilibrium concept.
Remark 13. Bhaskar and Hopkins (2011) examine a variant of the model with separable
preferences and nontransferable utility in which agents first choose their expenditure on
investment, then receive a realization of a random investment level drawn from a distribution
whose specification depends on the cost devoted to investment, and then match after realized
investments are drawn. In this model, Bhaskar and Hopkins (2011) find that, except for
knife-edge cases, (their counterpart to) ex post equilibria are inefficient. Their interpretation
is that one should be cautious in interpreting Peters and Siow (2002)’s observation that
equilibria are efficient, since this efficiency breaks down once one moves beyond the case of
deterministic investments.27
The presence of stochastic investments in Bhaskar and Hopkins (2011) implies that one of
the key results in our paper (and the papers discussed in Section 2.1.4) does not hold, namely
that any ex ante equilibrium is also an ex post equilibrium. Bhaskar and Hopkins (2011)
focus exclusively on the case in which markets are available only ex post, i. e., matches are
determined only after investments are sunk. The preceding statement can be made precise
only upon extending their model to also encompass ex ante markets, i.e., markets that allow
investments and matches to be simultaneously determined. However, we can readily identify
the source of difficulty without going too deeply into details.
Define an allocation as specifying, for each agent, an expenditure on investment, a
probability distribution over the partner with whom the agent matches, and a probability
distribution over the accompanying pairs of realized investments. Suppose we have a model in
which all buyers are the same type (and similarly all sellers are of the same type) and suppose
first that markets are available ex ante. Consider a candidate equilibrium in which all buyers
(and similarly sellers) choose the same expenditure on investment and hence induce the same
distribution over realized investments. The equilibrium matching will then be arbitrary, and
the distribution over the pair of investments that a buyer will realize in his match is the
product of the buyer’s and seller’s investment distribution. Now suppose, in contrast, that
markets are only available ex post, and so matching occurs after investments are realized,
and suppose that a supermodular function translates investments into payoffs. Then the ex
post market will match investments positive assortatively, introducing correlation into the
realized distribution of investments that a buyer will realize in his match, an impossibility in
the ex ante case. Hence, the two settings give rise to different sets of feasible allocations.
One then cannot simply argue that ex ante equilibria are also ex post equilibria, and it is
less surprising that investment levels might differ across the two cases. We would expect the
result that ex ante equilibria are also ex post equilibria to hold if, under ex post markets,
matching takes place after expenditures on investments have been made, but before realized
27 One interpretation offered by Bhaskar and Hopkins (2011) for their interest in stochastic investments
is that the latter serve as a perturbed model which can be used to choose between the multiple ex post
equilibria that appear in the model with deterministic investments. They leave open the question of whether,
as the perturbation become small, the equilibrium converges to a (pairwise efficient) allocation satisfying
Peters and Siow (2002)’s equilibrium definition.
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investments are drawn.
Once investment realizations are stochastic, another problem of missing markets appears
even when ex ante markets are available, since the agents are exposed to uninsurable risk.
This poses no difficulty in Bhaskar and Hopkins (2011) because the agent’s utilities are linear
in their investment realizations, ensuring that the investigation of ex ante equilibrium can
proceed just as it does in the case of deterministic investments, with expected investments
replacing investments in the agents’ payoff functions. In general, however, the presence of
uninsurable risk will introduce inefficiencies that could be mitigated by a complete set of
markets.

6
6.1

Discussion
Existence of Equilibrium

The existence of ex post equilibria is implied by the existence of ex ante equilibria (Corollary
1), but we have not addressed the question of when the latter exist. As we have noted, the
pairwise efficiency conditions characterizing ex ante equilibria are equivalent to the stability
conditions from the literature on matching and assignment models, which contains a number
of existence results. As long as the functions φ and ψ emerging from our investment-choice
problem satisfy the conditions from these results, we can apply them to infer existence of ex
ante equilibria in our model.
In the finite case, our Assumption 1 ensures that the continuity and monotonicity
assumptions of Alkan and Gale (1990, Theorem 1) are met (cf. our Lemma 1). As long as
the agents’ outside options are feasible within each match (i.e., the full matching condition
(76) holds), this suffices for the existence of an ex ante equilibrium in our model. With
nontransferable utility, existence of ex ante equilibria is implied by Gale and Shapley (1962)
even without the additional condition on outside options.
With an infinite number of agents, the case most commonly considered in the literature
is that in which types are continuously distributed and utility is perfectly transferable.
Conditions ensuring the existence of pairwise efficient allocations are provided by Chiappori,
McCann, and Nesheim (2010) and Ekeland (2010b)). These results allow for multidimensional
types, but require restrictions on utility functions reminiscent of the supermodularity conditions in Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (2001b), who prove existence for their unidimensional
model. Legros and Newman (2007a) study matching models with imperfectly transferable
utility and a continuum of types under assumptions akin to the ones we impose in Section
4.3. They identify conditions (including the continuous differentiability of φ and ψ, which we
could obtain from an appropriate strengthening of Assumption 2) under which the existence
of equilibrium follows from the existence of the solution to a differential equation.
The literature has obtained more general existence results for models with an infinite
number of agents than the ones cited above, but these results use a notion of feasibility
different from the one we employ. Kaneko and Wooders (1996) present a general existence
result for stable allocations in a model with either perfectly or imperfectly transferable
utility, but their notion of an f -core considers any allocation to be feasible which lies in
the closure of our set of feasible allocations. To make their result applicable to our setting
would then require the identification of additional conditions ensuring feasibility of a stable
outcome. That this is a non-trivial task becomes clear when considering the case of perfectly
transferable utility in which stable allocations coincide with the solutions of an optimal
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transport problem (e.g. Gretsky, Ostroy, and Zame, 1992; Ekeland, 2010b). In particular, our
existence problem is analogous to the existence of solutions to the so-called Monge problem,
which is a notoriously difficult problem, whereas general existence results have been obtained
for the so-called Kantorovich problem which considers an enlarged set of feasible allocations
(Villani, 2009).28

6.2

Foundations for Competitive Matching

We have focussed on investment decisions in competitive matching environments by building
the assumption that agents behave competitively into our equilibrium notions. In particular
all agents solve a maximization problem that takes prices (whether in monetary or utility
terms) as fixed at the candidate equilibrium level. Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (2001b),
Dizdar (2012) and Peters and Siow (2002) adopt a similar approach. The advantage of
this approach is that it takes the hold-up problem and positional externalities off the table,
allowing us to isolate the role of coordination problems.
Makowski (2004, pp. 19-20), building on work by Gretsky, Ostroy, and Zame (1992,
1999), argues that one should be leery of simply assuming the matching market to be
competitive, even when dealing with a continuum of agents, because by “accepting this point
of view, one runs the danger of making continuum analysis totally unconnected with the
analysis of large but finite economies.....”29 Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (2001a) show that
allocations in a finite model satisfying a “double overlap” condition will satisfy a constrained
efficiency condition analogous to the constrained efficiency condition that characterizes ex
post equilibria (when preferences are separable) in our model. It would be important to
investigate similar conditions in our setting. Bhaskar and Hopkins (2011, Appendix B) show
that their competitive matching market, with a continuum of agents, is the limit of a sequence
of models with finite numbers of agents. Hadfield (1999) also offers such a limiting analysis.
However, Peters (2007, 2011) examines models whose equilibria do not exhibit convergence
to competitive equilibrium as the number of agents grows arbitrarily large. Investigating the
conditions under which matching markets with a large numbers of agents will be competitive
remains an important area for further work.
28 The problem of finding a solution to the pairwise efficiency conditions in our model is a Monge problem
because we specify a matching as a map from names on one side of the market into names on the other side.
In the Kantorovich problem the set of feasible matchings is identified with a joint probability measure over
N × N , with the constraint that the induced marginal distributions, over the sets of buyers and sellers, match
the distributions of buyer and seller names. The interpretation is that the probability attached to any subset
of N × N as the probability that agents from this subset are drawn to match. Again, see Villani (2009).
29 Makowski (2004) defines the post-investment matching market as being perfectly competitive if the
equilibrium price vector is a continuous function of the measures describing the investments present in the
ex post market, so that an investment deviation by a small group of agents can have only a small effect on
equilibrium prices. An individual member of the continuum is then “viewed as the limit of a small group of
individuals,” and may or may not have market power.
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Appendices
A

Proof of Lemma 1 (Section 2.2.1)

We first confirm that φ (and similarly ψ) is well defined on N ×N ×R. Fix a pair (i, j) ∈ N ×N .
Then for any v ∈ R, we can fix a pair (b, s) and then use Assumption 1.3 to infer that there
is some t for which V (s, b, σ(j), β(i), t) ≥ v. This ensures that the maximization problem in
(17) is feasible, and the existence of the maximum then follows from the continuity assumed
in Assumption 1.1, the fact that B and S are compact, and the fact that U and V move in
opposite dictions in t (Assumptions 1.2–1.3).
[Lemma 1.1] We provide the proof for the function φ, with the case of ψ being similar. It is
immediate from (17) that φ is weakly decreasing in v. To see that it is strictly decreasing, fix
(i, j) and let v > v. Then there exists an exchange (b, s, t) with φ(i, j, v) = U (b, s, β(i), σ(j), t)
and V (s, b, σ(j), β(i), t) ≥ v. By Assumptions 1.1 and Assumption 1.3, there exists ε > 0
such that V (s, b, σ(j), β(i), t − ε) ≥ v. Using Assumption 1.2, we then have φ(i, j, v) ≥
U (b, s, β(i), σ(j), t − ε) > U (b, s, β(i), σ(j), t) = φ(i, j, v), giving the result.
[Lemma 1.2] We establish that u = φ(i, j, ψ(j, i, u)). Fix (i, j) ∈ N × N and u ∈ R. Then
ψ(j, i, u) exists (as established in our opening remarks) and we can let v := ψ(j, i, u). The
definition of ψ (cf. (18)) ensures that there exist b, s and t such that
U (b, s, β(i), σ(j), t) ≥ u
V (s, b, σ(j), β(i), t) = v.
This implies that φ(i, j, v) ≥ u. To complete the argument by showing that this is in fact an
equality, suppose φ(i, j, v) > u. Then there exists b, s and t with
U (b, s, β(i), σ(j), t) > u
V (s, b, σ(j), β(i), t) ≥ v.
From the strict Pareto property (cf. (1)–(2)) this in turn ensures that there exists t0 for
which
U (b, s, β(i), σ(j), t0 ) > u
V (s, b, σ(j), β(i), t0 ) > v,
contradicting the definition v := ψ(j, i, u).
[Lemma 1.3] As an implication of Lemma 1.2, φ has full range as a function of v and,
from Lemma 1.1, is strictly decreasing in v. Hence, φ is continuous in v. The same argument
gives continuity of ψ in u.

B

Pareto Efficiency (Section 3.1.1)

We present an example motivating the restriction to finite Pareto improvements in our
definition of Pareto efficiency.
Let N = B = S = [0, 1], let the sets B = {b} and S = {s} be singletons, and let β and
σ be identity functions. Utility is perfectly transferable, with
U (b, s, β, σ, t) = 1 + β + σ − t
V (s, b, σ, β, t) = t,
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and with U and V being identically zero. Now consider a fully matched allocation in which
J and I are identity functions and payoffs are given by
u(i) = 2i +

1
1
and v(j) = .
2
2

This allocation is feasible and is easily seen to be Pareto efficient in the sense of Definition 4.
However, we can construct a Pareto improvement by changing the allocation for a countable
set of agents. Let
Z = {. . . ,

1 15 1 7 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 7 1 15
− , − , − , − , , + , + , + , + , . . .}.
2 32 2 16 2 8 2 4 2 2 4 2 8 2 16 2 32

All agents whose name does not fall in the set Z are matched with their current partners. In
the set Z, the matching is as follows:
buyer
..
.

seller
..
.

15
1
2 − 32
7
1
2 − 16
1
3
2 − 8
1
1
2 − 4
1
2
1
1
2 + 4
1
3
2 + 8
1
7
2 + 16

1
7
2 − 16
1
3
2 − 8
1
1
2 − 4
1
2
1
1
2 + 4
1
3
2 + 8
1
7
2 + 16
1
15
2 + 32

..
.

.

..
.

We again set v(j) = 1/2 for all j. Then every buyer in the set Z has been moved up to a
match with a higher seller, with the seller commanding no higher a payoff, and hence every
buyer in Z is strictly better off, whereas every seller and every buyer not in the set Z receives
the same utility as before.

C
C.1

Calculations for Example 2 (Section 3.1.4)
Supermodularity of the Surplus Function

We verify that the function

√
z(b, s) = max{2 bs, bs}

√
is supermodular, which implies the corresponding
result for any value of k. Because 2 bs and
√
bs are both supermodular and bs ≥ 2 bs holds if and only if bs ≥ 4, it suffices to show that
at b√
= 4/s the partial derivative of bs with respect to s is larger than the partial derivative
of 2 bs with respect to s. As these partial derivatives are 4/s and 2/s, the result follows.

C.2

Underinvestment Equilibrium

We consider a candidate equilibrium in which the allocation splits the value equally between
any two agents in a match. Our calculations for the economy in which only the low investment
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is available confirm some of the ex post equilibrium incentive constraints for this allocation.
In particular, it is clear that these investments are optimal if only the low technology is
available, and clear that the presence of the high technology does not obviate this optimality
for agents with β(i) < β ∗ and σ(j) < β ∗ .
Completing the argument that this allocation is an ex post equilibrium requires confirming
that no buyer or seller whose type is above β ∗ would prefer to increase their investment and
make use of the high technology. It will be unprofitable for a buyer of type β (the case of a
1
seller is analogous) to match with some seller of type σ and hence investment σ 4 , and choose
an investment b large enough that the high technology is applicable, if
5

b5
4 1
σ4
4 1
max bσ −
−
− β 4 − σ 4 < 0.
b,β,σ
5β
5σ
5
5
1
4

The first three terms in this expression are the value produced by the deviating buyer and
seller, given that the buyer can choose investment b and the seller is fixed at her equilibrium
1
investment σ 4 , while the final two terms are the equilibrium payoffs of the buyer and seller.
Taking a derivative of this expression with respect to σ gives
1 −3
1 3
bσ 4 − σ − 4 ,
4
4
which is positive as long as b > 1, which we can assume without loss of generality.30 We can
accordingly maximize the left side by setting σ = β(1) =: β and write the problem as
1

max bβ 4 −
b,β

1
b5
4 1
− β4 − β4.
5β
5

The first order conditions for an interior solution for b and β are now
1

β4 −

b4
=0
β

b5
1 3
− β − 4 = 0.
2
5β
5
1

Given that β = 12, the first of these implies that b > β 4 , which in turn implies that the
second of these derivatives is positive for every value of β. We can thus also set β = β and
5

solve for b = β 16 . The inequality we need to establish is then
25

β

5
16

1
β 16
4 1
β −
− β 4 − β 4 < 0.
5
5β
1
4

5

This is equivalent to β 16 < 9/4, which holds for all values of β below approximately 13.40.

C.3

Overinvestment Equilibrium

We examine a candidate equilibrium in which the allocation splits the value equally between
any two agents in a match. Our calculations for the economy in which only the high
30 Given

√
1
that s2 (j) is maximized by s2 (1) = 12 4 ≈ 1.86, we can have bs > 2 bs only if b > 1.
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investment is available confirm some of the ex post equilibrium incentive constraints for
this allocation. In particular, it is clear that these investments are optimal if only the high
technology is available, and clear that the presence of the low technology does not obviate
this optimality for agents with β(i) > β ∗ and σ(j) > β ∗ .
Completing the argument that this allocation is an ex post equilibrium requires confirming
that no buyer or seller whose type is below β ∗ would prefer to decrease their investment and
make use of the low technology. It will be unprofitable for a buyer of type β (the case of a
1
seller is analogous) to match with some seller of type σ and hence investment σ 3 , and choose
an investment b small enough that the low technology is applicable, if
5
p
3 2
b5
σ3
3 2
1
3
max 2 bσ −
−
− β 3 − σ 3 < 0.
b,β,σ
5β
5σ
10
10

Taking a derivative with respect to σ gives
1

2 1 −5
2 1
σ− 3
b 2 σ 6 − σ− 3 =
6
6
3

"

#

1

b2
1

σ2

− 1 < 0,

where the inequality follows from the fact that values of b ≥ σ (and hence b ≥ 9) will be so
expensive as to obviously be suboptimal. Hence, we can maximize the left side by setting
σ = β(0) =: β. We thus have the inequality
q
1
b5
3 2
1 2
max 2 bβ 3 −
− β 3 − β 3 < 0,
b,β
5β
10
2
1

1

which we can differentiate in b to find the first-order condition b− 2 β 6 −
solve for b = β

1
27

β

2
9

b4
β

= 0, and then

and insert into the desired inequality to obtain
q
1
1
1 5 1
3 2
1 2
2
max 2 β 27 β 9 β 3 − β 27 β 9 − β 3 − β 3 < 0.
β
5
10
2

A derivative in β gives
5
8
1
2 − 8 27
1 5
2
β 9 β − β 27 β − 9 − β − 3
9
45
10

which is negative if
8

5

5

8

1

10β − 9 β 27 − β 27 β − 9 − 9β − 3 < 0,
1

which is β 3 < β, which is obvious. Hence we can set β = β and our inequality becomes
1
5
1 5 1
3 2
1 2
2β 9 β 27 − β 27 β 9 − β 3 − β 3 < 0
5
10
2

and hence

27
  10
9
β>
≈ 8.93.
4
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D

Calculations for Example 3 (Section 3.2.1)

We have to confirm that in the candidate equilibrium, no buyer i ∈ [0, 1/2) would prefer to
match with some seller j ∈ (i, 1/2]. Such a match will be undesirable if
1 i
1
i(e − c) > i(ej − c) − j(ej − c).
2
2
The left side is buyer i’s equilibrium payoff. The first term on the right is the total value
produced when buyer i matches with seller j, in the process choosing the investment ej − c
that is optimal for such a match. The final term on the right is seller j’s equilibrium payoff,
consisting of half the value produced in seller j’s equilibrium match. This expression holds
as an equality when i = j, so it suffices to show that the derivative of the right side with
respect to j is negative, or (multiplying the result by 2)
0 > (2i − j)ej − ej + c.
The term 2i − j can be no larger than j, so (substituting j for 2i − j, inserting the value of c,
1
1
and rearranging) it suffices to show that (1 − j)ej > e 2 − 1. Because 2 > e 2 this inequality
hold for j = 0 and j = 1/2. As (1 − j)ej is concave, the argument is complete.

E

The Leveraging Approach (Section 4.1.2)

This appendix continues the discussion of the leveraging approach to exchange efficiency with
an example patterned after the ones considered in Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (2001b).
In particular, as in Examples 1, 2, and 7 names, types, and investments are unidimensional,
utility is perfectly transferable, preferences are separable, value functions are supermodular,
and types are continuously distributed.
In both of the following examples the autarchy allocation, which is trivially exchange
efficient, is an ex post equilibrium. Our focus is on the remaining ex post equilibria, which,
by arguments similar to the ones discussed in Examples 1, 2, and 7, are positive assortative,
feature strictly positive investments for all types, and have continuous equilibrium utility
schedules. These properties are taken for granted.
Example 11. We consider the same specification as in Example 1, but with the surplus
function now given by

z(b, s) = max bs − k, 2(bs)2 − k .
Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (2001b) have studied the resulting supermodular value
function,

s5
b5
Z(b, s, β, σ) = max bs − k, 2(bs)2 − k −
−
5β
5σ
for the case k = 0. We assume that k is strictly positive, but sufficiently small for all
allocations considered in the following to satisfy the individual rationality constraints. Using
the terminology introduced in Example 2, we refer to z1 (b, s) = bs − k as the low technology
and to z2 (b, s) = 2(bs)2 − k as the high technology. Recall that the functions assigning types
to names are assumed to be given by β(i) = γ + αi and σ(j) = γ + αj with α > 0 and γ > 0.
If only the low technology is available, then exchange efficiency calls for the investments
1

1

b1 (i) = (β(i)) 3 ,

s1 (j) = (σ(j)) 3 .
68

In the case of the high technology, the exchange efficient investments are
b2 (i) = 4β(i),

s2 (j) = 4σ(j).

When both technologies are available, exchange efficiency calls for all agents with types below
3
β ∗ = σ ∗ = (3/29 ) 10 ≈ .21 to use the low technology with investments b1 (i) and s1 (j), while
those above this type choose the high technology with investments b2 (i) and s2 (j). When
γ < β ∗ < γ + α, as we assume throughout the following, the efficient investments take a
jump at type β ∗ .
As in Examples 2 and 7 there are two candidates for exchange inefficient ex post equilibria,
namely one in which all buyers choose the investments specified by b1 and all sellers choose
the investments specified by s1 and another one in which agents choose the investments
specified by s2 and b2 . Straightforward but tedious calculations show that there are values β
and β, satisfying 0 < β < β ∗ < β ≈ .71, such that for matched pairs (i, i) with types below β
conditional exchange efficiency dictates that they choose investments b1 (i) = s1 (i), whereas
for matched pairs (i, i) with types above β conditional exchange efficiency dictates that they
choose investments b2 (i) = s2 (i). For γ < β < β < γ + α this provides the counterpart to
the first step in Example 7. By a continuity argument analogous to the one given in the
second step of Example 7, this ensures the exchange efficiency of ex post equilibria.
But what if γ < β but γ + α = 0.7 < β? Then the efficient investments for the low
technology are conditionally exchange efficient for all agents and the argument in the first
step of Example 7 is no longer applicable to provide a starting point for the subsequent
leveraging step. However, we can now use the pairwise constrained efficiency of ex post
equilibria to obtain the result from the first step in Example 7. In particular, consider a
pair of agents i = j whose types are just above the cutoff β ∗ . Exchange efficiency calls for
these agents to choose investments slightly above 0.81 and operate the high technology (see
Figure 7). These investments are in the market, currently chosen by agents with types near
0.7. It then follows from Corollary 4 that there are no ex post equilibria in which these
agents inefficiently choose the low-technology investments. From this point on, the exchange
efficiency of ex post equilibria follows exactly as in the case β < γ + α.
The leveraging approach here exploits forces analogous to those in Example 4. In contrast,
suppose that the sets of types in Example 7 does not contain the counterpart to the value β
applicable in that example, which Appendix C.2 calculates as approximately 13.40. Then
the market contains none of investments that would be exchange efficient for any pair of
agents for whom exchange efficiency calls for the high technology, and the type of argument
developed in this example does not apply.
On the basis of Examples 11, one might reason as follows. Suppose we have two
technologies, one requiring rather low and one rather high investments. Suppose the optimal
investments conditional on using either of the technologies is strictly increasing in type.
Suppose further that pairwise efficiency requires some agents to use the low technology and
some to use the high technology. Then if the set of types is sufficiently diverse, it should
be impossible to support an exchange inefficient equilibrium in which either every agent
chooses the low technology or every agent chooses the high technology. The key would be to
consider a candidate equilibrium in which all agents use (say) the low technology. If the set
of types is sufficiently rich, some of these agents must then be choosing investments that
others would use to operate the high technology in the pairwise efficient allocation, at which
point Corollary 4 gives us a contradiction.
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4β

b

0.89

β1/3

0.81

β
β* ≈ 0.21

0.7

Figure 7: Illustration of the leveraging argument for Example 11. The heavy (red) line
illustrates the pairwise efficient equilibrium investments. We are interested in a candidate
inefficient equilibrium in which every pair of agents chooses the low-technology investment,
1
given by β 3 . Corollary 4 ensures that this is not an equilibrium. Instead, pairwise conditional
efficiency fails for agents with types just above β ∗ . A pair of matched such agents could both
increase their payoffs by choosing (exchange efficient) investments slightly above 0.81 and
operating the high technology, and these investments are in the market, currently chosen by
agents with types near 0.7. Corollary 4 then ensures that the allocation is not an ex post
equilibrium.

Two issues arise in pursuing this argument (in addition to a collection of details that have
to be filled in to make it precise). First, for this argument to be compelling, investments
must be malleable, in the sense that an investment chosen for use in the low technology
can be used in the high technology. We have been content to take malleability for granted
throughout, but become more cautious as malleability becomes a critical ingredient rather
than a convenience. Second, we present an example, modeled after a similar example from
Dizdar (2012)), showing that there is no obvious extension of this argument to cases in which
are there more than two technologies.
Example 12. We consider the same specification as in Example 11, but with the surplus
function now given by
n √
o
z(b, s) = max 2 bs, bs, 2(bs)2 − k .
√
We now think of there being three technologies, the low technology z1 (b, s) = 2 bs, the
medium technology z2 (b, s) = bs, and the high technology z3 (b, s) = 2(bs)2 − k. The value
function Z is supermodular.
Example 2 calculated that the low technology generates a higher value than the medium
technology, conditional on matching positive assortatively and choosing exchange efficient
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investments, for types β < β ∗ ≈ 10.53. We can calculate that for a pair of matched agents
with β(i) = σ(j), the high technology gives equilibrium payoffs (307.2)β(i)4 − k. Let k solve
1
(307.2)124 − k = 85 12 4 . Then the low and the high technologies provide equal values at
β = σ = 12 (cf. (53)). Let β ∗∗ , slightly larger than 12, be the value of β = σ at which the
medium and high technologies give the same value.
Let the set of types be [8, 14]. Then pairwise efficiency calls for agents in [8, β ∗ ) to use
the low technology and choose investments given by (52), for agents in (β ∗ , β ∗∗ ) to use the
medium technology and choose investments given by (50), and for agents in (β ∗∗ , 14] to use
the high technology and choose investments b(i) = 4β(i) and s(j) = 4σ(j). However, there is
an ex post equilibrium in which all agents in [8, 12) use the low technology (and investments
(52)) and agents in (12, 14) use the high technology (and investments (b(i) = 4β(i) and
s(j) = 4σ(j)). Notice that investments take a jump at 12, while equilibrium utility is
continuous. Figure 8 illustrates.
This equilibrium fails exchange efficiency, as agents in (β ∗ , 12) are inefficiently using
the low rather than medium technology, and agents in (12, β ∗∗ ) are inefficiently using the
high rather medium technology. However, the leveraging argument does not preclude this
equilibrium, and will not do so no matter how the interval [8, 14] of types is enlarged. The
difficulty is that equilibrium investments take a jump from about 1.86 to 48 as agents switch
from the low to the high technology at type 12. The investments needed to make deviations
to the medium technology profitable lie within this interval. Making the interval of types
larger will bring more low investments into the market as well as more high investments, but
will never fill in the required middle interval.

F

Proof of Lemma 2 (Section 4.2.2)

[Lemma 2.1] We show that φ̆ is continuous. Because S is compact this implies the
continuity of φ(i, j, v) = maxs∈S φ̆(i, j, s, v). The argument for the continuity of ψ̆ and ψ is
analogous.
Define the function τ : S × B × S × V × R → R by
V (s, b, σ, β, τ (s, b, σ, β, v)) = v.
To confirm that the function τ is well defined, we note that for each (s, b, σ, β), the function
V has R as its range (Assumption 1.3), ensuring that there exists a value t satisfying
V (s, b, σ, β, t) = v, and the fact that V is strictly increasing in t ensures that this value is
unique. Moreover, because V is continuous and strictly increasing in its last argument, τ is
continuous. Now define
τ (i, j, s, v)

=

max τ (s, b, σ(i), β(j), v)

τ (i, j, s, v)

=

min τ (s, b, σ(i), β(j), v).

b∈B

b∈B

Berge’s maximum theorem (Ok, 2007, p. 306) ensures that τ and τ are continuous. Then we
have
φ̆(i, j, s, v) =

max

U (b, s, β(i), σ(j), t) s.t. V (s, b, σ(j), β(i), t) ≥ v.

(b,t)∈B×[τ (i,j,s,v),τ (i,j,s,v)]
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Figure 8: Illustration of the ex post equilibrium failing pairwise efficient in Example 12. The
top panel shows the buyer’s investment as a function of β (with the seller’s investment being
analogous) for the low technology (β 1/4 ), medium technology (β 1/3 ) and high technology
(4β) (not drawn to scale). The ex post equilibrium investments follow the heavy (red) line
in the top panel, using only the low and high technology, while pairwise efficiency calls for
investments to be given by the dashed red line, using the medium technology, for β ∈ (β ∗ , β ∗∗ ).
The bottom panel shows the value Z generated by a pair of matched agents of identical type,
as a function of β. The values realized by the ex post equilibrium matches are given by the
heavy (red) line, while the dashed line indicates the value realized for β ∈ (β ∗ , β ∗∗ ) under
the pairwise efficient allocation.

This maximization problem again satisfies the conditions of Berge’s maximum theorem,
giving the result.
[Lemma 2.2] Suppose (J, I, b, s, u, v) is a fully matched ex post equilibrium and u is not
continuous (the case of v is similar). Then there exists a value δ > 0 and sequences {in }∞
n=1
and {in }∞
n=1 such that
u(in ) − δ > u(in )
1
|in − in | < .
n
The conditional exchange efficiency condition (29) for in gives us
u(in ) = φ̆(in , J(in ), s(J(in )), v(J(in )).
The fact that φ̆(i, j, s, v) is continuous in i on the compact set N (and hence uniformly
continuous) then enures that for sufficiently large n,



δ
u(in ) < u(in ) − δ = φ̆(in , J(in ), s(J(in )), v(J(in ))) − δ < φ̆(in , J(in ), s(J(in )), v(J(in ))) +
− δ,
2
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with the outside two terms then giving
δ
u(in ) < φ̆(in , J(in ), s(J(in )), v(J(in ))) − ,
2
contradicting the incentive constraint (27) for in .

G

Appendix for Section 4.3.1

Section G.1 provides simple necessary and sufficient conditions for (strict) single crossing of
φB̃,S̃ and ψS̃,B̃ , stated as Lemma 5. A similar result appears in Legros and Newman (2007b).
Building on Lemma 5, Section G.2 gives the proof of Lemma 4. Lemma 5 is also used in the
proof of Corollary 5 in Appendix H.

G.1

Cross Matched Agents

Let Assumption 1 hold. The functions φB̃,S̃ and ψS̃,B̃ then satisfy the properties noted
in Lemma 1 for any choice of nonempty closed sets B̃ ⊂ B and S̃ ⊂ S. As the following
argument only uses these properties, we may then simplify notation by considering the case
φ = φB,S and ψ = ψS,B .
Let i < i ∈ N and j < j ∈ N . If there exists utility levels u, u, v, v ∈ R such that
u = φ(i, j, v) ≥ φ(i, j, v)

(88)

u = φ(i, j, v) ≥ φ(i, j, v)

(89)

then we say that the pairs (i, j) and (i, j) are a cross match. We may apply the inverse and
monotonicity relationships in Lemma 1 to obtain that (i, j) and (i, j) are a cross match if
and only if there exists utility levels u, u, u, u ∈ R such that
v = ψ(j, i, u) ≥ ψ(j, i, u)

(90)

v = ψ(j, i, u) ≥ ψ(j, i, u).

(91)

To motivate the terminology of a cross match observe, first, that the equalities in the
above conditions indicate that the utility levels are chosen in such a way that they are
consistent with the agents in the pairs (i, j) and (i, j) matching with each other and choosing
exchange efficient exchanges. Second, the inequalities indicate that if the agents under
consideration were matched in this way, then no agent has an incentive to switch partners.
We say that a cross match can be uncrossed if the inequalities in (88)–(89) (or, equivalently,
the inequalities in (90)–(91)) can only hold as equalities, indicating that the agents in the
cross match can be reassigned to form matches (i, j) and (i, j) without changing their payoffs.
If a cross match cannot be uncrossed, then the strict Pareto property (or, more formally,
Lemma 1) implies that the pairs (i, j) and (i, j) are a strict cross match, meaning that u1 ,
u2 , v1 , v2 can be chosen such that the inequalities in (88)–(91) hold strictly.
Lemma 5. Let Assumption 1 hold. Then the functions φ and ψ satisfy strict single crossing
if and only if there exist no cross matches. They satisfy single crossing if and only if every
cross match can be uncrossed.
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Proof. The result for strict single crossing is immediate from the definitions.
Suppose there exists a cross match that cannot be uncrossed. Then, as noted above,
there exists a strict cross match (i, j) and (i, j) with
φ(i, j, v) > φ(i, j, v)
φ(i, j, v) > φ(i, j, v),
contradicting the single crossing condition (78). Hence, if single crossing holds, then every
cross match can be uncrossed. To prove the reverse implication, suppose the single crossing
condition (78) fails. Then there exist i < i, j < j and v, v such that
φ(i, j, v) ≥ φ(i, j, v)
φ(i, j, v) < φ(i, j, v).
Upon setting u = φ(i, j, v) and u = φ(i, j, v) we then have a cross match that cannot be
uncrossed.

G.2

Proof of Lemma 4

Let (J, I, b, s, u, v) be a fully matched ex ante equilibrium. Suppose J is strictly increasing.
Because J is a measure preserving bijection this implies that J is the identity function,
ensuring that (J, I, b, s, u, v) is positive assortative.
We may thus suppose that J is not strictly increasing or, equivalently, that there exists
i < i and j < j such that (i, j) ∈ M and (i, j) ∈ M hold. Using the incentive constraints
(21) every such pair of matches satisfies
u(i)

= φ(i, j, v(j)) ≥ φ(i, j, v(j))

(92)

u(i)

= φ(i, j, v(j)) ≥ φ(i, j, v(j)),

(93)

so that (i, j) and i, j) are a cross match. We refer to a cross match in which (92) – (93) holds
as an equilibrium cross match.
From Lemma 5 the existence of an equilibrium cross match contradicts strict single
crossing. Hence, if strict single crossing holds (J, I, b, s, u, v) is positive assortative and the
proof of the strict single crossing result in Lemma 4 is finished.
Suppose N is finite. Then the conclusion of Lemma 4 is immediate from the ability to
uncross any given cross match asserted in Lemma 5: We can start with the lowest buyer-seller
pair and proceed upward until we find a pair that is not matched to each other. This pair
must then be part of an equilibrium cross match, which we can uncross. We can repeat this
exercise, doing so at most finitely many times, until arriving at a payoff-equivalent ex ante
equilibrium featuring the identity matching.
To finish the proof, it remains to consider the case in which N is an interval and show that
(J, I, b, s, u, v) is payoff equivalent to a positive assortative allocation when single crossing
holds. Without loss of generality we let N = [0, 1]. The incentive constraints (21)–(22) imply
u(i) ≥ φ(i, i, v(i))
v(j) ≥ ψ(j, j, u(j))
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Figure 9: Illustration for the proof of Lemma 4 when N = [0, 1]. We hypothesize the existence
of a buyer i matched with seller J(i) < i, and suppose that buyer i and seller i cannot
achieve their equilibrium payoffs when matched with one another. We first invoke the cross
match argument of Section G.1 to conclude that every buyer i0 < i is matched with a seller
J(i0 ) < i, and hence feasibility requires that (almost) all sellers j < i must be matched with
buyers less than i. This allows us to consider a sequence {jn } of sellers whose types converge
to i. Each such seller must be matched with a buyer less than i. We use these converging
sequences of matched pairs and the continuity of φ to derive a contradiction.
for all i and j. If all these inequalities hold as equalities, then it is clear that the equilibrium
is payoff equivalent to an equilibrium satisfying positive assortative matching. We accordingly
suppose there exists i ∈ [0, 1] such that buyer i and seller i cannot achieve their equilibrium
payoffs when matched to each other, that is
u(i) > φ(i, i, v(i)).

(94)

We show that this leads to a contradiction.
The inequality in (94) implies J(i) 6= i and I(i) 6= i. If i were part of an equilibrium cross
match, then Lemma 5 implies that this cross match could be uncrossed, contradicting (94).
Hence, we must either have J(i) < i < I(i) or the reverse chain of inequalities. We focus on
the first of these cases throughout the following (with the case I(i) < i < J(i) following from
an analogous argument, swapping the roles of buyers and sellers throughout the following).
This gives us the configuration illustrated in Figure 9.
If J(i0 ) > i holds for some i0 < i, then, because i > J(i) holds, we have an equilibrium
cross match with pairs (i, j) = (i0 , J(i0 )) and (i, j) = (i, J(i))). We can uncross to match
i with J(i0 ) while preserving payoffs. This gives us an equilibrium cross match with pairs
(i, j) = (i, J(i0 )) and (i, j) = (I(i), i) which we can uncross to obtain a contradiction to (94).
Hence, we have that i0 < i implies J(i0 ) < i.
As the equilibrium matching is measure preserving, J(i0 ) < i for all i0 < i implies that
I(j) < i holds for almost all sellers j < i. We can thus choose a sequence {jn }∞
n=1 of sellers
with jn > J(i) and jn % i and in = I(jn ) ≤ i for all n. As (in , jn ) are matched, the
equilibrium feasibility conditions (23) and the incentive constraints (21)–(22) imply
u(in ) = φ(in , jn , v(jn )) ≥ φ(in , J(i), v(J(i))).
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Because i ≥ in , and jn > J(i) holds, the single crossing property (78) implies that the
above weak inequality also holds for i. We can then use u(i) = φ(i, J(i), v(J(i))) to obtain
u(i) ≤ φ(i, jn , v(jn )), and the equilibrium incentive constraints then imply
u(i) = φ(i, jn , v(jn ))
for all n. The continuity of φ and v, established in Lemma 2, along with jn % i, then ensures
lim φ(i, jn , v(jn )) = φ(i, i, v(i)) = u(i).

n→∞

The second of these equalities contradicts (94), finishing the proof.

G.3

Mismatch Example

In the following example utility is perfectly transferable and preferences are separable. All
ex post equilibria are fully matched. Assumptions 1–3 hold and the frontiers φ and ψ satisfy
single crossing. Lemma 4 thus ensures that all ex ante equilibria are payoff equivalent
to positive assortative allocations. Nevertheless, there exists an ex post equilibria that is
negative assortative and not payoff equivalent to a positive assortative allocation. This shows
that the requirement in Proposition 7 that single crossing not only holds for B and S but for
all closed subsets of these cannot be simply discarded.
A related example is given in Dizdar (2012, Section 5.3). Dizdar exploits multidimensional
investments in a setting similar to that examined by Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (2001b)
to construct value functions that have different single crossing properties when restricted to
different subsets of investments. As in our example, this opens the possibility for ex post
equilibria featuring matchings distinct from the ones that obtain in all ex ante equilibria.
Example 13. Let N = {0, 1}, B = {β1 , β2 }, S = {σ, σ} and B = S = {L, H1 , H2 }. Buyer
types are given by β(0) = β1 < β2 = β(1). Seller types are given by σ(0) = σ < σ = σ(1).
Utility is perfectly transferable and preferences are additively separable (cf. (14)–(15)). The
cost functions f and g are given by
σ
σ
β1
β2

L
0
0
0
0

H1
12
1
1
12

H2
12
1 .
12
1

The surplus function is z(b, s) is symmetric and given by
L
H1
H2

L
1
1
1

H1
1
8
4

H2
1
.
4
10

As the notation suggests, we think of L as a low investment and H1 and H2 as alternative
types of high investments, with H1 being more productive. Seller 0 with type σ has L as a
dominant strategy in the full appropriation game, while there are circumstances under which
seller 1 with type σ will find it advantageous to choose H1 or H2 . The buyer with type βi
has a cost advantage in choosing investments Hi .
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We assume that autarchy investments are L and outside options are zero, ensuring that
all ex post equilibria are fully matched (cf. Proposition 6).
It is clear that the above specification satisfies Assumptions 1–3. The maximal value
W (i, j) that can be obtained in a match between a buyer with type i and a seller with type
j is given by
W (1, 1) = 8, W (0, 1) = 6, W (1, 0) = W (0, 0) = 1,
which is a strictly supermodular function, implying that φ and ψ satisfy the strict single
crossing property. Consequently, Lemma 4 implies that every pairwise efficient allocation is
positive assortative. Indeed, it is easy to check that in any such allocation buyer 0 (with type
β1 ) matches with seller 0 (with type σ), choosing investments (L, L) and sharing a value of
1, while buyer 1 (with type β2 ) matches with seller 1 (with type σ), choosing investments
(H2 , H2 ) and sharing a value of 8.
However, there is also a negative assortative ex post equilibrium in which buyer 1 matches
with seller 0, choosing investments (L, L) and sharing a value of 1 equally, while buyer 0
matches with seller 1, choosing investments (H1 , H1 ) and sharing a value of 6 equally. To
see that such an allocation is an ex post equilibrium it suffices to note that the investment
choices are equilibria in the relevant full appropriation games and that the only potentially
profitable deviation involves matching buyer 1 with seller 1 for a value of 8. Alas, to achieve
this value both buyer 1 and seller 1 would have to change their investments. We can relate
the existence of this equilibrium to a failure of single crossing by considering the maximal
values W̆ (i, j) that can be realized in the various matches given the sets B = {L, H1 } and
S = {L, H1 } of investments that are in the market. These values are
W̆ (1, 1) = 1, W̆ (0, 1) = 6, W̆ (1, 0) = W̆ (0, 0) = 1,
which is strictly submodular rather than supermodular, as would be required for the frontiers
φB,S and ψS,B to satisfy single crossing.

H

Appendix for Section 4.3.2

We begin by stating the counterpart to Lemma G.1 for the functions ρ and σ and then turn
to the proofs of Corollaries 5 and 6.

H.1

Cross Matched Investments

Let Assumption 1 hold and let preferences be separable. Then the functions ρ and σ appearing
in (82)–(83) satisfy the counterparts to the properties established for φ and ψ in Lemma 1.
We define a cross match in investments in analogy to the cross matches introduced in
Appendix G.1, namely as a pair of investment choices (b, s) and (b, s) with b < b and s < s
such that there exists f , f , g, g ∈ R satisfying
f = ρ(b, s, g) ≥ ρ(b, s, g)

(95)

f = ρ(b, s, g) ≥ ρ(b, s, g).

(96)

As in Appendix G.1 we say that a cross match in investments can be uncrossed if the
inequalities in (95)–(96) can only hold as equalities and observe that a cross match in
investments cannot be uncrossed if and only if it is strict, that is, there exists f , f , g, and f
77

such that both inequalities in (95)–(96) hold strictly. As the proof of Lemma 5 relied solely
on Lemma 1 the following is then immediate:
Lemma 6. Let Assumption 1 hold and let preferences be separable. Then preferences satisfy
inner single crossing if and only if every cross match in investments can be uncrossed.

H.2

Proof of Corollary 5

We fix a pair of nonempty closed sets B̃ ⊂ B and S̃ ⊂ S and, to simplify notation, let
φ = φB̃,S̃ and ψ = ψB̃,S̃ . From Lemma 5 in Appendix G.1 it suffices to show that for these
utility frontiers every cross match can be uncrossed or, equivalently, that the existence of a
strict cross match leads to a contradiction.
Suppose that the pairs (i, j) and (i, j) with i < i and j < j are a strict cross match. That
is, there exists u, u, v, v ∈ R such that
u = φ(i, j, v) > φ(i, j, v)

(97)

u = φ(i, j, v) > φ(i, j, v).

(98)

Let β = β(i), β = β(i), σ = σ(j), and σ = σ(j). From Assumption 4.2, we have β < β and
σ < σ. Consider any pair of exchanges (b, s, t1 ) and (b, s, t2 ) such that
u = Û (fˆ(b, s, t1 ), b, β),

u = Û (fˆ(b, s, t2 ), b, β)

v = V̂ (ĝ(s, b, t2 ), s, σ),

v = V̂ (ĝ(s, b, t1 ), s, σ)

hold (the existence of such exchanges is assured by the definition of φ). Let f = fˆ(b, s, t1 ),
f = fˆ(b, s, t2 ), g = ĝ(s, b, t2 ), and g = ĝ(s, b, t1 ). By definition of ρ, we have
f = ρ(b, s, g) and f = ρ(b, s, g).
Using separability of the sellers’ preferences we have the inequalities
φ(i, j, v) ≥ Û (ρ(b, s, g), b, β)

(99)

φ(i, j, v) ≥ Û (ρ(b, s, g), b, β)

(100)

φ(i, j, v) ≥ Û (ρ(b, s, g), b, β)

(101)

φ(i, j, v) ≥ Û (ρ(b, s, g), b, β).

(102)

Combining the strict inequalities in (97)–(98) with (99)–(100) we obtain
Û (f , b, β) > Û (f , b, β)
Û (f , b, β) > Û (f , b, β),
so that the outer single crossing property (80) implies b ≤ b. Because Û is strictly increasing in
its first argument, b = b is inconsistent with the above two inequalities holding simultaneously.
We thus have b < b. We can repeat this argument using the equivalent restatement of (97)–
(98) for ψ and the outer single crossing condition (81) for the seller to obtain the inequality
s < s.
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Combining the strict inequalities in (97)–(98) with (101)–(102) we obtain
Û (ρ(b, s, g), b, β) > Û (ρ(b, s, g), b, β)
Û (ρ(b, s, g), b, β) > Û (ρ(b, s, g), b, β).
Because Û is strictly increasing in its first argument this implies
ρ(b, s, g) > ρ(b, s, g)
ρ(b, s, g) > ρ(b, s, g).
Hence, (s, b) and (b, s) are a strict cross match in investments. From Lemma 6 this contradicts
the inner single crossing condition (82).

H.3

Proof of Corollary 6

It suffices to show that the inner single crossing condition (83) holds. As single crossing is
an ordinal property and F and G are strictly increasing, we may assume that F and G are
the identity functions. We then have
σ(s, b, x) = g(s, b) + h(f (b, s) − x).
Let s < s, b < b, and x1 , x2 ∈ R satisfy
g(s, b) + h(f (b, s) − x1 ) = g(s, b) + h(f (b, s) − x2 ).

(103)

We show that this implies
g(s, b) + h(f (b, s) − x1 ) ≥ g(s, b) + h(f (b, s) − x2 ),

(104)

which (because of continuity and monotonicity in x) suffices for σ as given above to satisfy
the inner single crossing condition (83).
From (103) we have
g(s, b) − g(s, b) = h(f (b, s) − x2 ) − h(f (b, s) − x1 ) ≥ 0,
where the inequality holds because g is increasing in b. As h is increasing this implies
f (b, s) − x2 ≥ f (b, s) − x1 .
Because f is supermodular, we have




[f (b, s) − x2 ] − f (b, s) − x1 ≥ [f (b, s) − x2 ] − f (b, s) − x1
and because f is increasing in s we have
f (b, s) − x1 ≥ f (b, s) − x1
f (b, s) − x2 ≥ f (b, s) − x2 .
From the concavity of h these inequalities imply
h(f (b, s) − x2 ) − h(f (b, s) − x1 ) ≥ h(f (b, s) − x2 ) − h(f (b, s) − x1 )
Using supermodularity of g and (105) this suffices to give (104), finishing the proof.
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(105)

I

Proof of Proposition 10 (Section 5.3)

In the absence of effective transfers, the strict Pareto property fails and Lemma 2 does not
hold. Thus, we cannot apply Lemmas 5 and 6 or the arguments from the end of the proof of
Lemma 4 to infer monotonicity properties of the equilibrium, and instead we offer a direct
proof.
Let (J, I, b, s, u, v) be a fully matched ex post equilibrium. We first show that b and s
are increasing.
Consider b and suppose it is not increasing (the argument for s is analogous). Then
there exist buyers i < i with types β = β(i) and β = β(i) choosing investments b = b(i) and
b = b(i) such that β < β and b > b holds (where the first of these two inequalities is from
Assumption 6.2). Let s = s(J(i)) and s = s(J(i)). We must have
Û (fˆ(b, s), b, β) ≥ Û (fˆ(b, s)), b, β),
because otherwise i would prefer to match with J(i) with investments (b, s) and, by separability this option is available to i. Applying strict single crossing of Û to the previous
inequality implies
Û (fˆ(b, s), b, β) > Û (fˆ(b, s)), b, β).
Using separability, this contradicts the hypothesis that b is the equilibrium investment of i.
Hence b and s are increasing.31
If (J, I, b, s, u, v) has no equilibrium cross match, then J is increasing and (J, I, b, s, u, v)
is positive assortative (cf. the first paragraph of Appendix G.2).
Let (i, j) and (i, j) with i < i and j < j be an equilibrium cross match. Let β < β and
σ < σ denote the types of the agents in such a cross match, where the strict inequalities are
from Assumption 6.2. Similarly, let b, b, s, s denote their investments. We show
b = b and s = s

(106)

u(i) = φ̆(i, j, s(j), v(j)) = φ̆(i, j, s(j), v(j))

(107)

v(j) = ψ̆(j, i, b(i), u(i)) = ψ̆(j, i, b(i), u(i))

(108)

which, from separability, implies

for i ∈ {i, i} and j ∈ {j, j}.
Because b and s are increasing, we have b ≥ b and s ≥ s. Assuming that one of these
inequalities holds as an equality but that the other one is strict, results in an immediate
contradiction because in that case (using Assumption 6.3 and separability) the two agents
choosing the same investment would both strictly prefer to match with the higher of the two
agents on the other side of the market. It thus remains to exclude the possibility that b > b
and s > s hold. If this were the case, separability and Assumption 6.3 imply that agents i
and j would both strictly prefer to match with each other rather than with their assigned
partner. Hence, (106)–(108) hold in all cross matches.
31 Notice that we need the strict single crossing of Û for this, since otherwise we could have a range of
values of β that are indifferent over a range of values of b, and hence could not so readily conclude that b
and s are increasing.
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As in the proof of Lemma 4 in Appendix G.2, conditions (107)-(108) imply that any
equilibrium cross match can be uncrossed by matching the pair (i, j) and the pair (i, j)
without changing their investments or utility levels, resulting in an ex post equilibrium
payoff equivalent to (J, I, b, s, u, v). When N is finite, an induction argument, again as in
Appendix G.2, then shows that every fully matched ex post equilibrium is payoff equivalent
to a positive assortative ex post equilibrium.
By Assumption 3, it remains to consider the case in which N is an interval. If
u(i) = φ̆(i, i, s(i), v(i))
v(j) = ψ̆(j, j, b(j), u(j))
holds for all i, j ∈ N , then it is clear that changing J and I to the identity functions, while
leaving b, s, u, and v unchanged, results in an ex post equilibrium payoff equivalent to
(J, I, b, s, u, v). Suppose then that there exists i∗ ∈ N such that
u(i∗ ) > φ̆(i∗ , i∗ , s(i∗ ), v(i∗ ))

(109)

holds (with the case in which the corresponding inequality for some j ∗ ∈ N holds being
analogous). We show that this results in a contradiction.
Inequality (109) implies J(i∗ ) 6= i∗ and, thus, I(i∗ ) 6= i∗ . We assume J(i∗ ) < i∗ with
the case J(i∗ ) > i∗ being analogous. We then have J(i∗ ) < i∗ < I(i∗ ): otherwise the pairs
(I(i∗ ), i∗ ) and (i∗ , J(i∗ )) form a cross match, with (109) then contradicting (107).
Throughout the following, let b∗ = b(i∗ ), s∗ = s(J(i∗ )), b̃ = b(I(i∗ )) and s̃ = s(i∗ ).
Because b and s are increasing, we must have b̃ > b∗ and s̃ > s∗ as the equalities b̃ = b∗ and
s̃ = s̃∗ , which must hold otherwise, imply a violation of (109).
Suppose there exists i0 < i∗ such that J(i0 ) > i∗ . We then have a cross-match with
i = i0 i = i∗ , j = J(i∗ ) and j = J(i0 )). From (106) this implies s(J(i0 )) = s∗ . Because s
is increasing, this implies s(i∗ ) = s∗ , a contradiction. We thus have that J(i0 ) < i∗ holds
for all buyers i0 < i∗ . Because the equilibrium matching is measure preserving, it follows
that I(j) < i∗ holds for almost all sellers j < i∗ . We can thus choose a sequence {jn }∞
n=1
of sellers with jn > J(i∗ ) and jn % i∗ , with in = I(jn ) < i∗ for all n. Observe that all
the matchings (in , jn ) generate a cross-match with the matching (i∗ , J(i∗ )). From (106)
this implies s(j) = s∗ for all j ∈ [J(i), i∗ ). Using continuity of V̂ and ĝ and separability of
preferences, it follows that
V̂ (g(s̃, b̃), s̃, σ(i∗ )) = V̂ (g(s∗ , b∗ ), s∗ , σ(i∗ ))

(110)

holds.
By an analogous argument we can construct a sequence of cross matches, involving buyers
in & i∗ matched with sellers jn > j, leading to the conclusion that
Û (f (b∗ , s∗ ), b∗ , β(i∗ )) = Û (f (b̃, s̃), b̃, β(i∗ ))

(111)

holds.
Because u(i∗ ) = Û (f (b∗ , s∗ ), b∗ , β(i∗ )) and v(i∗ ) = V̂ (g(s̃, b̃), s̃, σ(i∗ )) and s̃ = s(i∗ ) hold,
the equalities in (110)–(111) then imply
u(i∗ ) ≤ φ̆(i∗ , i∗ , (i∗ ), v(i∗ )),
contradicting (109) and thus finishing the proof.
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